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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis argues that Beckett’s corpus is concerned with the fragile possibility of 
freedom as articulated by Adorno. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, this concern begins 
with an overt thematisation of freedom in Murphy and Eleutheria that ultimately leads 
to an impasse. In line with Adorno’s claim that ‘[f]reedom can be defined in negation 
only’, Chapters 2 to 5 proceed to illuminate the deeply negative expressions of 
freedom that pervade Beckett’s post-war corpus. 
Chapter 2 explores the question of aesthetic freedom⎯a key preoccupation of 
Adorno’s⎯in relation to Beckett’s Novellas: if art is wholly determined by its socio-
political context then it makes no sense to talk about freedom in relation to Beckett’s 
work. This chapter considers the paradox whereby art simultaneously embodies the 
illusion of freedom and the freedom of illusion. Chapter 3 traces the connection 
between freedom and evil in The Lost Ones and Endgame, analysing the systematic 
network of social unfreedom revealed in the cylindrical world of the former, and 
through the oppressive weight of history in the latter. 
Recognizing the significance of the philosopher’s critique of the Culture 
Industry, Chapter 4 takes some of Adorno’s more nuanced texts as the basis for an 
exploration of Beckett’s late media plays. It argues that the aesthetic incorporation of 
technology heralds liberatory possibilities in its radical reimagining of the role of 
technology as a mediator between subject and world. Finally, Chapter 5 considers the 
significance of Adorno’s reconceptualisation of metaphysics in Beckett’s late short 
prose, arguing that, while All Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine manifest 
the horror of absolute immanence, Company registers the transcending impulse of 
thought to free itself from the existing world. So, in Beckett’s resolutely negative art 
as a whole, a provisional and ephemeral possibility of freedom is kept alive by his 
abstaining from any affirmation of the existent. 
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York: Grove Press, 1996) 
⎯ Company, pp. 1–46 
⎯ Ill Seen Ill Said, pp. 47–86 
⎯ Worstward Ho, pp. 87–116 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Can it be we are not free? It might be worth looking into.  
⎯ Molloy, p. 32 
This thesis takes as its basis Theodor W. Adorno’s provocative claim that ‘[f]reedom 
can be defined in negation only’ (ND, p. 321), and argues that Beckett’s writing shifts 
from an overt and thematic exploration of freedom to what Adorno describes as a 
‘determinate negation’ of various ‘concrete expression[s] of unfreedom’ (HF, p. 243). 
I will expand upon Adorno’s philosophy later in this Introduction; for now, let it 
suffice to clarify the term ‘determinate negation’, a concept that derives from Hegel, 
but takes on a different significance in Adorno. Hegel’s conception of determinate 
negation is based on the idea that, contra Scepticism, the ‘refutation of a theory leads 
not to nothingness, but to another theory that could not exist without the one that it 
refutes’.1 Negation as critique leads to positivity in that what is negated is superseded 
rather than abstractly rejected. Adorno’s concerns about this ‘transfiguration of 
negativity as redemption’ (DE, p. 18) lead him to adapt the term for his own purposes. 
For Adorno, no affirmation follows from determinate negation: rather, the process 
aims to divulge the truth by revealing the contradictions in play without attempting to 
resolve them. A determinate negation of unfreedom, then, does not place its 
opposite⎯freedom⎯in the palms of our hands as in a historical dialectic of progress: 
rather, it reveals the untruth of the existing and allows us to ‘get in touch negatively 
with its truth’.2 This negative access to truth⎯the possibility of freedom⎯is always 
provisional, fragile and fleeting. For Adorno, determinate negation prevents us from 
jeopardising that which we are attempting to salvage by prematurely converting it into 
a positivity. Paradoxically, we can learn more about freedom from Beckett’s deeply 
negative expressions of unfreedom than from the portrayal of an idealized utopia that 
would be blind to its dependence on the given world.  
                                                
1 Andrew Bowie, Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 190. 
2 Berlin, Walter Benjamin Archiv, Akademie der Künste, MS 440, ‘Ästhetik’ (1961), p. 127. Quoted in 
Bowie, p. 161 (author’s translation). 
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Freedom in Beckett is at once a philosophical problem and a fragile, 
ultimately unrealizable possibility. Fundamentally, it is a condition that is never 
actualised as such⎯not even in the early works Murphy and Eleutheria, the only two 
of Beckett’s texts to manifest an overt and sustained engagement with the concept. 
Nonetheless, I argue that the interest in freedom Beckett so patently if provisionally 
evinces in the thematics of Murphy and Eleutheria endures in his later texts in far 
more intricate and nuanced ways. While a reader of mid- to late-Beckett might be 
excused for doubting the significance of freedom in a corpus seemingly so 
preoccupied with suffering, confinement and impotence, I read in these texts an 
intractable impulse to preserve and, where this is no longer possible, generate a 
minimal space of freedom that acts in direct opposition to an abjectly unfree social 
totality. 
In this, I am sustaining a tradition within Beckett studies that, by means of 
disparate historical and/or philosophical routes, positions the writer as political and 
radical.3 Such a tradition is threatened by a trend of unsettlingly conservative thought 
often affiliated with archive-inspired materialism and also a related revival of 
humanism in Beckett studies. At the heart of this former, political tradition lies 
Adorno, whose seminal 1961 essay, ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’, revolutionised 
the then predominant existential-humanist reception of Beckett by insisting on the 
play’s distinct and complex relation to its socio-political context. Beyond this, 
moreover, Beckett’s work became for Adorno the paradigmatic example of post-
Holocaust art, testifying to its acute historical moment in the only way that would not 
betray it: negatively. For Adorno, while art is indisputably tethered to the world⎯not 
least in its status as a commodity⎯it also, through its purposelessness, opposes it and 
thus, as I discuss in Chapter 2, transcends it in a small but significant way. This is a 
                                                
3 Paradigmatic of this tradition are Alain Badiou and Andrew Gibson, the major exponent and 
interpreter of Badiou’s conception of Beckett in the English-speaking world. See, for example, 
Alain Badiou, On Beckett, ed. by Nina Power and Alberto Toscano (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 
2003); Andrew Gibson, Beckett and Badiou: The Pathos of Intermittency (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). Other figures of note include James McNaughton, Tyrus Miller 
and Seán Kennedy. For representative parts of their work, see, respectively, McNaughton, 
‘Beckett, German Fascism, and History: The Futility of Protest’, Samuel Beckett Today / 
Aujourd’hui, 15 (2005), 101–116; Miller, ‘Dismantling Authenticity: Beckett, Adorno, and the 
“Postwar”’, Textual Practice, 8 (1994), 43–57; and Kennedy, ‘Introduction: Ireland/Europe… 
Beckett/Beckett’, in Beckett and Ireland, ed. by Seán Kennedy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 1–22. Laura Salisbury’s work can also at times be aligned with these 
thinkers. See, for example, Samuel Beckett: Laughing Matters, Comic Timing (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 
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key point of contention in the recent work of Steven Connor, whose uncritical 
materialist stance in Beckett, Modernism and the Material Imagination is set firmly 
against what he sees as a current ‘lexicon of the illimitable’ in Beckett studies.4 He 
argues instead for ‘Beckett’s radical finitude’,5 so called because its 
acknowledgement of the ‘inescapability of limit or restriction’ supposedly ‘imposes a 
limit on radicalism itself’⎯that is, the kind of radicalism embodied in Alain Badiou, 
Connor’s primary antagonist.6 Although Connor mentions Adorno only once in his 
book and in a different context,7 it seems likely that he would include the philosopher 
as a proponent of the ‘aesthetics of the inexhaustible’ that is supposedly exemplified 
by Badiou.8 Connor’s position exemplifies the more conservative direction of a 
certain kind of scholarship that severs, with zeal, the connection between the finite 
and the infinite, the physical and the metaphysical, the immanent and the 
transcendent⎯a problem that will be addressed in Chapter 5.  
A similar issue is at stake in Matthew Feldman’s attribution of an ‘agnostic 
quietism’ to Beckett and his work.9 The term derives from a long and dense letter to 
Thomas MacGreevy in 1935 in which Beckett considers the implications of Thomas á 
Kempis’ Imitation of Christ for his own aesthetic and ethical development. My 
primary reservation about Feldman’s supposedly ‘biographically apposite’ attribution 
of an ‘agnostic quietism’ to Beckett’s work lies in its oscillation between, on the one 
hand, his focus on Beckett’s ‘[e]arly development’ and, on the other, his extrapolation 
of what he takes to be Beckett’s early thought to his writings as a whole.10 While it is 
perfectly conceivable that, in 1935, Beckett was grappling with the merits and 
                                                
4 Beckett, Modernism and the Material Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
p. 148. I find Connor’s particular brand of materialism more problematic than the empiricism of 
such archivists as Mark Nixon and Dirk van Hulle⎯whose work is in many ways hugely 
valuable⎯fundamentally because his work raises more serious ideological problems. 
5 Ibid., p. 7. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid., p. 163. 
8 Ibid., p. 197. For an critical comparison between Adorno and Badiou as regards their interest in 
Beckett, see Jean-Michel Rabaté, ‘Philosophizing with Beckett: Adorno and Badiou’, in A 
Companion to Samuel Beckett, ed. by S. E. Gontarski (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 97–
117.  
9 ‘“Agnostic Quietism” and Samuel Beckett’s Early Development’, in Samuel Beckett: History, 
Memory, Archive, ed. by Séan Kennedy and Katherine Weiss (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), pp. 183–200 (p. 184). 
10 Ibid., p. 187. 
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demerits of Kempis’ ‘quietism of the sparrow alone upon the housetop’11 in a way 
that would have an impact on his early work, one look at such work⎯Murphy, for 
instance, as I will discuss in Chapter 1⎯reveals Beckett’s insight into the inherently 
problematic nature of such ‘isolationism’.12 Beyond this, Beckett’s first-hand 
experience of pre-war Nazi Germany, his wartime years in occupied France and his 
political allegiances from this time onwards, however particular,13 suggest a wealth of 
experience that would significantly complicate the position Feldman attributes to him. 
Finally, it is my contention that the texts themselves⎯particularly those written after 
the war⎯resist Feldman’s suggestion that ‘quietism provides an ethical and, for 
Beckett, aesthetic approach to suffering and failure as a spiritual purgation for 
living’.14 Adorno famously faced, and continues to face, similar (though differently 
motivated) charges of quietism,15 which he addresses in his late essay, ‘Resignation’. 
Here he makes a crucial distinction between quietism and thought’s ‘insatiable 
quality, the resistance against petty satiety’ (CI, p. 174). It is through this minimal and 
barely conspicuous gap between giving up and resistance that we are able to 
understand the freedom of Beckett’s work. 
As direct references to freedom in Beckett are scarce after Murphy and 
Eleutheria, an unusually explicit allusion in Molloy bears some scrutiny: 
It was she put him in the hole, though I was the gentleman. For I cannot stoop, 
neither can I kneel, because of my infirmity, and if I ever stoop, forgetting 
who I am, or kneel, make no mistake, it will not be me, but another. To throw 
him in the hole was all I could have done, and I would have done it gladly. 
And yet I did not do it. All the things you would do gladly, oh without 
enthusiasm, but gladly, all the things there seems no reason for your not doing, 
                                                
11 Samuel Beckett, The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929–1940, ed. by Martha Dow Fehsenfeld and Lois 
More Overbeck, 4 vols (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), I, p. 257 
(10 March 1935).   
12 Ibid. 
13 For more detail, see Andrew Gibson, Samuel Beckett (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), pp. 140–1; 
and also his ‘Beckett, Vichy, Maurras and the Body: Premier amour and Nouvelles’, Irish 
University Review [forthcoming]. 
14 Feldman, p. 184. 
15 In 1969, after deteriorating relations between Adorno and the Student Movement, the Institute for 
Social Research was occupied by the SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund), at which 
provocation Adorno called the police. For more details, see Philip Bounds, ‘Just Say No: Herbert 
Marcuse and the Politics of Negationism, in Revisiting the Frankfurt School: Essays on Culture, 
Media and Theory, ed. by David Berry (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 49–70. Espen Hammer has 
been instrumental in refuting the dominant image of ‘Adorno as an unpolitical aesthete’ that ‘has 
haunted his legacy since the 1960s’. Adorno and the Political (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 25. 
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and that you do not do! Can it be we are not free? It might be worth looking 
into. 
(Molloy, p. 34) 
Three freedom-related preoccupations are intertwined in this short and admittedly 
comic passage. First, Molloy’s ‘infirmity’, preventing him from stooping or kneeling, 
is representative of a shift towards physical unfreedom in Beckett’s texts. The bodily 
abnormalities of the early fiction grow and become more extravagant in Hamm’s state 
of debilitation and the bizarre movement of the narrator of The Expelled. Such bodies 
manifest an overt form of unfreedom in their subordination of the mental sphere to the 
whims of flailing or otherwise dysfunctional limbs. However, the disruption they 
cause to dominant and socially acceptable modes of being is curiously subversive and, 
paradoxically, freeing, as the encounters with authority in Molloy and The Expelled 
indicate.16 They are, moreover, gradually displaced by the increasing preponderance 
of those closed spaces that have a decidedly subordinate role in the earlier fiction, 
from Murphy’s garret to the sealed jar that contains the Unnamable. In Happy Days, 
Winnie is first ‘[e]mbedded up to above her waist’ (Happy Days, p. 138) and then 
later ‘up to neck’ (p. 160), unable to turn her head in any direction. In Play, the three 
unnamed characters are enclosed within urns. All Strange Away, Imagination Dead 
Imagine and Ping offer variations on the theme of an enclosed space, neutralising the 
singularity of the figures within, while The Lost Ones expands the ‘rotunda’ 
(Imagination Dead Imagine, p. 182) into a regulative cylinder that is inhabited by an 
entire social community.   
 Second, Molloy muses on the philosophical problem of the will: ‘I would have 
done it gladly. And yet I did not do it’. The predominance of first person pronouns in 
this passage⎯and, indeed, in the Trilogy more widely⎯mimics the typical 
philosophical assumption that the individual is the bearer of a free will. Molloy’s 
                                                
16 Molloy is accused of violating ‘I don’t know what, public order, public decency’ with his ‘attitude 
when at rest, astride [his] bicycle’ (Molloy, p. 17), while the narrator of The Expelled, 
conspicuous by his ‘gait’⎯‘Stiffness of the lower limbs, as if nature had denied me knees, 
extraordinary splaying of the feet to right and left of the line of march. The trunk, on the contrary, 
as if by the effect of a compensatory mechanism, was as flabby as an old ragbag, tossing wildly 
to the unpredictable jolts of the pelvis’ (The Expelled, p. 50)⎯is likewise stopped by a 
policeman, who ‘pointed out to me that the sidewalk was for every one, as if it was quite obvious 
that I could not be assimilated to that category’ (p. 51). In a letter written in Hanover in 1936, 
Beckett registers his own personal experience of subversive physicality: ‘Je viens de subir une 
petite amende (1RM) pour m’être promené d’une façon dangereuse [I have just had a small fine 
(1RM) imposed on me for walking in a dangerous fashion]’. The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929–
1940, pp. 394–5 (5 December 1936). 
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confusion at his own inability to throw the dog into the hole, despite his best 
intentions, points to a fundamental problem in conceiving freedom as an attribute of 
the individual, in abstraction from his social and historical context. The Unnamable 
confirms this by speculating that his master⎯the paradox here is self-evident⎯is 
perhaps ‘not solitary like me, not free like me, but associated with others’ (The 
Unnamable, p. 287). This instance of what has been, since Isaiah Berlin’s 1958 
lecture, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, defined as ‘negative liberty’,17 or freedom from 
oppression, is structurally dependent on the Unnamable’s solitary and incapable state 
and is thereby exposed as vacuous and valueless. From the assertion in Murphy that 
all the characters, saving the protagonist, are ‘puppets’ (Murphy, p. 78), to the 
automatism of Quad and What Where, in which all spontaneous behaviour seems to 
have been eradicated, Beckett manifests an awareness of the contradiction between 
the supposed free will embodied in rational individuals and their empirical 
unfreedom.  
 Finally, Molloy articulates a possible solution to his ponderings⎯‘Can it be 
we are not free?’⎯before ingenuously suggesting: ‘It might be worth looking into’. 
The irony that philosophers and theologians have been (one might say, fairly 
inconclusively) ‘looking into’ the problem of free will for thousands of years would 
not be lost on Beckett. However, this is far more than a philosophical soundbite or an 
amusing jibe at the futility of an endless abstract problem, because it is not long until 
Molloy finds himself empirically unfree. His description of his brief and not 
unpleasant imprisonment utilises language pertaining to a far more troubling 
situation: 
I went to the door. Locked. To the window. Barred. […] They had shaved me, 
they had shorn me of my scant beard. […] I must have fallen asleep, for all of 
a sudden there was the moon, a huge moon framed in the window. Two bars 
divided it in three segments. 
(Molloy, pp. 36–7) 
Taken out of context, this passage could easily be seen as referring to the plight of a 
prisoner, political or otherwise. The vaguely menacing and non-attributable ‘They’ 
submit Molloy to a potentially dehumanising process of shaving and confine him to a 
                                                
17 ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Liberty, ed. by Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
pp. 166–217 (p. 177). 
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locked and barred room. The fact that the real situation is rather different does not 
detract from the unease generated by this physical imprisonment and the language 
used to describe it. Molloy’s supposedly abstract and inconsequential musings on the 
question of freedom take on a more significant bearing in the light of this apposite 
reminder of the empirical reality of unfreedom. 
 I begin, then, by elucidating Adorno’s understanding of the concept of 
freedom. His characteristically unsystematic approach renders it impossible to isolate 
a formal theory of freedom⎯which, in any case, would be wholly incongruous with 
Beckett’s subtlety. Adorno’s work may seem to flit arbitrarily from one thought to 
another, but in fact proceeds according to the immanent contradictions of the matter at 
hand: in this case, freedom. Moreover, Adorno heavily relies on his extensive 
knowledge of Kant, a knowledge that he assumes his reader shares, and is, therefore, 
not always fully expounded. I will attempt to rectify this omission in this Introduction 
and more broadly throughout the thesis by elaborating on those elements of Kant’s 
philosophy that provide material for Adorno’s critique. Such an explication is all the 
more compelling given Beckett’s own documented interest in Kant and his works,18 
an interest that has received scant critical attention. Very little has changed since P. J. 
Murphy’s 1994 claim that ‘Kant’s influence on Beckett has been almost totally 
underestimated’19⎯an influence that Murphy argues is ‘vision-shaping’.20 It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to fill this prodigious gap, but Kant can be seen as a 
provocative intermediary between Beckett and Adorno, with their disparate 
intellectual backgrounds. One such preoccupation in which this comes to the fore is 
the Kantian insistence of the limits of knowledge⎯what I will call, following 
Adorno, the ‘Kantian block’ (KCPR, p. 75). Murphy suggests that while Beckett is 
struck by Kant’s recognition that ‘the direct relation between the self and⎯as the 
                                                
18 In January 1938, Beckett ordered and received ‘[t]he entire works of Kant’ and in May that year 
comments in a letter to Arland Ussher that ‘I read nothing and write nothing, unless it is Kant (de 
nobis ipsis silemus) and French anacreontics’, an activity that is reaffirmed in September, when 
he ruefully claims: ‘I read an average of an hour a day, after an hour the illusion of 
comprehension ceases, Kant, Descartes, Johnson, Renard and a kindergarten manual of science’. 
The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929–1940, p. 581 (5 January 1938); p. 622 (12 May 1938); p. 643 
(27 September 1938). Beckett additionally took extensive notes on Kant in his ‘Philosophy 
Notes’, based on Wilhelm Windelband’s A History of Philosophy. For more details, see P. J. 
Murphy, ‘Beckett’s Critique of Kant’, in Beckett / Philosophy, ed. by Matthew Feldman and 
Karim Mamdani (Stuttgart: ibidem, 2015), pp. 261–78 (pp. 261–4). 
19 Quoted in ‘Beckett and the Philosophers’, in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. by John 
Pilling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 222–40 (p. 229). 
20 ‘Beckett’s Critique of Kant’, p. 262. 
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Italians say⎯lo scibile, the knowable, was already broken’,21 he is unable to accept 
unreservedly ‘the limitations of the Kantian approach: ‘to create new worlds through 
“pure forces of the imagination” dialogically engages Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason’.22 While Murphy argues that ‘this is nowhere more decisively the case than 
in Beckett’s “war novel” Watt’,23 and offers a striking account of the Kantian 
moments in the novel,24 I am more interested in Beckett’s late prose, in which, as I 
discuss in Chapter 5, the Kantian block is visualised and ultimately defied in a way 
that reflects Adorno’s own ambivalence towards it.  
After establishing the significance of Kant to Adorno’s thought on freedom, I 
will offer a critical account of the literature relating Adorno and Beckett as it is 
relevant to this thesis. The abundance of this criticism points to an acute critical 
awareness of the significance of Adorno’s philosophy for a reading of Beckett (and, 
indeed, vice versa). However, no previous book-length study has attempted an 
extensive reading of the interplay between the two corpuses as wholes. This 
justification of my thesis leads into a rationale of its scope and a chapter-by-chapter 
summary. 
 
I 
 
Adorno’s most extensive work on the concept of freedom is found in the History and 
Freedom lectures of 1964–1965, which were published posthumously in German in 
2001 and translated into English in 2006. These lectures offer a far simpler but by no 
means less meticulous account of the issues that would only a few years later provide 
the basis of his notoriously elliptical Negative Dialectics, in which appears a 
condensed version of what he terms the Freedom Model. For some time, the 
significance of a concept of freedom to Adorno’s philosophy received limited critical 
attention in the English language. But Colin Hearfield’s 2004 Adorno and the Modern 
                                                
21 Ibid., p. 265. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., p. 265. 
24 Ibid., pp. 266–71. See also ‘Beckett and the Philosophers’, pp. 229–35; and P. J. Murphy, Beckett’s 
Dedalus: Dialogical Engagements with Joyce in Beckett’s Fiction (London: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 122–50. 
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Ethos of Freedom and Martin Shuster’s more recent Autonomy after Auschwitz: 
Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity to a certain extent filled this gap. 
Hearfield’s work perhaps suffers from having been composed prior to the English 
translation of the History and Freedom lectures. The study considers Adorno’s work 
in relation to that of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Habermas. It 
argues that Adorno develops a ‘negative dialectics of freedom’ by negotiating the 
supposedly oppositional modes of a ‘conceptual ratio’ and an ‘existential poiesis’.25 
Only Adorno, Hearfield concludes, is able to successfully mediate both positions. 
Despite the study’s clear contribution to the field, it is hindered by being, as Timo 
Jütten puts it, ‘a project of gigantic aspirations’.26 Its breadth is staggering, which 
unfortunately shifts the focus away from Adorno. While Hearfield is attentive to 
Adorno’s aesthetics, even summarising ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’,27 his 
expansive philosophical context prevents him from engaging with any particular 
instances of the play he discusses, or expanding its scope. This forms the main point 
of departure of this thesis, which proceeds immanently from Beckett’s work itself, 
using Adorno’s twists and turns on the topic of freedom to offer an analysis of the 
complex landscape of negativity in Adorno and Beckett, which puts paid to any 
simplistic account of negativity as simply the opposite of positivity, nothing rather 
than something. 
Shuster positions Adorno’s work and its Idealist predecessors (primarily Kant 
and Hegel) in dialogue with the contemporary Anglo-American analytic tradition. 
Rather than considering freedom in all its breadth, his focus is on autonomy, the 
critique of which he considers to be at the heart of the dialectic of enlightenment. His 
reading of Adorno sees the philosopher offering a radical reformulation of autonomy 
on the basis that ‘I must carve out a space outside my subjectivity, outside myself’.28 
Shuster’s position is one with which I have a lot of sympathy, and this thesis 
continually emphasizes Adorno’s stress on the perils of uninhibited subjectivity. Once 
again, however, my emphasis is on the aesthetic dimensions of Adorno’s thought, 
bringing his philosophical concerns to bear on the nodal point of Beckett’s radical art.  
                                                
25 Colin Hearfield, Adorno and the Modern Ethos of Freedom (Hampshire and Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2004), p. 6. 
26 ‘Logic, Experience and Freedom: Hegel and Adorno’, Hegel Bulletin, 61 (2010), 101–10. 
27 See Hearfield, pp. 163–5 
28 Autonomy After Auschwitz: Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity (London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2014), p. 41. 
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What these studies do articulate is the paramount importance of an idea of 
freedom to Adorno’s wider philosophical concerns. This is primarily the case 
precisely because of his enduring conviction that the modern world as we know it is 
characterised by oppression, false consciousness and the particularity-demolishing 
principle of exchange, and is therefore almost incapable of fostering any kind of 
freedom for its subjects. I say ‘almost’ because, for all his pessimism, Adorno does 
retain a glimmer of hope that a free condition could arise. His philosophy is 
committed to the critique of existing conditions⎯from the apparently insignificant 
minutiae of daily life to the grand systems developed by the German Idealist tradition. 
Such a critique diagnoses the sicknesses of society while attempting to carve out 
space for what Adorno elusively calls ‘something different’ (HF, p. 55). This is by no 
means an evasion of the central problematic of establishing freedom, but rather an 
acknowledgment of something that lies at the heart of Adorno’s conception of 
freedom: that it cannot be envisaged positively. There are a number of reasons behind 
this claim, and these are inextricably intertwined with Adorno’s other philosophical 
and sociological concerns. 
First, Adorno insists on the historical nature of all abstract concepts. The 
predominant perception of such concepts as static and timeless is what repeatedly 
leads to repression: ‘there is no category’, Adorno argues, ‘no valid concept that 
might not be rendered invalid at the moment when it is cut off from the concrete 
context to which it really belongs’ (HF, p. 61). Freedom is no exception: it ‘is itself 
the product of history and has altered with history’ (HF, p. 180). Although the 
concept obviously has a ‘core meaning that remains constant’ (HF, p. 180), its 
historical manifestation constantly changes, to the degree that ‘[w]hole epochs, whole 
societies lacked not only the concept of freedom but the thing’ (ND, p. 218). This 
claim does not lead to relativism⎯the idea that freedom is whatever a given 
individual considers it to be. It relies on Adorno’s theory of negative dialectics, which 
is concerned with the way in which ‘the concept enters into contradiction with the 
thing to which it refers’ (LND, p. 7). The concept is at once less and more than what is 
subsumed under it. It is less because it fails to account for the manifold diversity of its 
referent, instead abstracting one characteristic from it and defining it accordingly. It is 
more, on the other hand, insofar as the concept contains an speculative element that 
  19 
transcends the empirical referent. Freedom is the example Adorno uses to explicate 
this in his 1965 Lectures on Negative Dialectics: 
If, for example, I think and speak of ‘freedom’, this concept is not simply the 
unity of the characteristics of all the individuals who can be defined as free on 
the basis of a formal freedom within a given constitution. Rather, in a situation 
in which people are guaranteed the freedom to exercise a profession or to 
enjoy their basic rights or whatever, the concept of freedom contains a pointer 
to something that goes well beyond those specific freedoms, without our 
necessarily realizing what this additional element amounts to. 
(LND, p. 7) 
There is, then, what Adorno terms a non-identity between the concept and its referent. 
Because the relationship between them is dialectical, each influences the other, 
without, however, resulting in a synthesis (as in Hegelian dialectics). The concept of 
freedom is, accordingly, impacted by changes in the empirical world, without losing 
its core meaning. Empirical instances of freedom, on the other hand, always maintain 
a non-identical element that cannot be integrated into the abstract concept: this is the 
irreducible singularity of the object. As a historical concept, freedom ‘need not 
remain what it was, and what it arose from’ (ND, p. 275). It is therefore impossible to 
pin it down positively and fix it into place: to do so would be to suppress the inherent 
dialectical movement propelled by the ultimate non-identity between concept and 
referent. 
 Second, Adorno emphasises that the nature of social reality makes it 
increasingly difficult to envisage what a free life would consist of. Though he 
continues to use the Marxist term ‘ideology’, Adorno admits that ‘[w]here ideology is 
no longer added to things as a vindication or complement⎯where it turns into the 
seeming inevitability and thus legitimacy of whatever is’ (ND, p. 268)⎯it becomes 
useless as a tool to distinguish between the true and the false. Adorno notably 
diagnoses modern life as ‘damaged’ in the subtitle to Minima Moralia. The greatest 
obstacle to freedom in such a society is the difficulty of securing ‘a standpoint 
removed, even though by a hair’s breadth, from the scope of existence’ (MM, p. 247), 
an endeavour that Adorno characterises paradoxically as ‘the simplest of all things’ 
and ‘the utterly impossible thing’ (MM, p. 247). Such a standpoint is so problematic 
because it presupposes, first, individuals who have the ability to disentangle 
themselves from what Adorno describes as the ‘spell’ (HF, p. 177) of unfreedom⎯a 
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spell that is disseminated at every level of existence⎯and, second, knowledge that is 
not ‘marked […] by the same distortion and indigence which it seeks to escape’ (MM, 
p. 247). Adorno’s writings on freedom demonstrate an acute awareness that modern 
subjects are, to a worrying extent, blind to the structures of unfreedom that govern 
their lives; however, he also acknowledges his own inevitable entanglement in such 
structures. With this in mind, Adorno’s emphasis that ‘[f]reedom can be defined in 
negation only’ (ND, p. 321) becomes all the more significant. An immanent critique 
of ‘the concrete form of a specific unfreedom’ (ND, p. 321) is the only option open to 
us, and even this is fraught with peril. Adorno ends Minima Moralia, however, with 
an uncharacteristic and admittedly oblique glimpse of hope: ‘beside the demand thus 
placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly 
matters’ (MM, p. 247). That is, the desired end of redemption itself is ultimately 
occluded by the significance of the means by which it could be reached: speculative, 
undogmatic thought. This is another crucial manifestation of the minimal yet decisive 
gap between resignation and resistance I discussed above. The very act of 
critique⎯the frustratingly paradoxical attempt to ‘be at every moment both within 
things and outside them’ (MM, p. 74) in a reflection of ‘Munchhausen pulling himself 
out of the bog by his pig-tail’ (MM, p. 74)⎯is in itself an aspect of the very freedom 
it is trying to reach.  
 If our understanding of freedom, then, can only be wrenched from the 
empirical unfreedom of given conditions, then it is no wonder that a large proportion 
of Adorno’s explicit account of the concept is dedicated to an immanent critique of 
Kant, whom Adorno considers to be the archetypal bourgeois philosopher of freedom. 
The following by no means attempts to offer an exhaustive account of Kant’s notion 
of freedom;29 rather, it expands on those elements of Kant’s philosophy that are 
relevant to Adorno’s metacritique. In brief, Adorno’s departure from Kant must be 
understood as the foundation of a new and different kind of thinking about freedom, 
one that takes seriously not only historical atrocities but also the more insidious 
context of unfreedom that is no less pervasive now than it was fifty years ago. 
Kant’s third antinomy attempts to resolve, at least in the realm of possibility, 
the problem of reconciling natural causality and free will. Such an endeavour is far 
                                                
29 For this, see Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990; repr. 1995). 
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from mere theoretical speculation. In the second analogy, Kant established that 
natural causality is ‘the ground of possible experience’ (CPR A201/B246). The stakes 
of the third antinomy are therefore high: if freedom cannot be proved to be 
reconcilable with natural causality, then it must be discarded and, with it, all 
legitimating grounds for morality. Kant begins, then, by offering a thesis that posits 
the necessity of freedom: ‘Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only 
one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived. It is also necessary to 
assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them’ (CPR 
A444/B472). The following proof assumes the contrary position⎯that ‘there is no 
other causality than that in accordance with laws of nature’ (CRP A444/B472)⎯so as 
to test the thesis: if this contrary position leads to rational contradictions then the 
thesis is proved. Kant argues, then, that the concept of natural causality⎯the doctrine 
that ‘everything that happens presupposes a previous state’ (CPR A446/B472)30⎯is 
dependent on an infinite regress, with no original cause. For this reason, Kant 
concludes that ‘the proposition that all causality is possible only in accordance with 
laws of nature, when taken in its unlimited universality, contradicts itself, and 
therefore this causality cannot be assumed to be the only one’ (CPR A446/B474). 
Another causality must be assumed that impedes the infinite regress: this must be ‘an 
absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself a series of appearances that runs 
according to natural laws’ (CPR A446/B474). This causality is transcendental 
freedom⎯‘the cosmological idea of a spontaneous first cause’31⎯and this assertion 
concludes the proof of the thesis. 
Kant’s antithesis posits that ‘There is no freedom, but everything in the world 
happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature’ (CPR A445/B473). Once again, 
the proof attempts to establish a contrary argument, positing the existence of 
transcendental freedom as the prime or unmoved mover. This, Kant argues, 
contradicts the formerly proven law of natural causality in that it ‘presupposes a state 
that has no causal connection at all with the cause of the previous one, i.e., in no way 
follows from it’ (CPR A445/B473). Since the existence of transcendental freedom is 
inherently contradictory within the limits of reason, the antithesis is proved. Kant is 
                                                
30 All emphases are Kant’s own. 
31 Andrews Reath, ‘Kant’s Critical Account of Freedom’, in A Companion to Kant, ed. by Graham Bird 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 275–90 (p. 279). 
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therefore in a position in which both the thesis and the antithesis of this apparently 
irreconcilable antinomy can be proved a contrario. Within the limitations of 
transcendental realism, this situation cannot be resolved⎯and, since natural causality 
is already an established fact by this point in the Critique, the very possibility of 
freedom is under threat:  
Thus the only question is whether, despite this, in regard to the very same 
effect that is determined by nature, freedom might not also take place, or is 
this entirely excluded through that inviolable rule? And here the common but 
deceptive presupposition of the absolute reality of appearance immediately 
shows its disadvantageous influence for confusing reason. For if appearances 
are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved.  
(CPR A536/B564) 
Kant’s resolution of the third antinomy is based on the fundamental distinction 
between appearance and reality⎯or, as Kant also describes it, between phenomenon 
and noumenon, and a subject’s empirical and intelligible character. If these are 
identical, then we are forced to sacrifice freedom, because freedom⎯as the antithesis 
proves⎯simply cannot be posited in an empirical world governed by the law of 
causal determinism. Transcendental idealism neutralises the antinomy by attributing 
freedom to the intelligible character, which ‘does not stand under any conditions of 
sensibility and is not itself appearance’ (CPR A539/B567), and causality to the 
empirical character, which acts in accordance with the laws of nature: ‘Thus freedom 
and nature, each in its full significance, would both be found in the same actions, 
simultaneously and without any contradiction, according to whether one compares 
them with their intelligible or their sensible cause’ (CPR A541/B569). 
Far from following Kant in attempting to defuse the contradiction between 
causality and freedom in the third antinomy, Adorno roots both in their social context. 
He suggests, arrestingly, that ‘the validity of causality disintegrates correlatively to 
the decline of the possibility of freedom’ (ND, p. 268) and that such a decline is 
manifest in modern capitalist society. As society becomes increasingly ‘monolithic’ 
(ND, p. 267), contracting into ‘totality’ (ND, p. 267), it becomes increasingly difficult 
to attribute effects to causes and vice versa. We are in a situation, Adorno argues, ‘in 
which not only the machineries of production, distribution, and domination, but 
economic and social relations and ideologies are inextricably interwoven’ (ND, p. 
267), which renders it impossible to maintain Kant’s simplistic causal chain⎯or, 
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indeed, the Marxist division between base and superstructure. Unfortunately, ‘today’s 
disappearance of causality signals no realm of freedom’ (ND, p. 268): the total society 
that destroys the concept of causality by making it impossible to identify its 
mechanisms is equally as fatal to the possibility of freedom. Kant’s very terms 
presuppose what Adorno describes as the ‘uncomplicated surveyability of small town 
conditions’ (ND, p. 266), an evasion of the complex web that is empirical reality. 
Moreover, for Adorno, the third antinomy is prompted by an actual historical 
contradiction that cannot be neutralised by abstracting freedom from empirical reality 
and confining it to the intelligible sphere. He diagnoses Kant’s contradictory desire 
simultaneously to secure a place for freedom and limit its power as representative of 
bourgeois society, whose ‘attitude towards freedom was antinomian through and 
through’ (HF, p. 195). On the one hand, the rise of the bourgeoisie is synonymous 
with the claim to freedom:  
It meant freedom from the restrictions and dependencies that the feudal system 
had imposed on the bourgeois order, the bourgeois class. In raising the 
question of freedom, the youthful, increasingly self-confident bourgeois class 
felt it essential to ground freedom in the nature of man. 
(HF, p. 194) 
On the other hand, the bourgeoisie, while continuing to posit the absolute value of 
freedom and its status as existing, is disturbed by its subversive potential⎯that very 
quality that enabled the rise of bourgeois society in the first place⎯and carefully 
limits it. For Adorno, Kant’s ‘Thesis represented the interest of the emancipated 
bourgeois class in freedom, while the Antithesis incorporates what has recently been 
expressed accurately, repeatedly and in various places as the fear of freedom’ (HF, p. 
196). Kant’s Third Antinomy, then, is objective for Adorno: that is, it articulates a 
historical contradiction that lies at the heart of the society we have inherited from the 
revolutionary bourgeoisie. Kant succeeds in saving the possibility of freedom, but 
only by neutralising its subversive potential by restricting it to the intelligible sphere.  
Kant’s achievement in the third antinomy is preliminary: it establishes space 
for freedom within natural causality’s monopoly on empirical experience. It 
demonstrates that, when considered in the light of transcendental idealism, the theses 
of free will and natural causality are not, in fact, mutually contradictory. It therefore 
establishes freedom as a possibility⎯one that can be reconciled with rational 
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thought⎯but by no means a fact. It is not until the Groundwork for the Metaphysics 
of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason that Kant approaches the proof of 
freedom. In both of these texts, Kant is driven by what Henry Allison calls the 
‘Reciprocity Thesis’: ‘the claim that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts’.32 
However, while in Groundwork III, Kant attempts to prove freedom and, from it, 
deduce the existence of the moral law, in the second Critique he reverses his strategy, 
rooting his deduction of freedom in the givenness of the moral law⎯a step that, as 
Adorno establishes, has significant consequences for his conception of freedom. 
Kant’s first step in the Critique of Practical Reason is to establish the 
difference between practical principles and practical laws. The former ‘presuppose an 
object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will’ (CPrR 
5:21); that is, they ‘come under the general principle of self-love or one’s own 
happiness’ (CPrR 5:22). Practical laws, on the other hand, are not determined by their 
content or matter⎯an object of desire, for example⎯but by their form. A practical 
law can only be considered as such if, regardless of its content, it can be extrapolated 
into a universal law. Practical principles are determined by the senses; practical laws 
are determined by reason. Kant continues: 
But if no determining ground of the will other than that universal lawgiving 
form can serve as a law for it, such a will must be thought as altogether 
independent of the natural law of appearances in their relations to one another, 
namely the law of causality. But such independence is called freedom in the 
strictest, that is, in the transcendental, sense. Therefore, a will for which the 
mere lawgiving form of a maxim can alone serve as a law is a free will. 
(CPrR 5:29) 
A will that is determined by the moral law ‘must be thought as altogether independent 
of the natural law of appearances in their relations to one another, namely the law of 
causality’ because it acts according to reason rather than ‘the subjective condition of 
receptivity to a pleasure or displeasure’ (CPrR 5:21). Such independence can only be 
described as freedom: the will that acts according to practical laws (determined by 
form rather than content) can therefore be described as a free will. Kant goes on to 
confirm that, as a ‘fact of reason’ (CPrR 5:31), it is ‘the moral law […] that first 
offers itself to us and, inasmuch as reason presents it as a determining ground not to 
                                                
32 Allison, p. 201. 
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be outweighed by any sensible conditions and indeed quite independent of them, leads 
directly to the concept of freedom’ (CPrR 5:29).  
Adorno has significant reservations about Kant’s asserted proof of freedom: ‘it 
turns out that the more theory urges the need for freedom, and the more theory insists 
that human beings are essentially free and that they have absolute responsibility for 
themselves, then the more readily theory lends itself to repression’ (HF, p. 197). Such 
repression is most apparent in the sphere of legality, in which individuals are held 
entirely accountable for their actions, and such theories as Kant’s allow this 
punishment to be ‘metaphysically justified’ (ND, p. 215). The very real unfreedom of 
modern capitalist society is so apparent to Adorno that he sometimes seems to take it 
as a given. In no way, however, does he suggest that unfreedom is ontologically or 
metaphysically necessary, part of the human condition. Adorno’s specific work on 
freedom is inextricably bound to the rest of his philosophy, which is remarkably 
consistent throughout his career. It is his extensive work on the Culture 
Industry⎯spanning the period from the 1930s to the 1970s⎯that contain Adorno’s 
principal arguments for the systematic unfreedom of society. In these texts, Adorno 
suggests that the supposedly democratic and liberating culture of the masses is in 
reality a mechanism of deception. Consumers are encouraged to exercise their 
apparent individuality by choosing between near-identical products⎯and assured that 
in doing so they are utilising their freedom. One of the most pervasive examples of 
this deception is in the institution of free time, which is as functional as work. When 
Adorno suggests that ‘[o]rganized freedom is compulsory’ (CI, p. 190), he is alluding 
to the way in which society ‘foists upon you what your free time should be’ (CI, p. 
190). He continues: 
People have been refused freedom, and its value belittled, for such a long time 
that now people no longer like it. They need the shallow entertainment, by 
means of which cultural conservatism patronizes and humiliates them, in order 
to summon up the strength for work. 
 (CI, p. 193) 
Freedom is denigrated into free time, the insidious nature of which means that ‘the 
majority of unfree people are as unaware of this process as they are of the unfreedom 
itself’ (CI, p. 188). 
  26 
Adorno’s entire philosophy can be said to be dedicated to a demystification of 
the ‘spell’ (HF, p. 177) that prevents individuals from penetrating the depths of their 
own unfreedom. In such a world, any appeal to an existent freedom such as Kant’s is 
not only profoundly hypocritical in its failure to factor into its rationale the empirical 
unfreedom of individuals, but also dangerous as it necessitates ‘the unconditional 
responsibility of individual subjects’ (HF, p. 197), a responsibility that they cannot 
possibly live up to in a fundamentally unfree society. Outside of the sphere of 
legality, ‘the thesis of free will burdens the dependent individuals with the social 
injustice they can do nothing about’ (ND, p. 263): for all their formal 
freedom⎯which, indeed, Adorno in no way trivializes, citing his own experience ‘of 
what the world looks like when this element of formal equality is removed’ (HF, p. 
253)⎯subjects are in practice powerless to effect change: ‘the formal liberty of all 
individuals in bourgeois society must be contrasted with their actual unfreedom in 
reality’ (HF, p. 83).  
Adorno does not, however, conclude from this assessment of the state of 
freedom in modern capitalist society that people are wholly or necessarily determined. 
Such a claim ‘amounts to a metaphysically extended rule of the status quo’ (ND, p. 
263); it hypostatises the current state of affairs into a timeless given. Indeed, Adorno 
roots our modern understanding of determinism solidly in capitalism: 
Determinism acts as if dehumanization, the totally unfolded merchandise 
character of the working capacity, were human nature pure and simple. No 
thought is given to the fact that there is a limit to the merchandise character: 
the working capacity that has not just an exchange value, but a use value. To 
deny free will outright means to reduce men unreservedly to the normal 
merchandise form of their labor in full-fledged capitalism.  
(ND, p. 264) 
Far from an immutable given, determinism itself is revealed to be a historical⎯and 
hence necessarily changeable⎯concept. Under capitalism, determinism becomes 
indistinguishable from exchange, the absolute system of which neutralises any 
recourse to use-value. Finally, Adorno argues that ‘a factually consistent determinism 
would sanction the bellum omnium contra omnes; if all men were equally 
predetermined and blind, every criterion of actions would fall by the wayside’ (ND, p. 
217). Not only would determinism obliterate the concept of morality, which is the 
very concern that led Kant to sketch out a space for freedom in the third antinomy, but 
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society itself would never have been possible. Adorno argues, then, that the antinomy 
Kant erects between free will and determinism is itself at fault⎯or, to put it another 
way, the antinomy reveals the empirical contradiction at the heart of the concept of 
freedom. Shunning the logic of non-contradiction, Adorno asserts the very real 
possibility of the subject being ‘both free and unfree’ (ND, p. 240).  
Adorno also accuses Kant of abstracting freedom from the empirical world. In 
the third antinomy, he restricts freedom to the intelligible sphere, leaving some 
unanswered questions about how the intelligible character and the empirical character 
are related (if at all). In his discussions of practical freedom, however, Kant’s 
attempts to purify freedom from the taint of the empirical world become increasingly 
problematic for Adorno. I have already outlined the process by which Kant proves 
freedom in the second Critique, which rests heavily on his distinction between 
practical principles, which are subjective and based on one’s desire for happiness, and 
practical laws, which are formal and determined by reason. This principle of reason 
within the subject permits it to make decisions that are not defined by ‘impulses of 
sensibility’ (CPrR A533/B562)⎯lust, covetousness, greed, for example. In the 
Religion, Kant expands on this: 
[F]reedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, 
that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as 
the human being has incorporated it into its maxim (has made it into a 
universal rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself); 
only in this way can an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the 
absolute spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom).  
(R 6:24) 
Unlike in natural causality, in which events necessarily take place because of a prior 
cause, the capacity for reason allows subjects to choose which incentives to 
incorporate into their maxim, that is, their basis of conduct. The Kantian free will is 
wholly independent of heteronomous forces⎯which result in the will’s ‘dependence 
upon the natural law of following some impulse or inclination’ (CPrR 5:33)⎯because 
it is capable of acting according to the principle of reason: that is, capable of 
extrapolating an incentive into a universal law (or practical law). To recall, in the 
second Critique, Kant determined on rooting freedom in our innate consciousness of 
the moral law. The significance of this move, as Michelle Kosch explains, is that it 
results in ‘a dependence of our knowledge of our freedom on practical reason’s 
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demand that we be able to do what we are obliged to do’.33 Freedom, for Kant, is in 
fact synonymous with obedience to the moral law. Subjects only truly exercise 
freedom when they submit themselves to the moral law because such a law, far from 
being imposed externally, is the law of reason authored by rational people. If they 
ignore the moral law (to which all individuals have innate access), then they are 
operating under heteronomous forces that can ultimately be reduced to the underlying 
principle of self-love.  
 For Adorno, then, Kant’s mistake is to try to abstract freedom from the 
empirical world, ‘seeking to cleanse it of all impairments’ (ND, p. 256) in the form of 
heteronomous forces. The outcome is that ‘freedom is necessarily reduced to 
obedience to lawfulness’ (HF, p. 248). Hearfield notes that this paradox is replicated 
in Kant’s ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, in which ‘the 
maturity or freedom of being able to speak with a critical voice in the public domain 
jars with the apparent unfreedom of necessarily submitting to one’s everyday social 
roles and duties’.34 ‘What has come out of this’, Adorno argues, ‘is the intolerable 
mortgage imposed on post-Kantian philosophy: that freedom without law is not 
freedom, that freedom exists only in identification with the law’ (ND, pp. 248–9). 
Such supposed freedom ‘has its basis in unfreedom’ (HF, p. 245). For Adorno, Kant’s 
inability to ‘visualize the concept of freedom otherwise than as repression’ (ND, p. 
256) is another expression of the bourgeois antinomy described above, in which 
freedom is simultaneously posited as the ultimate value and restrained. 
Adorno argues that, despite Kant’s best efforts to extricate freedom from the 
empirical world, he cannot help but link the two. This is most apparent in his 
experimenta crucis in the Critique of Practical Reason, which represent the 
paradoxical attempt to, on the one hand, demonstrate the applicability of free will to 
reality and, on the other, ‘create chemically pure conditions’ (HF, p. 223) by stripping 
away, as far as possible, the empirical context in which the actions would make sense. 
For Adorno, Kant wants to ‘have his cake and eat it too’ (HF, p. 224):  
The logical error lies, I believe, in failing to recognize that such a thought 
experiment would only be compelling in empirical conditions in which real 
people exist, while, on the other hand, as soon as you introduce a degree of 
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reality into the experiment, you inevitably introduce elements that would 
deprive the example of its cogency. 
(HF, p. 222) 
Kant’s thought experiments are at once too abstract and not abstract enough, 
‘incompatible with reality’ (HF, p. 222) by their very artificiality and saturated with 
‘determining factors […] from outside’ (HF, p. 223). This is particularly evident in 
the ‘gallows case’, in which a lustful man is supposedly able to control his desires if 
he is threatened with death, while the same man would, at least conceivably, accept 
death if the alternative was dishonour. This very precisely delineated case clearly 
adheres to Adorno’s charge of artificiality, while it also fails to conform to 
psychological reality: ‘[i]t is not’, for example, ‘necessarily true that the immediate 
prospect of the gallows will deter men from obeying their instincts’ (HF, p. 224). In 
Groundwork III, Kant is similarly forced to acknowledge that ‘the drive to freedom is 
[…] produced by that same sensible world’ from which he attempts to extricate it.35 
This is where he attempts to demonstrate that even ‘the most wicked scoundrel’ 
(GMM A 4:454) ultimately desires to follow the moral law:  
[F]rom that wish he can expect no gratification of desires, hence no condition 
that would satisfy any of his actual or even thinkable inclinations […], but he 
can expect only a greater inner worth of his person. This better person, 
however, he believes himself to be when he transports himself to the 
standpoint of a member of the world of understanding. 
(GMM A 4:455) 
Adorno argues that the ‘mere consciousness of being a better person’ (HF, p. 210) is 
here shown to be extra-rational and hence, according to Kant’s own precedent, a 
heteronomous motivating force for the supposedly free decision to follow the moral 
law. Kant is therefore shown to be incapable of successfully isolating the pure free 
will from the empirical world. 
In contradistinction to Kant, Adorno argues that freedom only makes sense 
when we consider it as part of the natural and social world, even though, 
paradoxically, ‘freedom has never yet been made a reality in the entire realm of 
historical and natural experience so far as this is known to us’ (HF, p. 178). This 
encapsulates the significance of Kant’s ‘efforts to purify freedom’ (HF, p. 178): ‘All 
the difficulties of Kant’s doctrine of freedom are based on our need, on the one hand, 
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to respect the non-existence of this freedom but, on the other hand, not to deny 
freedom’ (HF, p. 178). Adorno uses Kant’s experimenta crucis as a spring-board to 
explore his own theory of the ‘additional factor’ (HF, p. 183) or ‘addendum [das 
Hinzutretende]’ (ND, p. 226). Contra Kant’s equation of the will with rationality, 
Adorno argues that what the experimenta crucis really demonstrate is that ‘decisions 
of the human subject do not simply glide along the surface of the chain of cause and 
effect. When we speak of acts of will, we experience a sort of jolt’: an ‘impulse’ (HF, 
p. 228). Even in the paradigmatic situation of Buridan’s ass⎯‘which found itself 
having to choose between two identical bundles of hay’ (HF, p. 222)⎯the ass ‘still 
has to exert itself, to make a gesture of some sort, to do something or other that goes 
beyond the thought-processes or non-processes of its pathetic brain. That is to say, it 
experiences some kind of impulse’ (HF, p. 228). Far from being purely rational and 
autonomous, then, as Kant would have us believe, the will contains an irrational, 
somatic moment⎯one that is, crucially, non-identical with pure reason⎯and this, far 
from inhibiting freedom, is actually its precondition. Freedom, Adorno emphasises, 
‘would need what Kant calls heteronomous’ (ND, p. 237): the ‘invasion’ of ‘countless 
moments of external⎯notably social⎯reality’ (ND, p. 213) into supposedly 
autonomous decisions.  
Indeed, Kant’s emphasis on the individual as the bearer of a free will is, for 
Adorno, at once problematic⎯in that ‘the empirical subject that makes those 
decisions […] is itself a moment of the spatial-temporal “external” world’ (ND, p. 
231) from which it is supposed to be separated⎯and indicative of a tendency towards 
a reified celebration of individualism inherent in bourgeois society. This is the focus 
of Eric S. Nelson’s exploration of libertarianism’s ‘pathologies of freedom’,36 in 
which he suggests, following Adorno, that the concept of negative liberty⎯that is, as 
discussed above, ‘independence from an arbitrary external will and authority’ that 
essentially amounts to ‘the separation of freedom from freedom in society’37⎯only 
succeeds in moulding a ‘pathologically conformist’ individual who cannot live up to 
the ideals of autonomy that nonetheless govern his life.38 The more such a society 
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celebrates the illusory freedom of the ‘heroic virile individual’,39 the less real 
individuals are free, as they are manipulated into emulating a non-existent model of 
being that destroys any hint of spontaneity. The supposedly free individual is 
fundamentally free only to consume: to choose to buy certain products within a 
coercive capitalist system. Adorno is scornful of the idea that freedom is merely the 
concept that ‘everyone should have enough money with which to buy a fridge and go 
to the cinema’ (HF, p. 182). Such an idea of freedom in reality maintains the real state 
of unfreedom that dominates capitalist society rather than transcending it. This is not 
to say, however, that Adorno disdains the material element of freedom. On the 
contrary, he emphasises that on a basic level, the very real ‘potential for freedom […] 
consists in the fact that the state of the forces of production today would allow us in 
principle to free the world from want’ (HF, p. 182). To this degree Adorno reveals 
himself as a classical Marxist: ‘[t]he concrete possibilities of making freedom a 
reality are to be sought […] in the forces of production’ (HF, p. 182). Nonetheless, as 
this thesis will show, he displays an acute awareness of the mechanisms of 
unfreedom⎯and, occasionally, the means of resistance⎯that take place within the 
superstructure, the relation of which to the base is far more dialectical than vulgar 
Marxism would allow.  
The ideology of the autonomous individual provides the basis of Adorno’s 
claim that ‘[t]he human subject is bewitched by the idea of its own freedom as if by a 
magic spell’ (HF, p. 220). Such an exaltation of the individual subject unremittingly 
promotes what Adorno terms identity-thinking: ‘the intrinsic aspiration of all mind to 
turn every alterity that is introduced to it or that it encounters into something like 
itself and in this way to draw it into its own sphere of influence’ (LND, p. 9). As 
Nelson argues, ‘[t]he narcissistic liberty of the self becomes the harshest legalism 
applied to others, as genuine difference is reduced to the identity of exchange in the 
name of the abstract individual’.40 The glorification of the individual and its supposed 
freedom is also predicated on the repression of non-identity within the self. As Nelson 
notes, this identity compulsion is modelled on the model of exchange that has 
saturated relations in modern capitalism. The exchange relation presupposes absolute 
equivalence between its objects, which must be self-identical in order to survive. This 
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provokes integration rather than freedom, and destroys the very concept of 
individuality that it so ardently celebrates, leaving only ‘a mockery of true freedom’ 
(ND, p. 262). Adorno concludes that the very premise that freedom is located within 
the individual is extremely limited: 
In ourselves, by introspection, we discover neither a positive freedom nor a 
positive unfreedom. We conceive both in their relation to extramental things: 
freedom as a polemical counter-image to the suffering brought on by social 
coercion; unfreedom as that coercion’s image. […] Whether or not there is 
autonomy depends upon its adversary and antithesis, on the object which 
either grants or denies autonomy to the subject. Detached from the object, 
autonomy is fictitious. 
(ND, p. 223) 
Contra Kant, Adorno insists on freedom’s dependence on heteronomy. Kant’s effort 
to extract empirical reality from the consideration of freedom is deluded because it 
fails to recognise that the very concept of freedom only makes sense as a socio-
historical category. Adorno turns to society to diagnose its mechanisms of unfreedom 
that ‘destine […] the individuals to be what they are’ (ND, p. 219). Freedom, he 
acknowledges, is historically dependent on the ‘formation of the individual in the 
modern sense […]⎯in the sense meaning not simply the biological human being, but 
the one constituted as a unit by its own self-reflection’ (ND, p. 218). There is no 
freedom in the absence of free empirical people. Nonetheless, freedom cannot be 
sustained as an unreflective concept that is ontologically rooted in the individual. 
Within this context of unfreedom that Adorno relentlessly diagnoses, freedom 
‘for the time being […] is never more than an instant of spontaneity, a historical node, 
the road to which is blocked under prevailing circumstances’ (ND, p. 219). It is 
primarily, though not solely, within art that Adorno locates these elusive flashes of 
spontaneity that radically reconceptualise the world. As I will discuss further in 
Chapter 2, art provides for Adorno an enigmatic locus of opposition to social reality. 
It is enigmatic because it remains outside the logic of commitment⎯to an ideology, 
cause or ethical position⎯and therefore cannot be ‘de-coded’ as such. Nonetheless, it 
can, and, indeed, must, be supplemented by philosophy, ‘which interprets it in order 
to say what it [art] is unable to say, whereas art is only able to say it by not saying it’ 
(AT, p. 94). Beckett’s work is, in this sense, profoundly ‘ill-said’ (Ill Seen Ill Said, p. 
80). 
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II 
 
Adorno delivered ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’ as a lecture in Frankfurt on 27th 
February 1961. Beckett was not looking forward to the engagement, which was 
arranged in his honour by Suhrkamp;41 in a letter to Barbara Bray several months 
previously, he writes that his commitment was the result of some uncharacteristic 
enthusiasm while inebriated: ‘drank too much whiskey and agreed to be present, now 
don’t see how to get out of it. What the hell anyway’.42 Knowlson relates Dr Siegfried 
Unseld’s recollection of the event that has by now become commonplace in Beckett 
studies: 
Adorno immediately developed his idea about the etymology and the 
philosophy and the meaning of the names in Beckett. And Adorno insisted that 
‘Hamm’ [in Endgame] derives from ‘Hamlet’. He had a whole theory based 
on this. Beckett said ‘Sorry, Professor, but I never thought of Hamlet when I 
invented this name’. But Adorno insisted. And Beckett became a little angry. 
[…] In the evening Adorno started his speech and, of course, pointed out the 
derivation of ‘Hamm’ from ‘Hamlet’ [adding that ‘Clov’ was a crippled 
‘clown’]. Beckett listened very patiently. But then he whispered into my 
ear⎯he said it this in German but I will translate it into English⎯‘This is the 
progress of science that professors can proceed with their errors!’43 
Barthes’ proclamation of the ‘death of the author’ is perhaps harder to sustain when 
the author is alive and well in the audience;44 nonetheless, this third-hand account of 
Beckett’s sentiments has been taken rather too seriously. Dirk van Hulle notes that 
‘[a]s a consequence of this account, Adorno tends to be better known in Beckett 
studies as the “crritic” who failed to listen to Beckett’ and quite reasonably points out 
that ‘the reference to Hamlet in his essay […] is only a relatively insignificant 
passage’.45 Most significantly, he shrewdly notes that Adorno’s phrasing in the 
original German essay, ‘Versuch, das Endspiel zu verstehen’, literally translates as 
‘Hamlet becomes varied [Hamlet wird variiert]’. Michael T. Jones’ later translation, 
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which, as van Hulle explains, ‘has played an important role in its reception in the 
Anglophone world’,46 states ‘Hamlet is revised’.47 This omits the musical connotation 
of ‘varied’, which, to an ear as musically attuned as Adorno’s, would be most likely 
intentional. Variation form (Variationenform) consists of a theme that is repeated in 
various modified forms: the term ‘varied’ resonates very differently to the more brutal 
concept of ‘revision’, which implies correction and alteration. Adorno writes: 
In music before Beethoven […] the procedure of variation was considered to 
be among the more superficial technical procedures, a mere masking of 
thematic material which otherwise retained its essential identity. Now, in 
association with development, variation serves the establishment of universal, 
concretely unschematic relationships. The procedure of variation becomes 
dynamically charged with newly gained dynamic qualities. In variation, as 
developed up to this point, the identity of the thematic material remains firmly 
established⎯Schoenberg calls this material the ‘model’. […] But the meaning 
of this identity reveals itself as nonidentity. 
(PMM, p. 40) 
The over-simplified and anti-intellectual view of Adorno as an obtuse philosopher 
stubbornly refusing to be guided by Beckett is one that stems at least in part from this 
mistranslation and hence fails to acknowledge the complex mechanisms at work in 
the minutiae of Adorno’s texts. In isolating this most superficial of semantic links, 
Adorno utilises specific musical terminology that goes to the heart of his philosophy’s 
concerns. The variation on Hamlet that Adorno attributes to Endgame is no simple 
identity, for variation, he insists, ‘serves the establishment of universal, concretely 
unschematic relationships’: it is a dynamic category. The Hamlet instance, indeed, 
acts as a synecdoche for the thrust of Adorno’s work, which is committed to non-
subsumptive relationships with its particular objects of interpretation: that is, it 
attempts to preserve the particularity of the object⎯literary or otherwise⎯from the 
universalising tendencies of the concept. He transposes Schoenberg’s concept of a 
‘model’⎯the thematic material that undergoes variation⎯from its original musical 
context to a means of analysing ‘a specific, selective and, if you like, restricted 
complex of problems in such a way that light falls on all the aspects that cannot be 
treated fully if one is reluctant, as I am, to elaborate a total, comprehensive system’ 
(HF, p. 184). Such a concept is not only useful when understanding (or trying to 
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understand) Adorno’s philosophy, but also when approaching Beckett’s work, which 
toys relentlessly with the systematic intentions of thought. 
 Since its publication, ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’ has been the subject of 
many articles and book chapters⎯not to mention being glossed by an inordinate 
number of books on Adorno and Beckett respectively. Such a wealth of resources on 
the topic may give the impression that the Adorno-Beckett relation has been 
exhausted, but, on the contrary, this area of research has barely left the starting-line. 
This is primarily due to its narrow focus on Adorno’s reading of Endgame. While this 
has prompted a number of sensitive and subtle dissections of what is, admittedly, an 
extraordinarily complex essay, the emphasis has remained the same: what we might, 
after Shane Weller, call ‘Adorno’s Beckett’,48 as exemplified primarily in ‘Trying to 
Understand Endgame’, but also in passages of Aesthetic Theory. While this thesis 
does not wholly ignore Adorno’s Beckett⎯that is, Adorno’s particular understanding 
of Beckett’s significance⎯it does attempt to neutralise its hegemony, allowing it to 
recede into the background so as to allocate space for new, more productive 
intersections between the two writers. 
Some Beckett critics have taken Adorno’s essay as a subject in its own right, 
grappling with its obscurity. This has prompted such article titles as David 
Cunningham’s ‘Trying (Not) to Understand’ and Matthew Holt’s ‘Trying to 
Understand Adorno’s Reading of Endgame’: the focus here is on the problem of 
understanding Adorno as much as it is about trying to understand Endgame.49 Others 
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offer a shorter and less rigorous summary as support for their own claims about 
Beckett’s work.50 Philosophical perspectives on the Adorno-Beckett relation tend to 
emphasise the significance of Beckett’s work for Adorno, unpacking the significance 
of ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’ in relation to other Adornian texts, notably 
Aesthetic Theory.51 James Martin Harding is unusual within Adorno studies for 
offering a sustained analysis of a Beckett text that is not Endgame. He takes as his 
basis Adorno’s more sporadic ‘digressions’ on Waiting for Godot,52 arguing that the 
relationship Didi and Gogo have to the always absent Godot recalls the master-slave 
dialectic between the Jews and God, which Hegel viewed unfavourably because it 
demonstrated an ‘unresolvable subservience’ to the law.53 This dialectic is juxtaposed 
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with a later historical variation of the master-servant dialectic in the relationship 
between Lucky and Pozzo. The resurfacing of the supposedly superseded Jewish 
dialectic attests to the recent historical atrocities that make a mockery of Hegelian 
progress. Didi and Gogo are condemned to wait ‘because they are emblematic of an 
unresolvable dialectic’.54 As intriguing as Harding’s interpretation is, it delivers itself 
all too easily to the accusation of reducing a literary text to a systematic philosophical 
meaning. As Beckett himself cautioned, ‘the danger is in the neatness of 
identifications’.55 
A small number of critics use Adorno’s essay⎯and, indeed, some of the 
philosophical responses to it⎯as evidence of philosophical, sociological or political 
failure in the face of Beckett’s work. Within this group there are those who have a 
genuine respect for Adorno’s work but see it as faltering in the face of the sheer 
resistance of Beckett’s texts to interpretation. Simon Critchley, for example, describes 
‘Adorno’s piece on Endgame’ as ‘the philosophically most powerful and 
hermeneutically most nuanced piece of writing on Beckett’, before going on to 
conclude that ‘ultimately it tells us more about Adorno’s preoccupations than those of 
Beckett’s text’.56 Other critics⎯Leslie Hill, for example⎯have more serious 
concerns about the efficacy of Adorno’s philosophy with regards to Beckett: 
This is arguably why Beckett's writing is so resistant to sociological readings. 
It's not that these are impossible; but for the most part, despite their best 
intentions⎯even Adorno!⎯they turn out to be distressingly reductive. Why? 
Because they are an exercise in conceptual appropriation. Sociology not only 
assumes it knows what politics is, it believes it knows what art is too.57 
This fear is not to be taken lightly. However, if sociology, as Hill argues, ‘believes it 
knows what art is’, Adorno certainly does not: the opening of Aesthetic Theory 
candidly states that ‘[i]t is self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident 
anymore, not its inner life, not its relation to the world, not even its right to exist’ (AT, 
p. 1). This acknowledgement of philosophy’s limits⎯set alongside Adorno’s 
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emphasis that he is only ‘trying’ to understand Endgame; that philosophical 
interpretation, while necessary, ultimately fails to speak the non-identical art 
object⎯recalls Beckett’s claim that he works with ‘impotence, ignorance’.58 While 
Adorno’s assured and sometimes grating tone may imply the opposite, his 
philosophical project is in fact dedicated to a non-repressive relation between subject 
and object, one that, in its always tentative attempt to salvage the non-identical, is 
predicated on the concept of failure and weakness. 
The most interesting work on this subject has emerged from a handful of 
critics, mainly within Beckett studies, who have strayed from the well-trodden and by 
now predictable paths that link Beckett and Adorno, and whose methods and 
conclusions have proven extremely beneficial to the development of this thesis. Tyrus 
Miller is one such critic, whose work has demonstrated an enduring preoccupation 
with possible lines of enquiry between Beckett and Adorno. In ‘Beckett’s Political 
Technology: Expression, Confession, and Torture in the Later Drama’, Miller 
considers the predominance of ‘scenarios of torture and interrogation’ in Beckett’s 
late work.59 He acknowledges a common interpretation of ‘the inquisitorial scenario 
as a self-reflexive allegory of the creative process’, but argues that this ‘falls far short 
of explaining the disquieting nature of the concrete contents of this repeated scene’.60 
A more sophisticated account, he suggests, would consider the concept of artistic 
expression and its relation to suffering, a gap that I seek to at least partly fill in my 
account of evil in Chapter 3. This article goes some way towards negotiating the 
                                                
58 Samuel Beckett, interviewed by Israel Shenker, New York Times, 5 May 1956. Quoted in ‘An 
Interview with Beckett (1956)’, in Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage, ed. by Lawrence 
Graver and Raymond Federman (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 146–9 (p. 148). 
59 ‘Beckett’s Political Technology: Expression, Confession, and Torture in the Later Drama’, Samuel 
Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 9 (2000), 255–78 (p. 257). See also his ‘Dismantling Authenticity: 
Beckett, Adorno, and the “Postwar”’, which considers the concept of mass death in relation to 
‘The Lost Ones’ and Endgame. Torture is also the basis of essays by David Cunningham and 
Jonathan Ullyot. The former explores How It Is in relation to Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
juxtaposition of Kant and Sade in Dialectic of Enlightenment, focusing on the formal dimensions 
of the relations of torture in Beckett and Sade. This formalism, he suggests, responds to the 
formalism of the empirical world. ‘“We have our being in justice”: Formalism, Abstraction and 
Beckett’s “Ethics”’, in Beckett and Ethics, ed. by Russell Smith (London: Continuum, 2008), pp. 
21–37. Ullyot’s article also focuses on How It Is, commenting on a slippage in Aesthetic Theory 
between the title of Beckett’s Comment c’est and Adorno’s concept-name ‘Comment c’est’. 
Despite an original approach to the relationship between Adorno and Beckett, Ullyot leaves 
himself wide open to Miller’s critique of those who dismiss concrete instances of ‘interrogation, 
persecution, and torture’ (p. 256) as mere allegories of the writing process. Ullyot’s real 
contribution to this area of study is his call for a dialogical reading of Adorno and Beckett. 
‘Adorno’s Comment c’est’, Comparative Literature, 61 (2009), 416–31. 
60 Ibid., p. 258. 
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problematic relationship between art and social reality⎯a relationship that forms the 
basis of Adorno’s aesthetics and that will be of paramount importance to this thesis. 
While Miller does not consider the concept of freedom directly, his subtle analysis of 
the very concrete mechanisms of unfreedom that pervade Beckett’s texts in the form 
of instruments of torture provides a useful platform from which to tease out a negative 
image of freedom in Beckett. 
Catherine Laws’ 2005 article ‘Beckett and Kurtág’ approaches the relation 
between Beckett and Adorno obliquely and, indeed, almost parenthetically, through 
an analysis of the Hungarian composer György Kurtág, who has composed three 
Beckett-based works. Laws builds on a suggestion by Alan E. Williams that 
‘Adorno's concept of the “sedimentation” of musical material is useful in fully 
understanding the role of musical influence and reference in Kurtag’s work’ to 
suggest that such sedimentation could be an interesting tool with regards to Beckett’s 
use of intertextuality.61 While Laws leaves this intriguing suggestion somewhat in the 
air as a topic for further analysis⎯‘suffice it to say that the musicality of Beckett’s 
texts and the related approach to meaning perhaps needs to be explored more 
carefully in relation to Adorno’s ideas’62⎯she certainly opens up an interesting line 
of enquiry that could productively relate Beckett’s enduring interest in music to 
Adorno’s own extensive musicology. While this thesis by no means claims to exhaust 
such an expansive topic, it does take it extremely seriously, understanding Adorno’s 
musicology as a crucial part of his philosophy.  
Marta Figlerowic locates an ethical productivity in the ‘anxiety caused by 
[the] loss of stable personal boundaries’ in Beckett’s characters,63 which she claims to 
set against ‘Adorno’s ethical analyses of Beckett’s plays’,64 the specifically ethical 
content of which remain largely unelucidated within the article. She agrees with 
Adorno that ‘the world constructed by Beckett denies any essentialist definitions of 
individualism’,65 but suggests that the anxiety provoked by this awareness permits 
‘these characters to perceive others as beings equally full and complex as 
                                                
61 ‘Beckett and Kurtág’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 15 (2005), 241–56 (p. 252). 
62 Ibid., p. 252. 
63 ‘Bounding the Self: Ethics, Anxiety and Territories of Selfhood in Samuel Beckett’s Fiction’, 
Journal of Modern Literature, 34 (2011), 76–96 (p. 91). 
64 Ibid., p. 90. 
65 Ibid. 
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themselves’.66 This is a reaction against what she describes as ‘a purely passive, 
deterministic vision of the late capitalist individual’ exemplified by Marxist thought 
(within which Adorno seems to lie).67 This article is intriguing, while flawed, because 
of its implicit link between the preponderance of reified and disconnected individuals 
in Beckett’s work and (a Marxist brand of) determinism⎯one that Figlerowic is keen 
to oppose. She resolves this problem with an uncomfortable return to a humanist 
Beckett: she describes the ‘strange dignity and complexity his characters have’ in an 
attempt to establish a tenuous basis for ethical relations.68 Her skewed reading of 
Adorno portrays him as a proponent of social determinism, failing to see beyond his 
admittedly pessimistic prognosis of modern capitalism. Nonetheless, her insistence on 
seeing the Beckettian ‘individual as more than just a symptom of society’ points us in 
the right direction.69 Although it is seldom the individual in Beckett that provides a 
locus of freedom, Figlerowic recognises, if obliquely and too optimistically, the 
significance of freedom as a counterbalance to the ‘world of manipulated objects and 
mechanical exchanges’.70  
Duncan McColl Chesney, deploring the lack of a ‘critical rapprochement 
between Beckett and Adorno’,71 offers a broad if compressed account of the affinities 
between the two thinkers in relation to the themes of his book: ‘silence and the 
minimal’.72 While he attempts to move beyond Endgame by considering Embers, 
Krapp’s Last Tape and Happy Days,73 his analyses seem, in the main, disconnected 
from their supposed Adornian framework. It is not until his final discussion of 
Beckett’s ‘ethical modernism’74⎯the term deriving from Jay Bernstein⎯that an 
intriguing ‘rapprochement’ is approached. Here, McColl Chesney attempts to isolate 
an ethical dimension to Beckett’s texts through Adorno’s conception of ‘metaphysical 
experience’.75 Unfortunately, his brief account of Adorno⎯filtered through 
                                                
66 Ibid., p. 91. 
67 Ibid., p. 93. 
68 Ibid., p. 91. 
69 Ibid., p. 93. 
70 Ibid., p. 90. 
71 Silence Nowhen: Late Modernism, Minimalism, and Silence in the Work of Samuel Beckett (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2013), p. 155. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See, respectively, Ibid., pp. 170–1; pp. 171–4; pp. 174–80. 
74 Ibid., p. 183. 
75 Ibid., p. 185. 
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Bernstein⎯is undeveloped and ultimately insufficient for the kind of deeper 
understanding of the Adorno-Beckett relation he is hoping to accomplish. 
Nonetheless, McColl Chesney goes further than any other critic in his more expansive 
gaze. 
Despite the broader engagement of some isolated articles and book chapters, 
however, as I have said, the critical response to Adorno and Beckett remains fettered 
to ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’⎯a position that ultimately fails to appreciate the 
paratactic nature of Adorno’s thought, which cannot be subordinated to any one major 
concept or theme. This thesis seeks to fill a major gap in Beckett studies by moving 
beyond this essay to Adorno’s philosophy as a whole. It works with a selection of 
Beckett’s texts representative of different phases of his corpus so as to demonstrate 
that freedom is an enduring preoccupation in his work, though it is approached in 
decidedly different ways. Similarly, it engages with Adorno’s major texts as well as 
some slightly more unfamiliar ones. Chapter 1, ‘Freedom and its Limits’ interrogates 
the thematics of freedom overtly presented in two of Beckett’s earlier works: Murphy 
and Eleutheria. Beckett’s aesthetic of failure⎯later enigmatically encapsulated in 
Worstward Ho’s ‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better’ (Worstward Ho, p. 89)⎯is 
provisionally and openly set out in these accounts of two discrete failures to attain 
freedom. Beckett submits the positive accounts of freedom espoused by Idealism and 
existentialism to a relentless and humorous critique, paving the way for his more 
nuanced exploration of freedom in later texts. This chapter simultaneously establishes 
the philosophical and aesthetic ‘limits’ of freedom: on the one hand, Beckett 
undermines philosophical accounts of freedom as an attribute of the individual; on the 
other hand, the texts themselves attest to the ‘limits’ of a thematic presentation of 
freedom. 
In Chapter 2, ‘The Illusion of Freedom and the Freedom of Illusion’, I explore 
the possibility of aesthetic freedom in relation to Beckett’s four Novellas. This hinges 
on the paradox evoked in its chiastic title. Art’s dependence on Schein, which might 
be translated as illusion, appearance or semblance, prevents it from effecting real 
change in the world. It is only ever an illusion of freedom: powerless in the face of 
reality. However, through Adorno’s dialectic of seriousness and 
lightheartedness⎯supplemented by Friedrich Schlegel’s complementary concept of 
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romantic irony⎯it is possible to redeem Schein and demonstrate the freedom inherent 
in illusion, that supposedly ineffectual concept. This chapter is crucial to the overall 
claims of my thesis: if art is wholly determined by its socio-political context then it 
makes no sense to talk about freedom in relation to Beckett’s work at all, except as a 
thematic concern. If Beckett’s work is indeed capable of offering a determinate 
negation of unfreedom then it must do more than reflect the society from which it 
springs. 
Chapter 3, ‘The Scars of Evil’, takes a closer look at the unfree society 
Adorno theorises, tracing the connection between freedom and evil in Beckett’s more 
disturbing works of the 1950s and 1960s. This necessitates a transposition of what 
were originally theological questions to a post-Auschwitz, secular era. This chapter 
follows Adorno in arguing that, far from being anachronistic, the concept of evil is in 
fact decidedly relevant to modern society, though, as with the concept of freedom, we 
must revise our understanding of it. Rather than being localised in the human will, 
evil is manifested in a systematic network of social unfreedom. In the light of this 
context, I consider the hellish world of How It Is and the autonomous and intricately 
managed cylinder of The Lost Ones, revealing the extent to which manmade 
constructs take on a life of their own. This chapter then offers an alternative Adornian 
reading of Endgame to Adorno’s own: it explores the philosopher’s critique of 
Hegel’s theodicy, which attempts to redeem evil by an affirmative account of Spirit’s 
progression towards freedom. Endgame’s manifest preoccupation with eschatology 
offers an alternative history from the perspective of its victims, freeing humans from 
preordained roles in a constricting narrative of progress. At the same time, it 
manifests the unfreedom faced by individuals in the light of the very real oppression 
of history. Endgame gives us reason to return to Hegel’s contentious claim that ‘[t]he 
wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind’:76 the scars of the play are as 
patently visible as they are unhealed. 
The unfree capitalist society that provides a consistent context for Adorno’s 
philosophy is characterised to a large extent by technological advances. Adorno’s 
avowed resistance to the Culture Industry is often seen as a blind-spot that forecloses 
the liberatory potential of modern technology. Without underestimating the 
                                                
76 Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 407. 
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significance of Adorno’s critique of the Culture Industry, Chapter 4, ‘Virtual 
Freedom’, explores the more fundamental problem of technology’s role in the 
domination of nature that characterises humanity’s relationship to the natural world, 
internal and external. Through a reading of Beckett’s late media plays, I suggest that 
their aesthetic incorporation of technology heralds liberatory possibilities in radically 
reimagining the role of technology as a mediator between subject and world. Not only 
does this have environmental implications, but it also gestures towards a way of 
breaking the cycle of self-preservation that is as detrimental to the subject as it is to 
the objective world. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I consider Beckett’s late prose in light of Adorno’s 
materialist metaphysics. I argue that All Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine 
manifest the horror of our modern trajectory towards an absolute immanence that 
swallows speculative thought. The paradoxical attempt to imagine the death of 
imagination in these texts offers a shockingly visual image of increasing unfreedom, 
while salvaging a remnant of hope through the existence of the imaginative act of 
writing itself. Such hope is, I suggest, more apparent in Company, in which the dark 
immanence is interrupted by moments of what Adorno describes as metaphysical 
experience: glimmers of transcendence that are nonetheless rooted in the ‘smallest 
intramundane traits’ (ND, p. 408) of life. The metaphysical resonance of Beckett’s 
work does not bespeak the empty fantasy of a life beyond the existent, but thought’s 
negation of the given world in pursuit of a freer one.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
FREEDOM AND ITS LIMITS 
 
 
Nowhere in Beckett’s corpus are freedom’s limitations explored so explicitly and 
intensely as in his first published novel, Murphy, and his original and often forgotten 
foray into theatre, the posthumously published Eleutheria. In these texts, Beckett 
stages the respective failures of Murphy and Victor to attain freedom, which while 
desperately desired remains a somewhat nebulous concept. Both characters position 
themselves in opposition to the empirical world⎯figured in Murphy primarily as a 
place of exchange and associated in Eleutheria with a post-war ethic of 
commitment⎯in the vain hope of circumventing its demands altogether. Though 
Murphy ends with a bang⎯with Murphy ‘delivered up to the third zone by a flush of 
the cosmic toilet’1⎯and Eleutheria with a whimper, the texts are united in their 
emphasis on the inherent limitations of their protagonists’ endeavour. Primarily, by 
isolating themselves from the legitimately despised bourgeois world, Murphy and 
Victor fail to recognise that everything they do is mediated by it⎯and in a far more 
profound way than their ironic acceptance of handouts from their respective families. 
Beckett’s interest in limits, moreover, extends to the philosophical systems 
invoked by these densely allusive texts.2 It is, I suggest, through an Adornian 
framework that we can best understand Beckett’s, admittedly non-systematic, 
metacritique of philosophy in Murphy and Eleutheria. In these texts, Beckett invokes 
philosophical positions only to undermine them, so it is imperative to see beyond the 
dense pattern of allusions to the broader questions that are being addressed. This 
mode of critique is characteristic of Adorno’s own philosophy, which is concerned 
with following the philosophical claims of others to the point where they undo 
                                                
1 Richard Begam, Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1996), p. 55. 
2 C. J. Ackerley’s The Annotated Murphy presents a detailed and unsurpassed commentary on 
Murphy’s complex and intricate network of philosophical allusions. Demented Particulars: The 
Annotated Murphy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 
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themselves. This may seem derivative, or even parasitic, but Adorno’s careful 
attentiveness to the meanderings of philosophical thought not only exposes 
conceptual crevices on that philosopher’s own terms, but also reveals the extent to 
which abstract thought is dependent on the empirical reality it so often shuns in search 
of immutable truths. In Murphy, then, the protagonist appropriates the extreme 
Cartesianism of Geulincx and the rationalism of Spinoza for his own narcissistic ends. 
His relentless and ingenuous perversion of their principles exposes their inherent 
limitations as philosophical systems while simultaneously pulling the rug from 
beneath his feet by undermining the basis of his own pursuit of freedom. Far from 
endorsing Murphy’s use of these philosophies, the narrator adopts a heavily ironic 
tone towards its protagonist’s pursuits, allowing us, with Adorno’s conceptual 
framework, to dissect their inherent limitations. If, above all, Murphy concerns itself 
with the relationship between subject and society, then Murphy’s explosive failure 
demonstrates how entrenched the ideology of individualism is and how it acts as a 
mounting obstacle to freedom. 
Victor’s withdrawal from society in Eleutheria, on the other hand, is 
manifestly positioned against Sartre’s advocacy of commitment as not only the ethical 
response to our absolute freedom but also the sole means of securing universal 
freedom. Here I trace a convergence between Beckett and Adorno, the latter of whom 
manifests a similar scepticism regarding Sartrean freedom and its ethos of 
commitment. Eleutheria’s parodic subversion of existentialism, however, is unable or 
unwilling to offer a viable alternative: Victor’s quiet resignation to his condition of 
‘limbo’ (Eleutheria, p. 164) is never fully endorsed by the text, even though it escapes 
the mocking explosion of Murphy’s pretensions to freedom. 
Finally, Beckett’s interrogation of the limits of his protagonists’ search for 
freedom and the philosophical systems they invoke or respond to leads to a more 
fundamental limitation: that of the thematic presentation of freedom. Beckett 
circumvents the inexorable problem of directly representing freedom by locating it in 
what Richard Begam, with reference to Murphy, describes as the ‘“absent” center’ of 
the texts:3 that is, freedom is at once the desired state of the protagonists, one that is 
never actualised, and the unpresentable theme around which the texts compulsively 
                                                
3 Begam, p. 58. 
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circle. To this extent, Murphy and Eleutheria reveal a logic of negation: a refusal to 
present, falsely, freedom as a positive given. Nonetheless, they are constrained by 
their exploration of freedom on the level of content alone. With this in mind, this 
chapter concludes by considering the significance of Adorno’s dialectic of form and 
content for Beckett’s post-war shift away from traditional representation. Ultimately, 
I suggest, the limitations of Murphy and Eleutheria catalyse Beckett’s 
experimentation with new and increasingly minimal ways of approaching that elusive 
concept of freedom.  
 
I 
 
Murphy’s quest for freedom is an unmitigated failure that ends in his undignified 
death and obsequies. Within what is at times ‘a riotous pot-pourri of many 
metaphysical systems’,4 Murphy adapts and distorts philosophies for his own ends, 
making it impossible to align him categorically with any one thinker. This is not, 
however, to underestimate the significance of these perverted philosophies for the 
novel as a whole or for Murphy’s own catastrophic journey. Murphy’s crude, 
instrumental application of Descartes, Spinoza and Geulincx certainly results in a 
humiliating failure, but the novel’s satirical force equally brings the philosophies 
themselves, and their basic ideological assumptions, hurtling down to the ground. 
Fundamentally, I argue, the qualities that limit Murphy in his search for freedom can 
be traced back to the systems of thought he modifies and, beyond that, to the social 
world he refuses to recognise as his own. That is, following Adorno, I insist on the 
necessity of understanding philosophy and the empirical world as dialectically 
mediated. The elevated ideas of seventeenth century rationalism and bourgeois socio-
economic conditions are interdependent, each maintaining and legitimating the other. 
Cartesian dualism offers Murphy the terms with which to detach himself from the 
world in a hypostatisation of his consciousness of subject–object alienation⎯or the 
gap between the ‘little world’ (Murphy, p. 112) of his mind and the ‘big world’ (p. 6) 
outside it. This prepares the ground for his warped acceptance of the bourgeois 
                                                
4 John Fletcher, ‘Samuel Beckett and the Philosophers’, Comparative Literature, 17 (1965), 43–56 (p. 
47). 
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Spinozan virtue of self-preservation, the perversion of which places Murphy at the 
system’s divine centre in a state of narcissistic self-affirmation. Far from escaping the 
external world and its values, his retreat into self only serves to confirm its power. His 
long-awaited freedom is revealed to be uncannily similar to the particular brand of 
determinism expounded by Geulincx. Only when he stares into the eyes of Mr. 
Endon, confronted with nothing but his obdurate self, does Murphy finally recognise 
the tautological horror of his little world, its dependence on the social world and its 
utter inability to provide anything resembling freedom.  
Neary’s prognosis that Murphy’s ‘conarium has shrunk to nothing’ (Murphy, 
p. 6) is not far from the truth⎯or, at least, from Murphy’s truth. Murphy’s 
system⎯his perception of himself and his relation to the world⎯is predicated on a 
belief in dualism, but, crucially, a dualism without mediation: without the benefit of 
Descartes’ conarium or pineal gland.5 Thus ‘Murphy’s mind pictured itself as a large 
hollow sphere, hermetically closed to the universe without’ (p. 69), an image that is 
bathetically prefigured in Murphy’s ‘holeproof’ suit that ‘admitted no air from the 
outer world’ and ‘allowed none of Murphy’s own vapours to escape’ (p. 47). More 
revealingly, perhaps, it is later compared by Murphy himself to a padded cell, 
‘windowless, like a monad’ (p. 114), exposing Beckett’s own awareness that the so 
called ‘century of reason’ is an absolute misnomer: ‘they’re all mad, ils sont tous fous, 
ils déraissonent! They give reason a responsibility which it simply can’t bear, it’s too 
weak’.6 These deflations of Murphy’s naïve philosophical system highlight its 
fundamental irrationality, preventing us from wholly coinciding with his antipathy 
towards the mercantile world. It is precisely Murphy’s relationship with this 
world⎯his emphatic rejection of it⎯that is so problematic, and which is the occasion 
for much of the novel’s irony. The dualism Murphy intuitively feels to be the case can 
be understood in Adornian terms as reflecting ‘the real separation, the dichotomy of 
the human condition, a coercive development’ (AR, p. 139). Murphy’s alienation from 
the capitalist world is perfectly justifiable. However, Adorno continues: 
the resulting separation must not be hypostasized, not magically transformed 
into an invariant. […] The separation is no sooner established directly, without 
                                                
5 The conarium, as Ackerley notes, is a solution to ‘the Cartesian conundrum’ (p. 121) of how the 
supposedly discrete entities of body and mind can interact. 
6 Quoted in P. J. Murphy, ‘Beckett’s Critique of Kant’, in Beckett / Philosophy, ed. by Matthew 
Feldman and Karim Mamdani (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2015), pp. 261–78 (p. 265). 
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mediation, than it becomes ideology, which is indeed its normal form. The 
mind will then usurp the place of something absolutely independent⎯which it 
is not; its claim of independence heralds the claim of dominance. Once 
radically parted from the object, the subject reduces it to its own measure; the 
subject swallows the object, forgetting how much it is an object itself. 
(AR, p. 139) 
Primarily through the use of a sardonic narrator, Murphy maintains an ironic distance 
from the views of its protagonist. Hence Murphy’s legitimate alienation from the 
abhorrent world of ‘Quid pro quo’ (p. 3) is complicated by his insistence upon 
universalising it as an absolute. In the long awaited ‘section six’ (p. 4) mentioned on 
the second page of the novel, we see how Murphy ontologizes his mind. In this way, 
his sense of estrangement from the external world is attributed not, fundamentally, to 
the profoundly unfree nature of capitalist society, but to the ontological fact of his 
mind as ‘a closed system, subject to no principle of change but its own’ (p. 70). The 
novel’s detachment from this view is made abundantly clear by the disclaimer at the 
beginning of the chapter: ‘[h]appily we need not concern ourselves with this 
apparatus as it really was⎯that would be an extravagance and an impertinence⎯but 
solely with what it felt and pictured itself to be’ (p. 69). Adorno insists that such 
hypostatisation as Murphy exhibits generates a deceptive belief in the mind’s 
independence and supremacy. And, indeed, Murphy’s absolute conviction that ‘his 
mind was a closed system, subject to no principle of change but its own’ (p 70) leads 
to a ‘claim of independence’ that is at once hubristic and facile, since it does not 
account for the significance of the empirical world. Murphy’s astrological leanings 
provide a case in point. Suk’s ‘Thema Coeli’ originally provides Murphy with a 
‘[c]orpus of deterrents’ (p. 24): guidance (admittedly absurd) as to how to live his life. 
As he increases his commitment to the ‘little world’ of his mind, the ‘ludicrous 
broadsheet that Murphy had called his life-warrant, his bull of incommunication and 
corpus of deterrents, changed into the poem that he alone of the living could write’ (p. 
60). The pattern continues: 
The more his own system closed round him, the less he could tolerate its being 
subordinated to any other. Between him and his stars no doubt there was 
correspondence, but not in Suk’s sense. They were his stars, he was the prior 
system. […] Thus the sixpence worth of sky changed again, from the poem 
that he alone of all the living could have written to the poem that he alone of 
all the born could have written.  
(pp. 114–5) 
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Finally, Murphy finds himself ‘cold, tired, angry, impatient and out of conceit with a 
system that seemed the superfluous cartoon of his own’ (p. 118). He ‘swallows’ the 
astrological system whole by affirming his own priority over it, a priority that is 
fundamentally premised on his absolute self-absorption.    
Murphy’s association between this self-love and his commitment to freedom 
is established early on in the novel: he binds himself to a rocking chair, an act that 
supposedly ‘set[s] him free in his mind’ (Murphy, pp. 3–4). The ‘pleasure’ (p. 4) that 
this induces⎯not to mention the accelerating rocking motions leading to a desired 
climax⎯has a distinctly masturbatory quality: the ‘little’ world of his mind is one in 
which ‘he could love himself’ (p. 6). It is hardly surprising that such narcissism is 
explicitly positioned against his reluctant love for another, Celia, whose ill-timed 
telephone call interrupts Murphy in the midst of his bodily stimulation: ‘The part of 
him that he hated craved for Celia, the part that he loved shrivelled up at the thought 
of her’ (p. 7). Within the binary divisions that govern Murphy, mind, self-love and 
freedom occupy the positive side, while body, extra-personal love and world are 
discarded as negative. Murphy is unable to reconcile or mediate these oppositions. 
Thomas J. Cousineau has noted that ‘Murphy’s quest for freedom is shadowed 
throughout the novel by the similarly catastrophic journeys of Icarus and Ulysses’,7 
and identifies Murphy’s rocking chair as a ‘transformation of the ship that carries 
Ulysses to his doom’.8 While I acknowledge the thrust of the allusion, I would 
suggest that Murphy’s self-induced binding to the rocking chair echoes in a more 
specific way the Sirens episode of Homer’s Odyssey:   
Then they bound me fast, hand and foot, with the rope-ends tied to the mast 
itself. […] So they sang with their lovely voices, and my heart was eager to 
listen still. I twitched my brows to sign to the crew to let me go, but they 
leaned to their oars and rowed on.9 
He sat naked in his rocking-chair of undressed teak. […] Seven scarves held 
him in position. Two fastened his shins to the rockers, one his thighs to the 
seat, two his breast and belly to the back, one his wrists to the strut behind. 
Only the most local movements were possible. 
(Murphy, p. 3) 
                                                
7 ‘Demented vs. Creative Emulation in Murphy’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 18 (2007), 335–
65 (p. 363). 
8 Ibid. 
9 The Odyssey, trans. by Walter Shewring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980; repr. 1998), p. 147. 
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The allusion seems to be parodic: in his diary entry of January 1937, Beckett 
described Murphy as the ‘fundamental unheroic’10⎯a far cry from Homer’s epic 
hero. However, Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation of the Sirens episode in their 
1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment offers an insight into Murphy’s self-obsession. In 
their allegorical reading, they describe Odysseus as ‘the prototype of the bourgeois 
individual’ (DE, p. 24), suggesting that his decision to be bound to the mast of the 
ship so as to resist the allure of the Sirens’ song betrays the bourgeois drive of self-
preservation at all costs. This ‘maxim of all Western civilization’ (DE, p. 22) is 
articulated in Spinoza’s claim that ‘the endeavour of preserving oneself is the first and 
only basis of virtue’ (quoted in DE, p. 22), to which I shall return. The price of 
Odysseus’ act of self-preservation, however, is impotence and immobility: as Adorno 
expresses it in Minima Moralia, ‘self-preservation forfeits its self’ (MM, p. 230). That 
is, the desperate preservation of the self actually prevents the subject from 
experiencing the world: the bourgeois mechanism of self-preservation⎯the 
safeguarding of one’s future self⎯as self-sacrifice, or the renunciation of the desires 
of the present self, defers pleasure to an illusory future. ‘All who renounce’, Adorno 
argues, ultimately ‘give away more of their life than is given back to them, more than 
the life they preserve’ (DE, p. 43).  
 This paradox is beautifully expressed in Murphy, although not, significantly, 
by Murphy himself, but by the novel’s emblem of exchange, Celia, who comes to the 
realisation that ‘[s]he could not go where livings were made without feeling that they 
were being made away’ (Murphy, p. 44). The pun on the word ‘living’ as, on the one 
hand, a means of income for the preservation of existence and, on the other, the 
experiential state of human life, demonstrates the novel’s dissatisfaction with the 
capitalist London it presents. Nonetheless, despite himself, Murphy is an unlikely 
proponent of the bourgeois virtue of self-preservation. His scathing rejection of the 
‘mercantile gehenna’ (p. 27) obscures the continuity between that world and his deep 
commitment to his selfhood. The visual similarity between Odysseus tied to a mast 
and Murphy bound to his chair allows us to plumb the depths of the latter’s self-
obsession: his desire to preserve his beloved self at all costs. In an ironic fusion of 
Geulincx, ‘a philosopher of negation and ignorance’, and Spinoza, ‘the extreme 
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example of a philosophy of affirmation’,11 Murphy exercises the bourgeois value of 
self-preservation precisely by retreating, as far as possible, into his mind. ‘An atheist 
chipping the deity’, as the narrator notes sardonically, ‘was not more senseless than 
Murphy defending his courses of inaction’ (p. 26). Murphy does not so much refuse 
‘Spinoza’s conatus essendi, the life lived as a pursuit of interest’, as Andrew Gibson 
claims,12 as reinterpret the dictum so as to preserve the part of him that he loves: his 
mind, ‘hermetically closed to the universe without’ (p. 69). Murphy’s irrational 
affirmation of his selfhood, couched in the language of negation, illustrates the 
‘compulsive character of self-preservation’ (DE, p. 23) in a time when it serves no 
biological function.  
  Murphy’s self-obsession, moreover, is expressed in overtly Spinozan terms in 
the epigraph to Chapter 6: ‘Amor intellectualis quo Murphy se ipsum amat’ (Murphy, 
p. 69). This, as P. J. Murphy points out, ‘combines Propositions XXXV and XXXVI of 
the Fifth Part of the Ethics’,13 irreverently replacing the original ‘God’ for ‘Murphy’. 
Discarding God from the equation altogether, Murphy places himself at the centre of 
the Spinozan system, conforming, in blissful ignorance, to the bourgeois 
individualism of the world he longs to escape. Beyond this blasphemy, he crucially 
perverts the significance of the propositions, which conclude that ‘God, insofar as he 
loves himself, loves mankind, and, consequently, that the love of God towards men, 
and the mind’s intellectual love towards God are one and the same’.14 Unlike God’s 
expansive intellectual love of himself that extends to mankind, Murphy’s narcissism 
is narrow and limited to the bounds of his mind. This hermeneutic corruption of 
Spinoza colours the description of Murphy’s mind in Chapter 6 and, more 
importantly, its ‘treasures’ (p. 71). It reveals what Gibson describes as the ‘fake 
grandiosity’ of what dresses itself up as a sophic search for freedom,15 but which is in 
fact an onanistic detachment from the world. Indeed, Adorno suggests that, 
inherently, ‘the human subject’s interest in his freedom is narcissistic’ (HF, p. 209): 
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In the light of the social coercion to which the ego succumbs, the self forms 
the idea that it would be better to be different, that it would be better to be 
free. In this web of delusion it adopts a kind of compensatory role in the sense 
that, having once surrendered to external compulsion, it imagines that it can 
still define itself as a free being, inwardly at least. […] This inner kingdom 
consists in the idea of an internal life that is supposed to be a haven of peace 
and quiet, largely independent of the factors that determine the external world. 
(HF, p. 220) 
What the narcissistic subject, infatuated with the idea of his own freedom, fails to 
realise is that, paradoxically, it is ‘the organization of the world, the nature of the 
world, that actually determines the extent to which the subject achieves autonomy’ 
(HF, p. 222). Freedom⎯or, indeed, the very concept of the individual⎯makes no 
sense except in relation to the very objective world from which Murphy flees. 
 It is in the ‘Magdalen Mental Mercyseat’ (Murphy, p. 99)⎯the ultimate 
withdrawal from the (ostensibly) rational world⎯that Murphy is able to 
wholeheartedly indulge in his self-destructive narcissism. Once again, the chapter 
epigraph offers a valuable insight: Malraux’s ‘Il est difficile à celui qui vit hors du 
monde de ne pas rechercher les siens’ (p. 99). As David Tucker argues, far from 
desiring a community of like-minded souls as Malraux’s idealistic formulation would 
suggest, Murphy is interested in the patients ‘only in so far as they reflect (he hopes, 
precisely mirror) his own sense of self’.16 His sense of ‘respect and unworthiness’ at 
the patients’ supposed ‘self-immersed indifference to the contingencies of the 
contingent world’ (p. 106) is maintained only by ignoring the ‘frequent expressions 
apparently of pain, rage, despair and in fact all the usual […], suggesting a fly 
somewhere in the ointment of Microcosmos’ (p. 112). Hence, of course, Murphy’s 
gratification at being told by Ticklepenny that he ‘had a great look of Clarke there a 
minute ago’, Clarke having ‘been for three weeks in a katatonic stupor’ (p. 121). It is, 
however, Mr. Endon⎯whose name, meaning ‘within’, offers Murphy a seductive 
example of nominative determinism⎯whose psychosis attracts Murphy ‘as Narcissus 
to his fountain’ (p. 116). The simile is not out of place. Mr. Endon is, for Murphy, 
merely an idealised reflection, and one in which he gazes with increasing obsession: 
‘Nor did he succeed in coming alive in his mind any more. He blamed this on his 
body, […] but it was rather due to the vicarious autology that he had been enjoying 
                                                
16 Samuel Beckett and Arnold Geulincx: Tracing a ‘Literary Fantasia’ (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), p. 
63. 
  53 
each morning, in little Mr. Endon and all the other proxies’ (p. 118). The patients at 
the MMM are no more than ‘proxies’ for Murphy’s blinkered self-study. The 
reflection-motif of the Narcissus myth is repeated when Murphy gazes into Mr. 
Endon’s eyes and sees, ‘in the cornea, horribly reduced, obscured and distorted, his 
own image’ (p. 156). This is a crucial moment of realisation for Murphy, the 
consequence of which is his decision to return to Celia and the ‘big world’. 
Throughout the novel, Murphy has been entranced by his own self, convinced that in 
the ‘little world’ of his mind he can achieve freedom. This last encounter with Mr. 
Endon unveils the true nature of this longed-for padded cell as a space of alienation 
and nescience that is a far cry from Murphy’s impulse to transcend the ‘big world’. 
His supposed freedom is exposed as an imprisonment in a hardened self that has 
never escaped capitalism’s logic of individualism. It is unsurprising that the 
description of Murphy’s third mental zone, in which he feels himself to be ‘a mote in 
the dark of absolute freedom’ (p. 72) appears here in similarly ‘obscured and 
distorted’ form: ‘Mr. Murphy is a speck in Mr. Endon’s unseen’ (p. 156). ‘KNOW 
THYSELF’ is the Geulingian exhortation designed to prompt a humble 
acknowledgement of our incapacity for action.17 But for all Murphy’s ‘vicarious 
autology’, he never succeeds in attaining self-knowledge. As Adorno suggests, ‘the 
individual, […] who has come to be his own be-all and end-all, falls victim to the 
delusion of an individualistic society and thus fails to know himself’ (HF, p. 264). 
Murphy’s retreat from the world of capital⎯‘where Quid pro quo was cried as wares’ 
(p. 6)⎯is utterly defined by its terms, all the more so because of his blinkered state.  
 For Tucker, who traces Murphy’s ‘uses and abuses’ of Arthur Geulincx’s 
work,18 it is Murphy’s narcissism that prevents him from fulfilling the Occasionalist  
maxim of ‘Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis’ (Murphy, p. 112): ‘Where you are worth 
nothing, there you should want nothing’.19 He argues that Murphy ‘cannot bring 
himself to want nothing in the big world’,20 due to ‘his deplorable susceptibility to 
Celia, ginger, and so on’ (p. 112). A life free from desire, as encapsulated in 
Geulincx’s ‘beautiful Belgo-Latin’ (p. 112), remains for Murphy ‘the unattainable, a 
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futile hope of freedom’.21 Tucker therefore suggests that it is precisely Murphy’s lack 
of humility⎯his inability to accept his powerlessness and hence 
worthlessness22⎯that prevents him from reaching the freedom for which he strives, 
arguing that ‘Murphy’s occasional access to his Occasionalist nothingness [is] an 
index of his freedom’.23 This hypothesis that Murphy’s failure lies merely in his 
perversion of Geulingian principles implies that if they were exercised correctly, they 
would induce an authentic freedom. And there is no doubt of the seductiveness of the 
Geulingian maxim as an alternative to the sphere of exchange, where everything has a 
price and a ‘worth’. The strength of Murphy, however, is that it does not make any 
such commitment to Occasionalism, despite Murphy’s own distorted faith in it. As L. 
A. C. Dobrez asserts, ‘one cannot envisage a world where all is kept in motion by 
God’⎯Geulincx’s world⎯‘except as a world bereft of free will’.24 In Molloy, Beckett 
echoes Geulincx’s own effort to salvage freedom within his own system: ‘I who had 
loved the image of old Geulincx, dead young, who left me free, on the black boat of 
Ulysses, to crawl towards the East, along the deck. That is a great measure of 
freedom, for him who has not the pioneering spirit’ (Molloy, p. 50). In light of this 
image, Tucker himself admits that Geulingian ‘submission that is both metaphysical 
and ethical […] endangers the viability of both actual free will and freedom to 
intend’.25 Even the humblest of Murphys could not attain freedom by submitting to 
Occasionalism. Its absolute determinism precludes any real freedom, even for those 
who lack the ‘pioneering spirit’.  
 Far from presenting Murphy’s failure to adhere to Geulincx’s principles, what 
Beckett illuminates through his protagonist’s occasional Occasionalism is the 
convergence between absolute freedom and determinism. In line with Dobrez’s 
observation that Murphy’s third zone of freedom is ‘indistinguishable from 
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necessity’,26 Adorno argues that, ‘[i]n their inmost core, the theses of determinism and 
of freedom coincide. Both proclaim identity. The reduction to pure spontaneity 
applies to the empirical subjects the very same law which as an expanded causal 
category becomes determinism’ (ND, p. 264). Murphy’s pursuit of a God-like 
freedom and Geulincx’s prescription of absolute humility in response to a world in 
which we ‘have no capacity for action’,27 are not, then, so far apart as they might 
seem: in the terms of Beckett’s re-imagining of Geulincx’s explanation of freedom, 
the pioneer Ulysses and the ‘sadly rejoicing slave’ (Molloy, p. 50) converge. 
Ultimately, neither acknowledges the necessity of mediation between subject and 
object, self and world. Both are therefore in thrall to the logic of identity that, for 
Adorno, characterises modern capitalism and its primacy of exchange that Murphy 
finds so abhorrent, but which he is ultimately unable to transcend.  
Gibson argues that the ‘uneasy irony’ of Murphy can be located precisely in 
the novel’s simultaneous ‘indifference to the economic claim’ and uncertainty that 
‘any plausible alternative to the logic of the market-place exists’.28 I would suggest 
that such irony is exacerbated by Murphy’s inability to move beyond the framework 
of the economic world and its social corollary of individualism. His retreat into the 
sanctuary of mind is always circumscribed by its narcissistic compulsion towards self-
preservation, definitive of the bourgeois individual. Murphy’s failure is not his lack of 
humility, as Tucker suggests, but his refusal to countenance a dialectic between 
‘[i]nner and outer’ (HF, p. 187). He is never able to acknowledge himself as 
belonging ‘to the external world to which [he knows himself] to be contrasted and 
counterpoised’ (HF, p. 187) and is therefore oblivious to the extent to which the 
doctrines of individualism according to which he lives his life are rooted in the world 
he rejects. Not only, Adorno insists, is ‘the self entwined in society’, but it ‘grows 
richer the more freely it develops and reflects this relation, while it is limited, 
impoverished and reduced by the separation and hardening that it lays claim to as an 
origin’ (MM, p. 154). In this sense we can see the legitimacy of Martin Schuster’s 
claim that the definitive outcome of the dialectic of enlightenment for Adorno is that 
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‘I must carve out a space outside my subjectivity, outside myself’,29 an ambition that 
is, for Murphy, completely unfathomable, but a space in which freedom, albeit of a 
negative sort, inheres. This does not, however, neutralise the critique levelled by 
Murphy at the mercantile society he so abhors, but it does significantly complicate his 
justifiable if ineffectual ambition to escape its context of unfreedom. Murphy 
articulates these deeper limitations at the heart of its protagonist’s own spectacular 
failure to attain freedom, but offers no discernible route out of their impasse. Adorno 
offers a compelling framework within which to understand Murphy’s self-defeating 
actions, one that brings to the fore the complexities of the novel’s engagement with 
freedom and its immersion in the empirical world.   
 
II 
 
In the immediate post-war period in which Beckett was writing Eleutheria, 
existentialism, Gibson notes, ‘reached the height of its popularity’,30 and, indeed, 
became what Nicholas Hewitt describes as the ‘official philosophy of the Fourth 
Republic’.31 Gibson goes on to explore Beckett’s wariness of the post-Liberation 
atmosphere of blind optimism and Gaullist unity. While he emphasises that there was 
no unproblematic alignment between existentialism and de Gaulle’s establishment,32 
he suggests that Beckett was sceptical of their shared rhetoric of commitment and 
responsibility. In this context, Victor’s withdrawal from society in Eleutheria can be 
understood as a targeted response to Sartrean existentialism⎯one that in striking 
ways coincides with Adorno’s own dogged critiques of existential philosophy. 
Victor’s refusal to commit to a project marks Eleutheria’s attempt to trace out an 
alternative route to freedom in direct antithesis to the values propounded by Sartre. 
However, the text does not simply endorse Victor’s efforts to be ‘the least possible’ 
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(Eleutheria, p. 149), but rather subverts the coercive logic of the decision altogether. 
Reading Eleutheria alongside Adorno’s explicit critiques of existentialism not only 
offers a provocative point of convergence between Beckett and Adorno⎯one that can 
be seen to follow on from Adorno’s contrasts between Beckett and the existentialists 
in ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’⎯but also permits a nuanced reading of 
Eleutheria that does not underestimate the significance of its struggles with the 
problematic of freedom. 
Sartre’s The Age of Reason, the first book of his trilogy, The Roads to 
Freedom, was published just two years before Beckett wrote Eleutheria. The parallels 
between the two texts are striking, with both exploring a man’s desperate struggle to 
attain freedom. Although Mathieu, Sartre’s protagonist, does not withdraw from the 
world in the way that Victor does, his very life is structured around an avoidance of 
commitment. As his brother argues: 
“You condemn capitalist society, and yet you are an official in that society; 
you display an abstract sympathy with Communists, but you take care not to 
commit yourself, you have never voted. You despise the bourgeois class, and 
yet you are a bourgeois, son and brother of a bourgeois, and you live like a 
bourgeois”.33 
Both Victor and Mathieu are caught up in structures of bourgeois society that they 
attempt to evade⎯Victor by renouncing it altogether and Mathieu by refusing to live 
with or marry the woman he loves. However, they are not motivated by political or 
social beliefs but rather by a rather nebulous personal desire to be free. Although 
Mathieu’s yearning is observed and discussed by the other characters, he still displays 
reluctance and almost embarrassment when discussing it:  
“Listen,” said Mathieu, “there’s a misunderstanding here: I care little whether 
I’m a bourgeois or whether I’m not. All I want is”⎯and he uttered the final 
words through clenched teeth and with a sort of shame⎯“to retain my 
freedom”.34 
In the same way, Victor’s begrudging revelation⎯‘I have always wanted to be free. I 
don’t know why’ (Eleutheria, p. 147)⎯is only dragged out of him at the threat of 
torture. However, these superficial similarities are undermined by the texts’ larger 
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concerns. While Christina Howells rightly warns against reading Sartre’s novels as ‘a 
mere simplification or popularization of his philosophical theories’,35 The Age of 
Reason is in essence an existential novel, into which Sartre’s major theories are 
distilled; Mathieu, for example, realises that he is ‘condemned for ever to be free’,36 a 
direct quotation from Being and Nothingness37, while in the third volume of the 
trilogy, the 1949 Iron in the Soul, his commitment to a final stand against the German 
soldiers invading France is couched in overtly existentialist terminology: ‘He fired. 
He was cleansed. He was all-powerful. He was free’.38 Eleutheria, on the other hand, 
satirises Sartre’s theories to mount a critique of the existentialist concept of freedom. 
M. Krap, for example, deflates the existentialist belief in the absurdity of life, which 
cannot be chosen:39 ‘I am the cow who arrives at the gate of the slaughterhouse and 
only then understands all the absurdity of the pastures’ (p. 20). Far from exhibiting a 
‘sense of metaphysical anguish at the absurdity of the human condition’,40 Beckett 
satirises contemporaneous existential discourses of the absurd. Similarly, he offers a 
reductio ad absurdum of Sartre’s claim that consciousness is ‘wholly body’, with 
‘nothing behind the body’,41 in Dr Piouk’s polite insistence that Mme Meck is her 
organs ‘[w]ithout the slightest residue’ (p. 31).  
 Eleutheria’s saturation with existentialist motifs has not gone unnoticed. 
Werner Huber notes that references ‘to “human existence”, “mankind”, and 
“absurdity” are over-determined’, rendering the ‘philosophical-historical background 
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to which Beckett is responding […] more than obvious’,42 while Mariko Hori 
Tanaka’s comparison between the play and Sartre’s The Flies emphasises Beckett’s 
‘critical and negative views of Sartre’s notion of freedom’.43 However, I suggest that 
Adorno’s explicit critique of Sartre allows for a more rigorous and revealing 
explication of the play’s specific subversion of, and possible alternative to, the 
hypostatising category of the Sartrean ‘decision’. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno 
opposes Sartre’s central claim that man ‘is wholly and forever free’,44 arguing that the 
‘notion of absolute freedom of choice is […] illusionary’ (ND, p. 50). Sartre explains 
the free decision as follows:   
Thus we shall not say that a prisoner is always free to go out of prison, which 
would be absurd, nor that he is always free to long for release, which would be 
an irrelevant truism, but that he is always free to try to escape (or get himself 
liberated); that is, that whatever his condition may be, he can project his 
escape and learn the value of his project by undertaking some action.45 
The example of the prisoner neatly explicates the notion of Sartrean freedom. 
Freedom, for Sartre, is not the ability to do whatever you want (the prisoner cannot 
simply leave the prison); nor is it a purely intellectual phenomenon (the prisoner 
could wish to be out of the prison but this would not accomplish anything). Rather, 
freedom is the ability, and, indeed, the compulsion, to determine the meaning of the 
‘situation in which I am born’ and act accordingly (the prisoner can ‘learn the value of 
his project’).46 For Adorno, Sartre urges the ‘category of decision the more 
exclusively, the smaller the objective chances left to it by the distribution of social 
power’ (ND, p. 49). He argues that Sartre radically underestimates the objective 
power of society that renders freedom an ever-diminishing possibility that is never 
guaranteed: indeed, ‘[w]hole epochs, whole societies lacked not only the concept of 
freedom but the thing’ (ND, p. 218). The absolute sense of responsibility that Sartre 
demands is therefore a cruel appendage to the powerlessness already experienced by 
individuals. Thus, for Sartre, a person with an inferiority complex has chosen it: ‘to 
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choose inferiority does not mean to be sweetly contented with an aurea mediocritas; 
it is to produce and to assume the rebellion and despair which constitute the revelation 
of this inferiority’.47 Adorno, on the other hand, argues that the presence of such 
neuroses provides an insight into one’s ‘unfree side’: ‘[t]his truth content of neuroses 
is that the I has its unfreedom demonstrated to it, within itself, by something alien to 
it’ (ND, p. 222). Neuroses mirror the unfreedom of society.48 Indeed, for Adorno, the 
‘paper-doll leaders’ (NL2, p. 81) who supposedly control society are equally 
determined by its objective forces; he claims that Sartre’s mistake is ‘in weaving the 
veil of personalization, the idea that those who are in charge, and not an anonymous 
machinery, make the decisions, and that there is still life on the heights of social 
command posts’ (NL2, p. 81). Sartre’s 1947 assertion that ‘[i]n whatever 
circumstances, at whatever time, and in whatever place, man is free to choose himself 
as traitor or hero, coward or conqueror’49 would be, for Adorno, dangerously naïve. 
Citing Adorno’s claim that ‘a free man would only be one who need not bow 
to any alternatives’ (ND, p. 226), David Sherman reiterates the same criticism that 
was levelled against Adorno in the late 1960s, charging him with resignation.50 As 
Adorno puts it, ‘a person who in the present hour doubts the possibility of radical 
change in society and who for that reason neither takes part in nor recommends 
spectacular, violent action is guilty of resignation’ (CI, p. 171). Sherman identifies 
two ways of interpreting Adorno. The weak reading would claim the following:  
Adorno only means to say that thought must not shirk its responsibility to 
continually think through changing social circumstances in the process of 
aligning itself with the most emancipatory political alternative, which it then 
seeks to positively affect.51 
The strong reading, on the other hand, interprets Adorno as arguing that ‘one must not 
even critically and self-consciously choose to align oneself with the best alternative 
within a “coercive structure” (which, historically, is, of course, ubiquitous)’.52 
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Arguing that this strong reading more convincingly captures the thrust of Adorno’s 
argument, Sherman accuses the philosopher of attempting to ‘dodge moral 
responsibility by refraining from political practice’⎯a charge of resignation.53 This 
claim is partly based on the fact that Adorno ‘abstains from participating in the new 
left’,54 a correlation that places Sherman firmly in the Sartrean camp, with its 
manifesto: ‘I ought to commit myself and then act my commitment, according to the 
time-honoured formula that “one need not hope in order to undertake one’s work”.’55 
Sherman presents an overly simplistic account of Adorno’s view, failing to take into 
account the extent to which he wrestles with the problem of active engagement with a 
bad totality. Moreover, Adorno offers an alternative to the ‘category of the decision’ 
(ND, p. 49) hypostatized by existentialism⎯an alternative that is framed by the 
‘controversy’ (NL2, p. 76) between committed and autonomous art. For Adorno, this 
binary opposition cannot be maintained: 
Each of the two alternatives negates itself along with the other: committed art, 
which as art is necessarily detached from reality, because it negates its 
difference from reality; l’art pour l’art because through its absolutization it 
denies even the indissoluble connection that is contained in art’s autonomy as 
its polemical a priori. 
(NL2, p. 77) 
Each position precludes mediation with reality: committed art purports to offer an 
unmediated representation of the world, thus refusing to acknowledge its status as art, 
while autonomous art falsely professes its complete isolation from the sphere of 
existence. Paradoxically, then, Adorno argues that true commitment can only take 
place through autonomy, but an autonomy that is acutely aware that its ‘detachment 
from empirical reality is at the same time mediated by that reality’ (NL2, p. 89).  
This aesthetic argument finds its social corollary in Minima Moralia, in which 
two adjacent aphorisms address the problem of engagement with the world. The first 
argues that ‘[t]here is nothing innocuous left’ (MM, p. 25). Nothing, Adorno insists, is 
‘exempt from the responsibility of thought’ (MM, p. 25): the cinema is an instrument 
of the Culture Industry, fostering conformism; the beauty of a ‘blossoming tree’ (MM, 
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p. 25) belies the damaged world surrounding it; and sociality is a sham. In light of 
this, Adorno argues that ‘inviolable isolation is now the only way of showing some 
measure of solidarity’ (MM, p. 26). The next aphorism, as its title, ‘Antithesis’, would 
suggest, offers the opposite viewpoint: ‘He who stands aloof runs the risk of believing 
himself better than others and misusing his critique of society as an ideology for his 
private interest’ (MM, p. 27). Adorno’s resolution of this antinomy is that while ‘[t]he 
detached observer is as much entangled as the active participant’⎯concurring with 
Sherman that ‘we are always already up to our elbows in blood in the “coercive 
structure” in which we find ourselves’56⎯the former gains ‘insight into his 
entanglement, and the infinitesimal freedom that lies in knowledge as such’ (MM, p. 
27). This freedom is elsewhere attributed to the refusal to be bound by the necessarily 
constraining options provided by society that are reflected in the ‘absolute’ (ND, p. 
49) Sartrean decision: 
A free man would only be one who need not bow to any alternatives, and 
under existing circumstances there is a touch of freedom in refusing to accept 
the alternatives. Freedom means to criticize and change situations, not to 
confirm them by deciding within their coercive structure. 
(ND, p. 226) 
This refusal to adhere to the ‘prescribed form of the alternatives’ (NL2, p. 79) and 
commit to one or the other or them does not necessitate resignation; nor does 
disengagement from a society obsessed with ‘pseudo-activity’ (CI, p. 173) amount to 
capitulation to the status quo. ‘When the doors are barricaded’ (CI, p. 173), Adorno 
argues, what is required is thought, the ‘force of resistance’ (CI, p. 175) that opens our 
blinkered eyes. 
As Peter Boxall notes, Eleutheria’s very title has a strong political resonance: 
‘it originates from the word “Eleutherian”, a title given to Zeus which names him in 
his specific capacity as protector of political freedom’, and ‘has come to signify a 
transgressive desire for political liberty’.57 This situates Victor’s emphatically 
apolitical search for freedom both within and against a Sartrean context of 
commitment and, indeed, what Gibson describes as the ‘morality of engagement’ that 
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overwhelmingly characterised post-war France.58 The play is propelled forward by an 
intensifying insistence that Victor must ‘explain’ (Eleutheria, p. 141) his withdrawal 
from home and society. As the reasonable bewilderment of his friends and family is 
supplemented by the burning curiosity of strangers and audience members, the play 
itself threatens to disintegrate, as though Victor’s inexplicable retreat has damaged the 
very mechanisms of the work-a-day world. 
 Victor is positioned against the ideal of the committed man propounded by 
Sartre. His passivity and indifference threaten the play’s other characters, who insist 
on reinscribing his non-decision into a personal ‘project’: 
GLAZIER      […] [W]hat is all this bullshit? We need feelings, for Christ’s 
sake! Naturally you love your mother, naturally you love your fiancée, 
but… but you have your duties⎯to yourself, to your work, to science, to 
the party, to I don’t know what else, which make you a man apart, an 
exceptional being, which don’t allow you to enjoy the pleasures of 
family relationships, of passion, which clap a cellophane mask over your 
face. To have feelings, to have feelings⎯and then to reject them, that’s 
your mission! To sacrifice everything, to your fixed idea, to your 
vocation! And only then do you start living. No one would want to lynch 
you any more. You are the model of the poor young man, the heroic 
young man. People see you dying like a dog at thirty-three, exhausted by 
your labours, by your discoveries, ravaged by radium, prostrated by 
sleepless nights and privation, killed in the performance your duty, shot 
by Franco, shot by Stalin. Everyone applauds you. Your mother dies of a 
broken heart, so does your fiancée, but what does that matter, we need 
men like you, men of ideals […]. 
 (Eleutheria, p. 87) 
The Glazier does not compel Victor to take a particular course of action; rather, he 
charges him to commit to something. He expounds the existential belief that, as a man 
‘condemned to be free’ in a godless world, Victor has an obligation to create his own 
values and make decisions accordingly.59 His withdrawal from society is only socially 
comprehensible as a consequence of his free commitment to ‘work, to science, to the 
party’. Even Jesus, who was supposedly crucified at ‘thirty-three’, is referenced as a 
political figure who died for his beliefs. Victor is permitted to throw his life away if 
he does so through a sense of ‘duty’. Sartre argues that man’s free choices place ‘the 
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entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders’.60 However, 
man’s responsibility does not rest here; in Kantian terms, Sartre insists that he is 
‘responsible for all men. […] [I]n choosing for himself he chooses for all men’.61 By 
committing to a course of action, Victor would, implicitly or otherwise, be an 
advocate for that path. Since, for Sartre, freedom is ‘the foundation of all values’, ‘the 
actions of men of good faith have, as their ultimate significance, the quest of freedom 
itself as such’.62 Sartrean commitment is communal: it extends beyond the self 
towards ‘the liberty of others’.63 According to this logic, Victor’s personal search for 
freedom through withdrawal is not only self-deceptive but fundamentally unethical.64 
Victor himself is acutely aware of what the family, friends and strangers who 
‘persecute’ (Eleutheria, p. 144)⎯another loaded term⎯him want. He recognises that 
‘[s]aints, madmen, martyrs, victims of torture⎯they don’t bother you in the least, 
they are in the natural order of things’ (p. 145). These are carefully chosen examples. 
Saints and martyrs, like the ‘men of ideals’ in the Glazier’s speech, have carried out 
actions that are comprehensible as part of their project. The reference to ‘madmen’ 
and ‘victims of torture’ allude pointedly to two of Sartre’s more provocative claims: 
first, that madmen are in bad faith⎯he stated in 1964 that he considered ‘mental 
illness as the “way out” that the free organism, in its total unity, invents in order to 
live through an intolerable situation’65⎯and, second, that ‘even the red hot pincers of 
the torturer do not exempt us from being free’.66  
That Beckett satirises the Sartrean ethic of commitment is evident, but it is 
questionable how far the text validates the alternative presented by Victor. Tanaka 
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presents Victor as a straightforward mouthpiece for Beckett by claiming that ‘[i]f 
Sartre believed positively in the freedom of action as a means for responsibly 
changing society for the better, Beckett clearly sought for freedom of inaction as a 
right of human beings’.67 However, if we have learnt anything from Adorno’s critique 
of Sartre, it is that we do not have to⎯and, indeed, should not⎯acknowledge a false 
alternative such as Tanaka erects. Eleutheria would certainly be simpler if, as the 
Spectator suggests, ‘its characters had clear heads and fresh mouths, the two lives, the 
two principles, faith and pleasure, faith in no matter what and the minimum of 
displeasure’ (Eleutheria, p. 136). However, as Adorno argues, when ‘committed 
works of art present decisions to be made and make those decisions their criteria, the 
choices become interchangeable’ (NL2, p. 80). Eleutheria is a play about commitment 
and decision-making, but it does not genuinely offer the audience a choice between 
alternatives, for all the Spectator’s efforts to twist the play into something eminently 
logical: ‘Either it’s life, with all the… all the… subjection it entails, or it’s… the great 
departure, the real one, to use one of the metaphors you’re so fond of. Isn’t it?’ (p. 
151). In fact, it is ultimately unclear what the somewhat nebulous freedom so prized 
by Victor actually amounts to. He accuses the Glazier and Spectator of feeling ‘the 
furious hatred old maids feel for whores. Your own liberty is so miserable! So paltry! 
So threadbare! So ugly!’ (p. 148), but his very metaphor betrays the ‘threadbare’ 
nature of his own supposed freedom: prostitutes are no more free from the world than 
old maids. In fact, one of the most revealing lines in the play comes from the 
Spectator, who gloats: ‘Dead or alive, he belongs to us, he’s one of us again. That’s 
all we had to prove. That basically there’s only us’ (p. 152). This ‘ignominious 
adaptation’ (MM, p. 99) to reality divulged by the man who claims to represent ‘a 
thousand spectators, all slightly different from each other’ (p. 128) is a fundamental 
polemic against the very possibility of freedom, and one that Victor ultimately resists 
by refusing to either return home or kill himself. He evades the absolute 
decision⎯couched in existentialist terminology but perverting its principles⎯offered 
to him by Dr Piouk: ‘Come on! The great refusal, not the lesser one, the great one, the 
one that only man is capable of, the most glorious one he is capable of, the refusal of 
Existence!’ (p. 161). He accepts the tablet whilst refusing to take it⎯‘I don’t need it. I 
shall keep it, though’ (p. 163)⎯and returns to his original condition of ‘limbo’ (p. 
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164). It is perhaps an unsatisfactory and even unsettling ending, but the play’s circular 
structure should not obscure the extent to which Victor has gained a privileged 
‘insight into his entanglement, and the infinitesimal freedom that lies in knowledge as 
such’. 
 
III 
 
Negativity is inscribed within Beckett’s work as early as Murphy and Eleutheria in 
their recognition of the impossibility of directly presenting freedom. Even the three 
zones of freedom depicted in Murphy are carefully framed by what Murphy’s mind 
‘felt and pictured itself to be’, in contradistinction to how ‘it really was’ (Murphy, p. 
69): as David Weisberg observes, ‘[t]he private, subjective realm in which such 
freedom becomes visible is antithetical to the narrative perspective, which can only 
look in at a mind, an “apparatus”, looking at itself’.68 Indeed, Murphy’s failure is 
preordained by the narrator’s very first lines: ‘The sun shone, having no alternative, 
on the nothing new. Murphy sat out of it, as though he were free’ (p. 3; my italics). 
Freedom cannot be positively presented in art, Adorno argues, because it ‘is 
something that cannot be found in the realm of factual reality’: 
[I]f we wanted, paradoxically, to uncover its empirical, factual roots, it would 
lead us to a void, a deficiency⎯namely to the experience that freedom has 
never yet been made a reality in the entire realm of historical and natural 
experience so far as this is known to us.  
(HF, pp. 177–8) 
In this respect, freedom converges with utopia: ‘the yet-to-exist’ (AT, p. 178). Like 
utopia, it cannot be concretized in thought or art, ‘in order not to betray it by 
providing semblance and consolation’ (AT, p. 41). In fact, Adorno argues, ‘[t]he 
Utopian impulse in thinking is all the stronger, the less it objectifies itself as 
Utopia⎯a further form of regression⎯whereby it sabotages its own realization’ (CI, 
p. 175). Beckett extricates himself from this dilemma by honing in on the failure of 
his protagonists to attain freedom, the concept itself figuring as an elusive emptiness 
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at the heart of the texts. Its very inexpressibility is encapsulated in Victor’s final and 
incoherent explanation of his life, the tantalising hints of which are undermined by his 
dogged insistence that it ‘isn’t the truth’ (Eleutheria, p. 150). However, ultimately this 
negative logic that preserves the texts from betraying freedom by portraying it does 
not go far enough, because it is confined to content alone.  
For Adorno, form and content (Inhalt) are dialectically related.69 It is 
impossible to extricate one wholly from the other, given their ‘entwinement’ (AT, p. 
185), but this is not to say that their relationship amounts to an undifferentiated 
identity. In explicitly Kantian terms, Adorno argues that absolute form or absolute 
content would be, respectively, ‘empty or blind, self-sufficient play or raw empiria’ 
(AT, p. 194), even assuming that the one could be utterly disentangled from the other. 
Within the dialectic, however, ‘the scale […] tips toward form’ (AT, p. 191): Adorno 
stresses that ‘[a]s little as art is to be defined by any other element, it is simply 
identical with form’ (AT, p. 186). Since every dialectic is historically mediated, we 
should see Adorno’s self-conscious leaning towards the primacy of form as a reaction, 
first, against the Communist Georg Lukács’s dogmatic inheritance of Hegel’s 
‘aesthetics of content [Inhalt]’ (AT, p. 196) and, second, to the objective conditions of 
reality: if form is the means by which art ‘separates itself from the merely existing’ 
(AT, p. 187), then the content of a disenchanted and alienated world requires 
intensified mediation if it is not to degenerate into affirmation within the artwork. The 
significance of form for Adorno lies in its ‘transformation of what is given into 
something other, that is, something unreal, nonidentical’.70 With this in mind, he 
notes that ‘while the concept of subject matter [Stoff] remains a concern of art, in its 
immediacy as a theme that can be lifted over from external reality and worked upon, 
it has, since Kandinsky, Proust, and Joyce, incontrovertibly declined’ (AT, p. 196).  
Following Lukács, Adorno describes the novel as ‘the literary form specific to 
the bourgeois age’ (NL2, p. 30). Since its inception, the novel has ‘had as its true 
subject matter the conflict between living human beings and rigidified conditions’ 
(NL2, p. 32): that is, as David Cunningham explains, it is ‘essentially defined by its 
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modern, alienated character, directing itself towards the (historically new) “inner 
experience” of the bourgeois subject’.71 It is a genre defined by the historical 
phenomenon of individualism. However, as Benjamin suggests, the very invention of 
the novel is the ‘earliest symptom of a process whose end is the decline of 
storytelling’.72 That is, the novel form contains within itself the liquidation of ‘the 
very category of the individual itself, around which [it] was historically constituted’,73 
because this very individual was always already an alienated self, formed by the logic 
of capital. Within this trajectory, the novel’s mode of representation must inevitably 
change so as to be equal to the increasingly disenchanted world it is part of, but which 
it also critiques. Murphy acts as a pastiche of an earlier (and now historically defunct) 
form of the novel by combining an individualist narrative, with all the trappings of the 
nineteenth-century novel in the Neary et al. subplot, with an omniscient but self-
reflexive narrator who is aware of the impossibility of his stance in the absence of 
‘[t]he identity of experience in the form of a life that is articulated and possesses 
internal continuity’ (NL2, p. 31). The novel thematically expresses the alienation felt 
by the subject⎯Murphy⎯in relation to the world, but within an aesthetic framework 
in which there is still an individual to feel alienated and pursue his own ends in 
defiance of the external world. The self-preserving and thereby self-destructive 
individualism that is cleverly and complexly thematised in Murphy, and which 
ultimately literally blows up in the protagonist’s face, is reflected in a form that only 
parodies rather than entirely deconstructing the logic of individualism at the heart of 
the novel. For this reason we can say that Murphy’s form lags behind its content. It 
fails to register that ‘the experience of the disintegration of experience evade[s] direct 
presentation’74⎯that which Beckett’s later texts are so acutely aware. If Beckett’s 
stated aim in 1961 is to ‘find a form that accommodates the mess’,75 the pre-war 
Murphy’s form accommodates the mess a little too neatly, retaining too much of the 
aesthetic unity it consistently mocks on the level of content⎯for example, in the 
‘closed system’ (Murphy, p. 38) of desire:  
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Of such was Neary’s love for Miss Dwyer, who loved a Flight-Lieutenant 
Elliman, who loved a Miss Farren of Ringsakiddy, who loved a Father Fitt of 
Ballinclashet, who in all sincerity was bound to acknowledge a certain 
vocation for a Mrs. West of Passage, who loved Neary. 
(p. 5) 
The form of an advanced work of art, as Fred Rush explains, is ‘barely […] able to 
contain the disintegration of that world’ it mediates.76 While Murphy is in many ways 
an exciting and experimental novel, its critical force qua art is limited by its form, 
which does not sufficiently stray from its subverted models to inaugurate a new and 
sufficiently radical mode of representing and opposing the world.  
 Adorno compares the traditional novel ‘to the three-walled stage of bourgeois 
theatre. This technique was one of illusion. The narrator raises a curtain: the reader is 
to take part in what occurs as though he were physically present. The narrator’s 
subjectivity proves itself in the power to produce this illusion’ (NL2, p. 33). As a 
‘highly satirical, melodramatic, bourgeois comedy’,77 Eleutheria parodies the popular 
nineteenth-century ‘well-made play’.78 It brashly subverts the ‘illusion’ of bourgeois 
theatre, breaking the fourth wall by the entry of the Spectator, the huffy exit of the 
Prompter and such self-reflexive comments as Victor’s irritated ‘[i]mpossible to break 
anything’ (Eleutheria, p. 66)⎯as Boxall notes, ‘Victor recognises that his attempts to 
destroy his environment are always absorbed into his belonging to and inclusion in 
the stage space’.79 Visually speaking, the third act of the play sees the expansion of 
Victor’s side of the stage, forcing the Kraps’ salon into the orchestra pit. Nonetheless, 
Eleutheria, like Murphy, remains tied to the very conventions it subverts. Boxall 
argues that the text ends with Victor’s ‘acknowledgement of his ineluctable 
containment within the cultural and theatrical references which bring the stage that he 
occupies into being’;80 such an acknowledgement could as easily be attributed to 
Beckett himself, who would never again write a play so subordinate to traditional 
theatrical forms. 
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Adorno argues that ‘[f]orm is the law of the transfiguration of the existing, 
counter to which it represents freedom’ (AT, p. 189). For all their obsession with 
freedom, neither Murphy nor Eleutheria sufficiently transfigure or reconstellate the 
content that they lift from empirical reality. They are tied to the traditional even as 
they mock it. In these terms alone both texts can be considered failures, mirroring the 
failures of Murphy and Victor to ‘be free’ (Eleutheria, p. 147). Nonetheless, it is from 
the vantage-point of these failures that we are able to penetrate the remainder of 
Beckett’s work and its relation to the complex question of freedom. The development 
in Beckett’s prose after Murphy and theatre after Eleutheria shifts the always 
precarious dialectic⎯precarious because an abstract formalism runs the risk of 
neutralisation⎯away from content and towards form, in the hope, I argue, that the 
freedom that could only be conceptualised as a nebulous and unreachable goal might 
be approached more successfully in a radical transformation of form. The negativity 
already present in Murphy’s and Eleutheria’s thematics of failure, registering 
Beckett’s awareness that it is impossible to present freedom as a positive given, is 
intensified in the mid to late works, as freedom can only be read negatively from the 
formal contraction and minimal representation synonymous with Beckett’s name.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE ILLUSION OF FREEDOM AND THE FREEDOM OF ILLUSION 
 
 
Irony is something one simply cannot play games with. 
⎯ Friedrich Schlegel1 
In a footnote on Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein suggests that the American 
philosopher ‘is frequently condemned for what some take to be the ultimate 
philosophic sin: failing to be “serious”’.2 This may not appear to be a problem for 
Adorno, whose work can be accused of quite the opposite ‘sin’: seriousness to the 
point of joylessness. This reputation has its roots in Adorno’s condemnation of the 
Culture Industry and its ‘prescribed fun’ (CI, p. 89); his dense and elliptical prose 
style that ties translator and reader alike in knots; and his unwavering critique of 
modern capitalist society and all its seemingly innocuous trappings. Nonetheless, and 
perhaps surprisingly, Adorno demonstrates an acute awareness of what he describes 
as the ‘essential element of play in philosophy’ (LND, p. 90). This playful component 
is a necessary response to philosophy’s ‘fallibility’ (LND, p. 90): 
Philosophy goes beyond whatever secure knowledge that it possesses, and 
because it knows this, and because it is fallible, it also possesses this playful 
element without which it could not be philosophy in the first place. It does not 
just flirt with playfulness in its motives or methods; rather playfulness is 
deeply embedded in it and candidly so. I would go so far as to say that without 
playfulness there can be no truth. 
(LND, p. 90) 
Playfulness, then, manifests philosophy’s acknowledgement of its own 
epistemological limits, the thinker’s awareness of ‘how far he remains from the object 
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of his thinking’ (ND, p. 14). At the same time, however, it is the very thing that 
propels the thinker beyond such limits, by ‘remind[ing] us of the unthinkable’ (LND, 
p. 90). This element of play remains external to ‘the total rule of method’ (ND, p. 14), 
which cannot acknowledge its fallibility at any price. Playfulness, then, is a form of 
freedom, permitting philosophy to transcend, at least to a degree, the constraints of 
the given world: namely, what Adorno would describe as the logic of identity that 
pervades thought within the repressive structures of modern capitalism. It is this 
peculiar playfulness inherent within philosophy⎯for Adorno is adamant that it can by 
no means be a mere appendage⎯that allows him to declare, with uncharacteristic 
irony, that ‘[p]hilosophy is the most serious of things, but then again it is not all that 
serious’ (ND, p. 14). 
 This relationship between seriousness and play is as much a dilemma when it 
comes to art. Art is predominantly taken seriously by artists, critics and the general 
public⎯even those whose uninterest nonetheless betrays a kind of wariness in its 
vicinity. Adorno himself repeatedly refers to ‘serious’ (ernst) works (see, for 
example, CI, p. 27, p. 28, p. 33; DE, p. 107), usually in contradistinction to ‘light’ 
(leicht) works (see, for example, CI, p. 29, p. 33, p. 48; DE, p. 107) or Culture 
Industry products. Nonetheless, the concept of ‘serious art’ is profoundly paradoxical. 
For art is, by its very nature, unreal; its semblance-character, or Schein,3 might 
conceivably seem to neutralise any seriousness it professes to hold. Art’s tragedy, in 
this sense, is that it will never be anything more than art. Beckett’s texts are 
particularly conducive to an exploration of this problem. On the one hand, they are 
dense, complex and intricate, providing the basis for serious academic study; on the 
other, they are extraordinarily witty and funny, developing their distinctive humour 
despite changes in style and medium. Laura Salisbury’s recent book on laughter and 
comedy in Beckett’s work offers compelling readings of a number of texts, exploring 
the difficulty of reconciling their often uncomfortable and unredemptive 
humour⎯their refusal to fit into a theory of laughter as catharsis or to sublate the 
inherent violence of humour⎯with their ethical dimension.4 This chapter departs 
from this stance to consider in more detail Adorno’s dialectic of seriousness and 
                                                
3 Due to the untranslatable nature of the German Schein, I have chosen not to gloss it with the 
necessarily insufficient English translations of appearance, semblance or illusion, unless it is 
helpful to stress one aspect of these renditions. 
4 Samuel Beckett: Laughing Matters, Comic Timing (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 
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lightheartedness, concisely outlined by Salisbury,5 and how it may be thought of as 
informing Beckett’s post-war Novellas. These four texts are the first instances of 
Beckett’s development in prose style from the intrusive third-person narration of 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women, More Pricks than Kicks and Murphy, with their 
depth of allusion and strongly satirical tone, to the more recognisable first-person 
narrators of The Trilogy and Texts for Nothing, where the humour, though very much 
still palpable, works in an altogether different way. 
 Adorno’s dialectic of seriousness and lightheartedness, I will argue, is utterly 
indispensable in fathoming the nature of the freedom of art. Without such a 
tension⎯and indeed, without the often frustrating questions it raises⎯art as Adorno 
understands it simply would not exist. This dialectic is entirely predicated on the 
artwork’s uneven relation to reality: it is ‘something that has escaped from reality and 
is nevertheless permeated with it’ (NL2, p. 249). Without this element of escape, there 
would be no freedom; without the work’s saturation in the world, the concept of 
freedom would make no sense. To adapt Kant’s famous expression: on the one hand, 
the artwork would be blind, unable to see beyond the given world; on the other, it 
would be empty, disconnected from human experience. In a wonderful formulation, J. 
M. Bernstein claims that, for Adorno, artworks ‘are the illusory appearing of 
freedom’.6 This encapsulates the dialectic of seriousness and playfulness; any 
manifestation of freedom in art⎯its serious relation to the world⎯is only ever 
illusory, but such freedom is only possible because of this playful retreat into illusion. 
 Where Adorno’s otherwise intricate and fascinating theory loses precision is 
in its concrete discussion of literary texts. Although he invokes Beckett’s name in 
practically every discussion of play and lightheartedness,7 he offers very little in the 
way of analysis of the particular modalities of such play and, moreover, has a distinct 
tendency to emphasise the other end of the dialectic: seriousness⎯a tendency that has 
helped to lead to his austere reputation.8 For this reason, I will supplement Adorno’s 
                                                
5 Ibid., pp. 102–3. 
6 The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 237. 
7 See, for example, AT, p. 108, p. 400, p. 402; NL2, p. 248. 
8 This can perhaps be traced to Adorno’s abiding loathing of the Culture Industry and what he 
describes as the ‘failure of culture’ (MCP, p. 139) to prevent the Holocaust. His cultural austerity 
can be interpreted as an attempt to redress the balance; it is for this reason that he takes products 
of the Culture Industry eminently seriously, even as he submits them to intensive criticism. 
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aesthetic theory with the work of Friedrich Schlegel,9 whose fragmentary and literary 
style has prompted even more accusations of ‘failing to be “serious”’ than 
Rorty⎯indeed, as Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert emphasises, early German Romanticism 
is traditionally interpreted ‘as at best a literary movement with excessive emphasis on 
the irrational forces of human life’.10 Not least, perhaps, because it is so deeply 
refracted through Hegel, Adorno’s debt to the early Romantics remains predominantly 
ignored. However, a number of critics have at the very least gestured towards 
affinities in thought between the early Romantics and the Frankfurt School. Andrew 
Bowie is instrumental in this field, his work repeatedly situating Adorno and the 
Frühromantik within the same philosophical tradition.11 Millán-Zaibert notes the 
congruous attempts by Adorno and Schlegel to ‘make the Enlightenment reflexive’,12 
while Brady Bowman suggests, as an aside, that ‘Adorno’s concept of negative 
dialectics can itself be construed as a radicalization of the romantic dialectics we find 
in F. Schlegel and the early Schleiermacher’.13 Moreover, it should not be forgotten 
that the intended epigraph for Aesthetic Theory was taken from Schlegel: ‘What is 
called the philosophy of art usually lacks one of two things: either the philosophy or 
                                                
9 There has been relatively little critical attention directed at affinities between Beckett’s work and 
Early German Romanticism. A 2007 special edition of Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui is 
dedicated to the topic of ‘Beckett and Romanticism’, but only a few articles dwell on the German 
connection. See, for example, Dirk van Hulle, ‘“Accursed Creator”: Beckett, Romanticism, and 
“the Modern Prometheus”’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 18 (2007), 15–29; Mark Nixon, 
‘Beckett and Romanticism in the 1930s’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 18 (2007), 61–76; 
and Andrew Eastham, ‘Beckett’s Sublime Ironies: The Trilogy, Krapp’s Last Tape, and the 
Remainders of Romanticism’, Samuel Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui, 18 (2007), 117–29. Tine Koch 
offers a more recent article on the Romantic problematic of finitude and infinitude in ‘Searching 
for the Blue Flower: Friedrich Schlegel’s and Samuel Beckett’s “Unending Pursuits” of “Infinite 
Fulfilment”’, Journal of Beckett Studies, 19 (2010), 228–44.  
10 Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2007), p. 1. 
11 See Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 42; p. 195 n. 7; the 
complementary texts From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary 
Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) and Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to 
Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990; repr. 2003), which trace a tradition 
including Early German Romanticism and Adorno; ‘Romantic Aesthetics and the Ends of 
Contemporary Philosophy’, in Das neue Licht der Frühromantik, ed. by Bärbel Frischmann and 
Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008), p. 223; ‘The Romantic 
Connection: Neurath, The Frankfurt School, and Heidegger’, British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, 8 (2000), 275–98; ‘The Romantic Connection: Neurath, The Frankfurt School, and 
Heidegger, Part Two’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 8 (2000), 459–83; and 
‘“Non-Identity”: The German Romantics, Schelling, and Adorno’, in Intersections: Nineteenth-
Century Philosophy and Contemporary Society, ed. by Tilottama Rajan and David L. Clark 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 243–60. 
12 Millán-Zaibert, p. 161. References to Schlegel allude to Friedrich rather than August Wilhelm. 
13 ‘On the Defense of Literary Value: From Early German Romanticism to Analytic Philosophy of 
Literature’, in The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on German Romantic Philosophy, ed. by 
Dalia Nassar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 147–62. 
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the art’ (AT, pp. 464–5). While a number of compelling parallels can be drawn 
between Adorno and early German Romanticism, this chapter will focus on how the 
concept of romantic irony can offer an alternative, though sympathetic, perspective on 
Adorno’s dialectic of seriousness and lightheartedness in art and its relation to 
Beckett’s perplexing Novellas.  
 This dialectic first requires further explication. I will then consider the extent 
to which the Frühromantik concept of irony can be mapped onto it, arguing that the 
dialectic as Adorno conceives it is radicalised by the structural and linguistic irony of 
the Novellas. Accentuating their containment within the limits of Schein, they flaunt 
their hermeticism in a play of allusions that inevitably lead to a hermeneutic impasse. 
Moreover, they manifest a restlessly ironic tone that floats free of any secure 
signification: rather than situating irony as a deviation from stable, communicative 
discourse, they obstruct any attempt to distinguish between sincerity and sarcasm. Far 
from a mere retreat into trivial game-playing, however, the playful ambivalence of the 
Novellas raises the possibility of an alternative to the reductive principle of exchange 
endemic to capitalism. In positing an absolute equivalence between disparate things, 
such exchange attests to an underlying logic of identity: a form of ‘domination’ (ND, 
p. 178), given the necessarily disparate nature of each. In rejecting, through a 
persistently radical irony, the terms by which the supposedly serious world is 
governed, the Novellas acquire a seriousness based not on what they can empirically 
accomplish, but what they can promise is possible. 
 
 
 
 
I 
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Adorno’s dialectic of seriousness and lightheartedness in art is formulated most 
explicitly in his 1967 essay, ‘Is Art Lighthearted?’,14 although it is also explored in 
more oblique form in Aesthetic Theory. His discussion takes as its basis Schiller’s 
claim: ‘“Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst”⎯life is serious, art is lighthearted’ 
(Quoted in NL2, p. 247). Adorno’s central aim is to debunk the very binary evidenced 
in this formulation: that they should be characterised in opposition to each other. In an 
argument later expanded upon in his 1977 essay, ‘Free Time’, he suggests that 
Schiller’s assertion ‘affirms the established and popular distinction between work and 
leisure’ (NL2, p. 247). The bourgeois separation of the spheres of work and free time 
masks the extent to which free time is merely ‘a continuation of the forms of profit-
oriented social life’, functioning for ‘the recreation of expended labour power’ (CI, p. 
164) in the provision of gratuitous amusement for the sake of greater productivity. 
The division formulated by Schiller not only neutralises art by confining it to a sphere 
of vacuous enjoyment but also enlists it in capitalism’s all-consuming task of 
improving productivity: ‘art is prescribed to tired businesspeople as a shot in the arm’ 
(NL2, p. 248). Against Schiller’s binary division, then, Adorno argues that art is 
neither wholly serious nor lighthearted. The former not only ‘terminates in sterility’, 
but ‘would be pitilessly ideological’: ‘To act dignified [art] would have to put on airs, 
strike a pose, claim to be other than what it can be’ (AT, p. 49). The latter, on the 
other hand, ‘degrades art to fun’ (AT, p. 49), as consumable as any other product of 
the Culture Industry, and risks ‘irrelevance’ as ‘the kind of repetitive formulaic play 
that has been debunked in other species of art, decorative patterns’ (NL2, p. 90). 
Instead, ‘art vibrates between this seriousness [Ernst] and lightheartedness 
[Heiterkeit]. It is this tension that constitutes art’ (NL2, p. 249). 
As always, Adorno’s terminology requires close attention; his use of everyday 
language should not mislead us into assuming its everyday meaning is all that is 
intended. We have already seen that seriousness is not to be confused with what he 
terms ‘the Wagnerian art religion’ (AT, p. 49), which attributes an empty dignity to 
the artwork. Nor is lightheartedness to be equated with the kind of hollow fun he 
associates with the Culture Industry (as Ross Wilson wryly suggests, fun for Adorno 
                                                
14 This essay was first published under the title ‘Ist die Kunst heiter?’ in 1967, then as ‘Zur Dialektik 
von Heiterkeit’ in 1968. Heiter can alternately be translated as ‘cheerful’, but I have chosen to 
retain Shierry Weber Nicholson’s original translation for the sake of continuity. 
  77 
is ‘stupid, but it turns out not even to be all that much fun’).15 In fact, Adorno is 
(perhaps uncharacteristically) unequivocal, if not conventional, in his understanding 
of these terms. In Aesthetic Theory, he argues: 
What can […] justly be called serious in art is the pathos of an objectivity that 
confronts the individual with what is more and other than he is in his 
historically imperative insufficiency. The risk taken by artworks participates 
in their seriousness.  
(AT, p. 49) 
The seriousness of art inheres in its sense of ‘responsibility’ (AT, p. 49) for the world, 
the ‘objectivity that confronts the individual’. Art’s responsibility derives from its 
ability to reconstellate⎯a term I borrow from Lambert Zuidervaart⎯the existing 
world, to offer ‘a determinate negation of contemporary society’ that gestures towards 
the possibility of a free society.16 Ultimately, however, art is not only unable to live 
up to its responsibility to achieve the changes it imagines, but it actively ‘diminishes 
[suffering]; form, the organon of its seriousness, is at the same time the organon of the 
neutralization of suffering’ (AT, p. 49; my italics). Art’s constraint by 
Schein⎯varyingly translated as appearance, semblance and illusion⎯instigates a 
crisis neatly explicated by Frederic Jameson:  
Genuine art, which cannot abolish Schein altogether without destroying itself 
and turning to silence, must none the less live its illusory appearance and its 
unreal luxury status as play in a vivid guilt that permeates its very forms, and 
is sometimes oddly called reflexivity or self-consciousness.17 
Art’s consciousness of the guilt of Schein provokes a twofold response, which can at 
once be understood as a historical progression and as a constitutive tension within the 
artwork itself. The first response⎯the acceptance, even celebration, of Schein and the 
abdication of responsibility⎯Adorno situates roughly in the nineteenth century, in 
which ‘aesthetic semblance was heightened to the point of phantasmagoria’ (AT, p. 
135). In retaliation, he continues, modernism attempted a disavowal of Schein in a 
drive to, in Jameson’s words, ‘transcend the aesthetic’:18 Dadaism is perhaps the most 
obvious example of this. However, Adorno’s extremely generalised and possibly 
                                                
15 Theodor Adorno (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), p. 28. 
16 Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1991; repr. 1994), p. 130. 
17 Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 1990), p. 166. 
18 Ibid., p. 159. 
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misleading chronology is best circumvented in favour of his much more compelling 
claim that all artworks embody, in varying degrees, this tension between, on the one 
hand, a playful admission of irresponsibility and, on the other, an attempt to entirely 
overcome Schein. It is the former of these tendencies that, for Adorno, articulates art’s 
lightheartedness, to which we shall now turn. 
Art, Adorno acknowledges, is a ‘source of pleasure’ (NL2, p. 248), and this 
pleasurable aspect ‘is not something external to it […] but part of its very definition’ 
(NL2, p. 248). However, such pleasure is extraordinarily difficult to locate, given that 
it is qualitatively different from the pseudo-pleasure inspired by products of the 
Culture Industry. It can best be captured in an image that Adorno uses more than 
once: that of the excitement and anticipation of the raising of a curtain at the 
beginning of a play (NL2, p. 248; AT, p. 108). The raised curtain invokes Schein: the 
illusory nature of the artwork; its status as semblance. Adorno notes that this moment 
is ‘the expectation of the apparition’ (AT, p. 108), and it is through his detailed 
scrutiny of this concept that we can penetrate the significance of art’s 
lightheartedness. Adorno identifies fireworks as ‘prototypical’ (AT, p. 107) 
apparitions: 
They appear empirically yet are liberated from the burden of the empirical, 
which is the obligation of duration; they are a sign from heaven yet artifactual, 
an ominous warning, a script that flashes up, vanishes and indeed cannot be 
read for its meaning. 
(AT, p. 107) 
What is particularly significant here is the capacity of the apparition to gesture 
towards something entirely new: ‘possibility made historical’, as Zuidervaart 
describes it.19 This possibility, Adorno emphasises, ‘is not dreamt up out of disparate 
elements of the existing. Out of these elements artworks arrange constellations that 
become ciphers, without, however, like fantasies, setting up the enciphered before the 
eyes as something immediately existing’ (AT, p. 109). What is ‘enciphered’ is the 
purposelessness of art in contradistinction to the ‘prevailing principle of reality: that 
of exchangeability’ (AT, p. 109). Art is neither ‘a dull particular for which other 
particulars could be substituted, nor is it an empty universal that equates everything 
specific that it comprehends by abstracting the common characteristics’ (AT, p. 109). 
                                                
19 Zuidervaart, p. 189. 
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In Minima Moralia, Adorno suggests that ‘[a]rt is magic delivered from the lie of 
being truth’ (MM, p. 222): the ‘magic’ of art is its release from the fungibility of the 
given world. Truth, in this case, would merely reflect what is⎯a lie.  
Adorno’s terminology is suggestive: the apparition is a ‘script that flashes up, 
vanishes and indeed cannot be read for its meaning’ and a ‘cipher, without […] 
setting up the enciphered before the eyes as something immediately existing’. In both 
descriptions the emphasis is on language, albeit a form of signification that cannot be 
deciphered. This is the enigma-character of artworks: ‘Through form, artworks gain 
their resemblance to language, seeming at every point to say just this and only this, 
and at the same time whatever it is slips away’ (AT, pp. 159–60). By saying ‘just this 
and only this’, artworks announce themselves as particulars liberated from the 
exchange-principle.20 This is the enigma of artworks: that, as J. M. Bernstein notes, 
‘they attain to purposefulness, to meaning, despite (and because of) their evident lack 
of meaning’.21 The enigma returns us to the vexed question of art’s seriousness, or the 
guilt of Schein; Adorno suggests that ‘art becomes an enigma because it appears to 
have solved what is enigmatical in existence’ (AT, p. 167): ‘as the image of what is 
beyond exchange, it suggests that not everything in the world is exchangeable’ (AT, p. 
110), a claim that can easily slip into an ideological affirmation of the world as it is. 
Art’s apparent unity or, in musical terms, harmony, fashions a realm in which the 
disunity of the objective world can be temporarily ignored; it appears to offer a 
solution to the problems of reality, one that it is nevertheless powerless to effect. 
Adorno continues: 
the enigma in the merely existing is forgotten as a result of its own 
overwhelming ossification. The more densely people have spun a categorical 
web around what is other than subjective spirit, the more fundamentally have 
they disaccustomed themselves to the wonder of that other and deceived 
themselves with a growing familiarity with what is foreign. […] A priori, art 
causes people to wonder. 
(AT, p. 167) 
                                                
20 This liberation, as Adorno makes clear, is illusory, in the sense that it exists only within the realm of 
Schein.  
21 J. M. Bernstein, p. 210. 
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Art may not be able to solve the enigma of society; however, it reveals the 
forgotten⎯or reified, for ‘all reification is a forgetting’22⎯that lies beneath the 
‘categorical web[s]’ of subjectivity. In so doing, it offers a new way of viewing the 
world that is based on wonder⎯the basis of philosophy for Plato and Aristotle, 
although, in typical Adornian fashion, wonder is reformed to articulate man’s 
mediated response to social conditions rather than an immediate response to the 
authentically real. The ‘wonder of that other’ is a wonder at the unexchangeable, the 
unsubsumable, the non-identical. It induces ‘a change in the existing mode of 
consciousness’ (NL2, p. 248) and therefore embodies, through art’s lighthearted play 
within the purposeless world of Schein, a critique of the serious world: a critique ‘that 
is also, to be sure, its seriousness’ (NL2, p. 248). In a paradoxical move, the very 
quality that prevents art from fulfilling its serious responsibility⎯Schein⎯is 
redeemed.  
On the one hand, then, the lighthearted element of the artwork allows it to 
inhabit a realm that is free from society and its repressive seriousness⎯a seriousness 
predicated on the inescapable exchange-relation and its logic of identity-thinking. On 
the other hand, this very critical distance from the supposedly serious world, the 
limited freedom from social, religious or political purpose that characterises the 
artwork, directly contributes to art’s sense of responsibility to change the given world. 
Unlike the pseudo-seriousness of an exchange-dominated society, art’s seriousness 
derives from its ‘promesse du bonheur’ (AT, p. 109). Never able to live up to this 
sense of responsibility, to guarantee that its promise will be kept, it oscillates uneasily 
and yet productively between a hermetic playful space and a longing to overcome 
Schein entirely. Most importantly, it is this very tension that constitutes art; without it, 
art would be either superficial decoration, utterly dependent on the model of exchange 
and subordinate to the existing world, or purely instrumental, once again constrained 
by that which is. It is perhaps only in these terms that we can appreciate the 
significance of freedom to Adorno’s aesthetics: it only emerges in the constitutive 
tension between lightheartedness and seriousness in the artwork; without it, art 
degenerates into merely an object of exchange in one form or another.  
                                                
22 Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence, 1928–1940 (London: 
Polity Press, 1999), p. 321. 
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 Consistent with his claim that ‘it is scarcely possible to speak of the aesthetic 
unaesthetically’ (NL1, p. 154), Adorno argues that the essay form, like the artwork, 
holds seriousness and lightheartedness in a critical tension. Its play derives, at least in 
part, from its relation to its object, which is emphatically not the subservient, detached 
relation one might expect from an essay. The essay, Adorno argues, ‘overinterprets’ 
(NL1, p. 152), refusing to be ‘terrorized by the prohibition of going beyond the 
intended meaning of a certain text’ (NL1, p. 152). It situates itself in a playful relation 
to its object, though always taking its cue from the object itself: ‘the effort of the 
essay reflects a childlike freedom that catches fire, without scruple, on what others 
have already done’ (NL1, p. 152). Once again, an element of ‘irresponsibility’ (NL1, 
p. 154) is emphasised⎯something utterly alien to the systematizing impulse that 
cannot understand the essay’s ‘groping intention’ (NL1, p. 164). Moreover, the 
playful nature of the essay turns out to predicate its seriousness. Adorno quotes 
Lukács: 
The essayist dismisses his own proud hopes which sometimes lead him to 
believe that he has come close to the ultimate: he has, after all, no more to 
offer than explanations of the poems of others, or at best of his own ideas. But 
he ironically adapts himself to this smallness⎯the eternal smallness of the 
most profound work of the intellect in face of life⎯and even emphasizes it 
with ironic modesty.    
(Quoted in NL1, pp. 257–8) 
In an echo of Socrates’ humble acknowledgement of his own foolishness, which 
paradoxically makes him wise, Lukács suggests that the essayist’s self-effacing 
recognition of his own small accomplishments⎯necessarily deriving from the 
achievements of others⎯must be understood as ironic, belying the real seriousness 
and weight of the essay form. Such irony permits us neither to assert with any 
confidence that the essayist is wholly modest or arrogant, small or great, playful or 
serious⎯a subversive gesture, given that, according to Adorno, ‘[i]rony, intellectual 
flexibility, and scepticism about the existing order have never been highly regarded in 
Germany’ (NL2, p. 306). 
Nonetheless, in Minima Moralia, Adorno presents a somewhat reductive and, 
indeed, dismissive view of irony: 
Irony convicts its object by presenting it as what it purports to be; and without 
passing judgement, as if leaving a blank for the observing subject, measures it 
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against its being-in-itself. It shows up the negative by confronting the positive 
with its own claim to positivity. […] Irony’s medium, the difference between 
ideology and reality, has disappeared. […] Irony used to say: such it claims to 
be, but such it is; today, however, the world, even in its own radical lie, falls 
back on the argument that things are like this, a simple finding which 
coincides, for it, with the good. There is not a crevice in the cliff of the 
established order into which the ironist might hook a fingernail.   
(MM, pp. 210–11) 
In this account, I argue, Adorno fails to recognise not only the subversive potential of 
irony but also its affinity with his own aesthetics. His concerns are twofold. First, he 
offers a simplistic account of irony, which he rightly condemns for being 
conservative. That is, he interprets irony as ‘the determinate negation of what is 
asserted in a proposition: “That was good”, said ironically, means it wasn’t’.23 He 
relies, uncharacteristically, on the logic of non-contradiction: irony ‘shows up the 
negative’ by revealing that ‘such [something] claims to be, but such it is’ (MM, p. 
211). Second, he argues that such irony⎯even in its limited capacity⎯has no chance 
of survival in a world obsessed with the objective goodness of the given.  
 For Schlegel, however, irony cannot be construed as the rejection of a 
sentence’s meaning in favour of its opposite. Rather, it involves ‘assertion which […] 
negates itself without leading to a final opposed positive position’.24 The similarity to 
Adorno’s negative dialectics should be immediately apparent: as ‘a dialectics not of 
identity, but of non-identity’ (LND, p. 6), it rejects the Hegelian principle that the 
‘negation of negation is the positive’ (LND, p. 14). Likewise, romantic irony 
oscillates indeterminately between multiple possible meanings. For this reason, it 
occupies an ambivalent space between comprehensibility and incomprehensibility, in 
that it can be pinned down to neither its overt meaning nor a simple negation of that 
meaning, but, at least to a certain extent, still operates within the rules of language. It 
is perhaps for this reason that Schlegel’s essay ‘On Incomprehensibility’ not only 
takes as its focus the concept of irony, but is itself riddled with irony. The essay 
begins with Schlegel lamenting the prevailing state of incomprehension among his 
readers: ‘not only the incomprehension of the uncomprehending but even more the 
incomprehension of the comprehending’.25 The irony of an essay on the topic of 
                                                
23 From Romanticism to Critical Theory, p. 69. 
24 Ibid., p. 87. 
25 ‘On Incomprehensibility’, pp. 297–8. 
  83 
incomprehension beginning with such a paradoxical and, possibly, at least, 
incomprehensible statement will hardly escape the attentive reader. In an overhauling 
of the logic of non-contradiction, Schlegel bemoans incomprehension and 
comprehension and, more confusingly still, defines both as uncomprehending. 
Ultimately, Schlegel is preparing the reader for the paradoxical status of irony, which, 
he suggests, will craftily elude those who are arrogantly certain of their 
comprehension. The sciences and the arts may well ‘aim at comprehension and at 
making comprehensible’,26 but, Schlegel suggests, no such simplicity can be expected 
in his own work. Indeed, ‘On Comprehension’ could quite aptly be described as 
immersed in irony. From barbs coated with an air of innocence⎯‘artists can already 
begin to cherish the just hope that humanity will at last rise up in a mass and learn to 
read’27⎯to philosophical word-play⎯the infinite progression back to an illusory 
‘prime shoulder’28⎯the essay is comprehensively saturated in irony, right down to 
the tongue-twisting taxonomy of its various sub-categories.29 
 The playful nature of romantic irony should be apparent to even those 
‘harmonious bores’ who ‘are at a loss about how they should react to this continuous 
self-parody’.30 However, its significance as a supplement to Adorno’s aesthetics lies 
in its accompanying seriousness. Indeed, Schlegel insists, in a remark that would no 
doubt receive Adorno’s approval, that ‘[t]he world is much too serious, but 
seriousness is nevertheless a rather rare phenomenon’.31 Under capitalism, as J. M. 
Bernstein suggests, ‘purpose has itself become purposeless, production for exchange 
without end’:32 an interminable game of Monopoly from which meaning has been all 
but eliminated. The seriousness of irony lies, for Schlegel, in its ability to 
approximate the Absolute, which he understands, in the tradition of German Idealism, 
as the ‘unity of thought and Being’,33 or ‘mind and nature’.34 Schlegel argues that 
                                                
26 Ibid., p. 298 
27 Ibid., p. 299. 
28 Ibid., p. 301. 
29 Ibid., pp. 303–4. 
30 Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Peter Firchow (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 13. 
31 Ibid., p. 84. 
32 J. M. Bernstein, p. 210. 
33 Millán-Zaibert, p. 32 
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philosophy is inherently incapable of knowing the Absolute because, as Frederick C. 
Beiser explains, ‘any attempt to know the unconditioned would falsify it by making it 
conditioned’.35 Another way of conceiving this dilemma is through the paradox of 
humans as ‘finite knowers with a longing to know what is without limits’.36 The 
significance of irony for Schlegel lies in its ability to combine in new ways ‘the finite 
elements of language itself, […] which constantly point beyond themselves, thereby 
employing the finite means to a non-finite purpose’.37 Irony is able, and, indeed, 
obligated, to ‘go beyond what it represents, by alluding to that which it does not 
succeed in saying’.38 The very slipperiness of irony, its oscillation between 
comprehensibility and incomprehensibility, permits it to gesture towards the Absolute 
without representing it and thereby conditioning that which cannot be conditioned. 
This is necessarily an infinite task, and it is for this reason that Schlegel emphasises 
the essentially incomplete nature of knowledge, basing this humble assessment of 
man’s capabilities on Socrates’ famous (and ironic) discovery that the wisest man is 
one who knows that he knows nothing.  
 Within an Adornian framework, then, irony’s seriousness lies in its 
responsibility for the world. In Schlegel this is seen in mainly epistemological terms: 
irony offers us a qualitatively different kind of knowledge to the concept-driven 
knowledge of philosophy. However, this bears more than a passing resemblance to 
Adorno’s claim that the lightheartedness of art lies in its retreat into a purposeless 
realm of Schein that resists the world’s logic of exchange. Both philosophers 
emphasise the insufficiency of the dominant ways of perceiving the world. And, 
crucially, irony’s ability to approximate the Absolute without limiting it is achieved 
through play. Within Schlegel’s concept of irony, then, we can see, albeit roughly 
sketched out, the dialectic between seriousness and lightheartedness overtly theorised 
by Adorno. While the proximity between these two thinkers is interesting in and of 
itself, it is primarily significant here insofar as it can further develop Adorno’s 
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dialectic, teasing out its latent content. As Peter Uwe Hohendahl notes, the ‘potential 
danger’ of Adorno’s aesthetics lies in ‘the repetition of the theory itself, reformulated 
as a disclosure of aesthetic meaning’:39 that is, the possibility that Adorno’s broader 
claims about art could be applied to a number of literary texts fails to account for their 
singularity. Hohendahl acknowledges that ‘[t]his problem cannot be completely 
avoided because the theoretical level functions as the mediating link between the 
literary text and the outside world’.40 Nonetheless, the bent towards theoretical 
abstraction in Adorno’s work can be compensated for by a careful consideration of 
the specificities of the text at hand and the use of an alternate lens⎯in this case 
romantic irony⎯with which to view it. 
 Schlegel is attracted to what he considers to be ironic forms: that is, forms that 
emphasise their own provisionality and partiality and therefore indirectly attest to the 
incomplete nature of all knowledge claims. For Schlegel, ‘[i]t is equally fatal for the 
spirit to have a system and to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the 
two’.41 The traditional philosophical system is fundamentally impossible. It purports 
to possess a transparent view of the Absolute, but this is, as we have seen, structurally 
paradoxical: to know the Absolute would be to limit it. Nonetheless, he insists that we 
cannot abandon the urge to strive towards a system. The fragment, as the ironic form 
par excellence, combines, for Schlegel, the having and not having of a system. For, as 
Rodolphe Gasché emphasises, ‘fragmentation does not exclude systematic intention 
and exposition’.42 The fragment strives for⎯and necessarily fails to attain⎯system’s 
promise of wholeness; in Peter Szondi’s words, ‘the fragment is perceived as 
anticipation, promise’43⎯a thought similarly captured in Jacques Rancière’s insight 
that ‘[a] fragment is not a ruin; it is much more a seed’.44 This is its openness, its 
desire to exceed its limitations and its refusal to ‘sacrifice living, changing reality to 
fixed, teleological categories’.45 However, simultaneously the fragment, ‘like a 
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miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be 
complete in itself like a porcupine’.46 Indeed, art itself manifests the paradoxical logic 
of the fragment, as is evident in Adorno’s use of Leibniz’s model of the windowless 
monad to describe the way in which artworks relate to the world around them. On the 
one hand, ‘[a]rtworks are closed to one another, blind’ (AT, p. 237), and this autotelic 
hermeticism is what generates their playfulness; on the other hand, as Jameson notes, 
‘the monadic work of art must somehow “include” its outside, its referent, under pain 
of lapsing into decorative frivolity’.47 Adorno claims, then, that ‘what is external to 
the monad, and that whereby it is constituted, is sedimented in it’ (AT, p. 454); that is, 
the artwork manifests or expresses the bourgeois whole from which it ultimately 
derives⎯through the labour process that ensures its production and the objective 
social conditions that are filtered through the subjective consciousness of the artist. 
He insists that ‘[t]here is no content, no formal category of the literary work that does 
not, however transformed and however unawarely, derive from the empirical reality 
from which it has escaped’ (NL2, p. 89). 
 In this way, the romantic fragment and the artwork of Adorno’s aesthetics can 
be seen to be governed by the same internal logic. In both, as Gasché explains, ‘the 
universal can be achieved only as a manner that is each time singular’.48 For Schlegel, 
the universal for which the fragment yearns is the Absolute, while for Adorno, art 
expresses and critiques the socially constructed totality. Neither fragment nor artwork 
can be co-opted into any traditional philosophical system because their moment of 
what we might call revelation, or at least expression, is fleeting and, to use Adorno’s 
term, apparitional. As Millán-Zaibert notes, ‘[p]hilosophers, interested in the serious 
construction of lasting systems, do not welcome such fiery presentation’.49 In 
contrast, the playful and unsubsumable nature of the romantic fragment and its 
counterpart, the hermetic artwork, is precisely what enables its seriousness: its always 
impeded sense of responsibility for the world. 
 Beckett’s Novellas are not only governed by this paradoxical logic of the 
fragment, but accentuate it. Written in quick succession over the course of 1946, they 
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occupy an ambivalent position in relation to one another: they neither add up to a 
cohesive whole nor can be read entirely separately. Their history only serves to 
accentuate their fragmentary nature: the first half of The End was published in Les 
Temps modernes in July 1946, while the second half was later rejected by Simone de 
Beauvoir, much to Beckett’s anger; in an outraged letter he insisted that ‘the fragment 
which appeared in your last number’ is ‘no more than a major premise’.50 The 
Expelled was also published separately, this time in the December 1946–January 1947 
edition of Fontaine. Not until November 1955 were these novellas joined by The 
Calmative in Nouvelles et Textes pour rien. This still leaves First Love, which, in a 
significant anomaly, was not published until 1970, when it appeared in isolation. 
Since that time, it has been variously included in collections with the other three 
novellas, excluded entirely and, interestingly, accommodated within the volume but 
segregated in some way. The publication history of these texts⎯a retroactive 
imposition of an illusory coherence⎯then, attests to a fundamental indeterminacy 
inherent in the Novellas: are they to be considered together or separately, and, if the 
former, which are to be included?  
 These questions, I suggest, are not merely incidental to an understanding of 
the Novellas. Rather, they expose a fundamental awareness that the texts do not obey 
a neat logic of either/or⎯a logic to which, as Steven Connor suggests, critics rigidly 
conform: ‘[t]ime and again, the distinctions between narrative levels and narrators are 
collapsed, to yield the image of a single, primal, underlying voice’.51 This voice, he 
suggests, is typically considered to be a generic ‘universal human subject’.52 Even 
Marjorie Perloff’s otherwise persuasive reading of the Novellas as a ‘searing 
examination of wartime conditions in Vichy France’ falls into the trap of describing 
them as a ‘three-story cycle’⎯omitting the awkwardly divergent First Love without 
question⎯with a consistent first-person narrator, ‘whom we might, for brevity’s sake, 
call Sam’.53 Leaving aside the problematic attribution of the author’s first name to his 
deliberately unnamed narrator, Perloff ascribes an episodic and thematic unity to the 
Novellas that, I argue, simply cannot be assumed. Ultimately, any reading of the 
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Novellas as a ‘self-contained volume’ undermines both the manifest differentiation 
between them and the subtle interweaving of similarities that pervades them; ‘a chain 
of repetitions and resemblances’, as Connor describes it.54 ‘Living souls, you will see 
how alike they are’ (The Expelled, p. 46), the narrator of The Expelled declares, and it 
is this singular and uncanny likeness between the Novellas that prevents any sweeping 
assertion of their identity, on the one hand, and their disconnection, on the other.  
 Not only, then, does each novella formally manifest the dialectic of 
seriousness and lightheartedness by which art’s sense of responsibility for the world 
derives precisely from the very quality⎯Schein⎯that renders it impossible to fulfil, 
but the complex interlinking chain of all four novellas raises the dialectic to the level 
of self-reflexivity. The Novellas self-consciously play with their hermeticism, 
constantly threatening to overspill their textual bounds, but only ever into another 
space of purposeless Schein. In accentuating the element of play, however; in 
‘straining toward synthesis’ (AT, p. 306) and promising but never attaining 
wholeness, they strengthen the dialectic between such play and the serious content of 
art: ‘[w]ithout the synthesis, which confronts reality as the autonomous artwork, there 
would be nothing external to reality’s spell’ (AT, pp. 306–7). The Absolute, then, 
offers for Adorno as much as for the Early Romantics a framework within which the 
only legitimate combination is a ‘utopian’ striving for ‘the whole truth’ alongside ‘the 
unfathomable and melancholic knowledge of [its] vanity’.55 The freedom of art may 
be illusory, existing as it does in the sphere of Schein, but its very attempt to attain a 
hermetic wholeness, false as it is, is what underlines art’s seriousness and the freedom 
of Schein.  
The fracturing movement of the Novellas is most apparent in the anomalous 
First Love. As Perloff notes of the other three novellas: 
each tale is a hallucinatory dream narrative that begins with an expulsion from 
‘home’ down a flight of steps, from a ‘den littered with empty tins,’ or from an 
institution that may be asylum, hospital, or prison. In each case, the journey 
takes the protagonist through a town that is at once familiar and yet wholly 
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alien; the passage through that town takes the form of a series of tests that try 
Sam's patience and put his sanity into question.56 
First Love significantly deviates from this generic pattern: while the narrator is indeed 
ousted from his father’s house, repeating the opening scenario of The Expelled, he 
takes no significant journey. Instead, the narrative is structured around his relationship 
with Lulu (later re-named Anna), in a notable divergence from the other novellas, 
which lack what we might for simplicity’s sake call a love-interest. Nonetheless, 
despite its thematic difference from the other novellas, First Love maintains a 
linguistic connection to them. To offer a pertinent example, the narrator ponders: 
Kepis […] exist beyond a doubt, indeed there is little hope of their ever 
disappearing, but personally I never wore a kepi. I wrote somewhere, They 
gave me… a hat. Now the truth is they never gave me a hat, I have always had 
my own hat, the one my father gave me, and I have never had any other hat 
than that hat. I may add it has followed me to the grave. 
(First Love, p. 35) 
This short passage relates to each of the other novellas. The narrator of The End also 
refers to a kepi, claiming to wear one, before retracting his statement: ‘no, that must 
be wrong’ (The End, p. 83). The narrator of First Love claims to have written 
‘somewhere, They gave me… a hat’, which seems to allude to the hat presented to the 
narrator of The End when he leaves the charitable institution, but the precise words 
never repeat except in a varied form: ‘They gave me a tie’ (The End, p. 79). The 
narrator of First Love immediately goes on to retract his words⎯‘Now the truth is 
they never gave me a hat’⎯as if to deny any relationship to the other novellas. The 
narrator of The Expelled suggests dryly that his own hat seems to have ‘pre-existed 
from time immemorial in a pre-established place’ (The Expelled, p. 48), a 
recapitulation of the kepis’ abstract ‘exist[ence] beyond a doubt’; moreover, it was 
also given to him by his father. While The Calmative also contains a hat, its defining 
characteristic is the string that keeps it close; this string also emerges more tentatively 
in The End, where the narrator notices it as if for the first time.  
 The repeated resurfacing of the hat⎯not just in passing but often with a 
comment⎯is just one of the many instances of repetition and difference in the 
Novellas. What is striking about such passages as the one from First Love quoted 
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above is the way they seem to operate in dialogue with the other novellas⎯by, for 
example, suggesting that the narrator has written elsewhere about receiving a hat and 
insisting, with odd vehemence, that he has only ever owned one hat, and certainly not 
a kepi⎯without ever definitively establishing the relationship between them. A sense 
of indeterminacy emerges in which the narrators at once drift closer together, their 
words becoming almost interchangeable, and further apart, as the differences between 
them remain irreducible. It is certainly not the case, as the hat instance perhaps 
implies, that the Novellas each contain a number of objects and scenarios that are 
merged in different combinations in a kind of parody of the systematising impulse 
that leads to, say, Propp’s theory of folktales, with its identification of a finite number 
of narrative elements. Some facets of the Novellas are particular to one text alone 
alone, while some repetitions are confined to two or three, the other/s remaining 
stubbornly resistant. The narrator of The Expelled confides his unusual antipathy to 
any furniture in his room ‘except the bed’ (The Expelled, p. 56), a sentiment echoed 
by the narrator of First Love when he moves in with Lulu: ‘I surveyed the room with 
horror. Such density of furniture defeats imagination. Not a doubt, I must have seen 
that room somewhere’ (First Love, p. 39). The ambiguity of the final two sentences is 
evident. They might seem to imply that the narrator is attempting to keep a hold on 
reality; if imagination alone could not come up with the ‘density of furniture’, the 
room must be real. This is in keeping with other narrators’ uncertainty about whether 
they are dreaming or awake (The End, p. 98), alive or dead (The Calmative, p. 61). 
Alternately, however, the final sentence could also suggest that the narrator has seen 
the room somewhere before, a possible allusion to the lodging-places that the narrator 
of The Expelled visits with the cabman, who ‘had taken it into his head, whence 
nothing could ever dislodge it, that I was looking for a furnished room’ (The Expelled, 
p. 56) 
 Another notable recurring image is that of the dying flower. The passages in 
the relevant novellas are worth quoting in full: 
One day I asked her to bring me a hyacinth, live, in a pot. She brought it and 
put it on the mantelpiece. […] At first all went well, it even put forth a bloom 
or two, then it gave up and was soon no more than a limp stem hung with limp 
leaves. The bulb, half clear of the clay as though in search of oxygen, smelt 
foul. She wanted to remove it, but I told her to leave it. She wanted to get me 
another, but I told her I didn’t want another.  
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(First Love, p. 42) 
Once I sent for a crocus bulb and planted it in the dark area, in an old pot. […] 
It sprouted, but never any flowers, just a wilting stem and a few chlorotic 
leaves. I would have liked to have a yellow corcus, or a hyacinth, but there, it 
was not to be. She wanted to take it away, but I told her to leave it. She wanted 
to buy me another, but I told her I didn’t want another.  
(The End, pp. 84–5) 
These passages are strikingly similar. Both flowers languish and both narrators reject 
attempts to remove or replace them. The latter two sentences of each passage are 
practically identical, and although they of course refer to entirely different women, 
both Lulu and the Greek woman provide the same function for the narrators: a place 
to live where one’s basic needs can be fulfilled. The fact that both narrators send for a 
flower is striking as it fulfils an aesthetic desire that is distinct from the otherwise 
functional needs of food, shelter and a chamber pot. While the desire for a ‘yellow 
corcus, or a hyacinth’ on the part of the narrator of The End is fulfilled in First Love, 
both plants ultimately wither. They do not, however, actually die. In this way, they 
express the logic of the Novellas, which, like the narrator of The End, crucially lack 
‘the courage to end or the strength to go on’ (The End, p. 99).  
Adorno argues that ‘the unrelenting seriousness of the artwork declares itself 
as frivolous, as play. Art can only be reconciled with its existence by exposing its own 
semblance’ (AT, p. 325). The Novellas do more than expose their containment within 
Schein: they flaunt it with a structural irony worthy of Schlegel’s admiration. This 
play offers an intoxicating image of purposelessness that is only possible through the 
texts’ critical distance from the world. The web of allusions, folding back into each 
other like origami, parody the serious world’s demand for meaning. Nonetheless, and 
in a darker way than is envisioned in Schlegel’s concept of irony, the hermetic play of 
Schein in the Novellas manifests art’s ‘vivid guilt that permeates its very forms’:57 
guilt at its harmlessness and hollow failure even to get a purchase on a world that 
might be changed. For this reason, Adorno sees in play’s ‘compulsion toward the 
ever-same’ a ‘remainder of horror’ (AT, p. 400). A decidedly minimal freedom is 
salvaged in art ‘when play becomes aware of its own terror’ (AT, p. 400) and, rather 
than attempting to whitewash over it, accentuates it like the open sore it is. 
                                                
57 Jameson, p. 166. 
  92 
 
II 
 
The ‘syntax of weakness’ that is so often said to characterise Beckett’s work⎯its 
‘endlessly proliferating series of non sequiturs, of planned inconsistencies and 
contradictory sayings and unsayings’58⎯gains depth when it is seen through the lens 
of romantic irony. ‘All I say cancels out’, the narrator of The Calmative complains of 
his self-editing, ‘I’ll have said nothing’ (The Calmative, p. 62). This is simultaneously 
true and false: true because the Novellas say ‘nothing’ that is certain or objective; 
false because they nonetheless say something. They manifest the self-cancelling 
impulse of irony, holding contradictions in a critical tension. The 
‘incomprehensibility’, in Schlegel’s words, of the irony of the Novellas derives from 
our inability to secure what Catherine Bates, in her work on puns, describes as a 
‘differentiated, supposedly non-punning field of “seriousness”’ against which such 
irony can be measured.59 That is, there is no reliable foundation on the basis of which 
we can determine irrevocably what is ironic and what is not.60 ‘In this sort of irony’, 
Schlegel argues, ‘everything should be playful and serious, guilelessly open and 
deeply hidden’.61 The Novellas play relentlessly with meaning, letting it collapse 
under its own weight: they offer knowledge claims only to undermine them; they 
open an uncomfortable space where humour and cruelty collide; they delight in the 
accidental, surplus and indecent qualities of language. However, their irony always 
holds back from the brink of nihilism: from an affirmation of pure and empty play. By 
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turning its back on the world in the name of a purposeless Schein, such irony subjects 
the world of ‘quid pro quo!’ (Murphy, p. 3) to a withering critique.  
The End situates the ambivalent narrator between two competing 
discourses⎯on the one hand, capitalism, with its bourgeois work-ethic; on the other, 
a dogmatic Marxism⎯and thus plays with the question of art’s responsibility for the 
world, parodying the concerns of committed literature. The former is approached 
through what David Weisberg describes as the narrator’s ‘reception theory of 
begging’:62  
But people who give alms don’t much care to toss them, there’s something 
contemptuous about this gesture which is repugnant to sensitive natures. To 
say nothing of their having to aim. They are prepared to give, but not for their 
gift to go rolling under the passing feet or under the passing wheels, to be 
picked up perhaps by some undeserving person. So they don’t give. There are 
those, to be sure, who stoop, but generally speaking people who give alms 
don’t much care to stoop. What they like above all is to sight the wretch from 
afar, give ready their penny, drop it in their stride and hear the God bless you 
dying away in the distance. Personally I never said that, nor anything like it. 
(The End, p. 92) 
The narrator’s dead-pan commentary on the various inhibitions of ‘sensitive’ would-
be philanthropists offers an ironic spin on the seemingly straightforward task of 
begging. Far from being a passive and mindless activity, the narrator suggests, it 
requires an intimate understanding of human psychology⎯an understanding that does 
not reflect well upon those bourgeois philanthropists who prefer to donate their 
pennies from behind the safety of a cordon sanitaire. One way of thinking about the 
workings of irony in this passage is through the musical concept of ‘overtones’, which 
Beckett himself employs in an oft-quoted assertion usually seen to exemplify the 
writer’s distrust of critics: ‘My work is a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke 
intended), made as fully as possible, and I accept responsibility for nothing else. If 
people want to have headaches among the overtones, let them. And provide their own 
aspirin’.63 As Catherine Laws argues, the musical significance of ‘overtonal 
frequencies’⎯that is, surplus notes usually referred to as harmonics, which are 
created by the vibrations of the played note⎯would not have escaped Beckett: ‘they 
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determine the quality of a musical sound’, attesting to precise tuning.64 Unlike the 
more frequently used figurative meaning of ‘overtone’ as ‘[a] subtle or elusive 
implication or association’ (OED), the musical use of the term posits a significant yet 
paradoxical relationship between the overtone and the fundamental note from which it 
necessarily derives. Beckett’s statement overtly discounts the need for any deeper 
reading of his texts beyond what they say: they are a ‘matter of fundamental sounds’. 
However, this apparently unequivocal claim undoes itself: Beckett acknowledges the 
supposedly unintended ‘joke’ deriving from the scatological pun on ‘fundamental’, 
but, as we have seen, an additional meaning of ‘fundamental sounds’ is ‘the tone 
produced by the vibration of the whole of a sonorous body, as distinguished from the 
higher tones or harmonics’ (OED). The overtones of this particular claim 
paradoxically belie its surface meaning: that overtones are insignificant. Any engaged 
and critical reading of Beckett is obligated to accept the concomitant ‘headaches’, 
with or without the recommended aspirin. The End articulates this very same tension 
between what we can call, following Beckett’s lead, ‘fundamental sounds’ and 
‘overtones’. Overtones of castigation and contempt for these self-important do-
gooders, with their Victorian distinction between the deserving and ‘undeserving’ 
poor, resonate within the narrator’s words without being rooted firmly in them. The 
irony of the passage lies in its Janus-faced refusal to affirm any single opinion or 
ideology. 
The Marxist discourse of The End is embodied in what the narrator describes 
as an ‘orator’, ‘perched on the roof of a car and haranguing the passers-by’ (The End, 
p. 94). The orator is presented derisively by the narrator, who is baffled at the 
speaker’s garbled soundbites: ‘Union… brothers… Marx… capital… bread and 
butter… love. It was all Greek to me’ (p. 94), he confesses, emphasising the 
emptiness of such concepts in the absence of any real physical change. The orator 
then gesticulates to the narrator ‘as at an exhibit’ (p. 94)⎯the significance of this 
word lying in its reduction of the narrator to an example of a solid, pre-determined 
category: a mere ‘specimen’ (ND, p. 408). This reification neutralises the supposedly 
ideologically distinct systems of capitalism and Marxism in order to illuminate the 
underlying problem of identity-thinking. The narrator, unsurprisingly, given the 
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dominant mode of irony throughout the Novellas, does not engage in rational debate, 
instead suggesting, with an indulgent tone: ‘[h]e must have been a religious fanatic, I 
could find no other explanation. Perhaps he was an escaped lunatic. He had a nice 
face, a little on the red side’ (p. 95). This final somewhat patronising comment on the 
episode deflates the orator’s charade by attributing to him the very irrational 
dogmatism he seeks to undermine. 
 What is striking about this passage, moreover, is that the capitalist system is 
by no means allowed to stand triumphant. The narrator’s life offers a reductio ad 
absurdum of the bourgeois work ethic. By describing his begging as ‘work’ (The End, 
p. 95), carried out in order to allay his small ‘expenses’ (p. 95), and directing a 
substantial amount of energy and cunning into establishing an intricate begging 
system by which he can generate small sums, the narrator embodies, and 
simultaneously ridicules, the figure of the self-made man. In an exemplary instance of 
bourgeois thrift, he ‘even managed to put a little aside’ (p. 95) for his old age. The 
irony is directed not only at the capitalist system, but also at the narrator himself, who 
is baffled by the concepts of ‘brothers’ and ‘love’, and cannot see the element of truth 
in the orator’s words. The latter’s description of charity as ‘a crime, an incentive to 
slavery, stultification and organized murder’ (p. 94) returns us to the novella’s 
opening, in which the philanthropy of the ‘charitable institution’ (p. 80) from which 
the narrator is evicted is undermined in the simple and apparently deadpan exchange 
between himself and the featureless Mr Weir: ‘I am greatly obliged to you, I said, is 
there a law which prevents you from throwing me out naked and penniless? That 
would damage our reputation in the long run, he replied’ (p. 80). The irony of The 
End, then, serves to critique bourgeois institutions on the one hand and the Marxist 
alternative on the other, revealing the inconsistencies and inadequacies of each 
system. Nonetheless, in the words of Montaigne, ‘every example limps’:65 Beckett’s 
Marxist orator and bourgeois philanthropists are by no means realistic instances of the 
ideologies they purport to embody. Instead, they are fragmented and even unlikely 
caricatures. The End is neither a political pamphlet, nor high realism. Its thematic 
engagement with the concerns of the serious world is filtered through a discourse of 
irony that prevents any simplistic commitment of the kind satirised, as we have seen, 
in Eleutheria. This irony engages with the vexed question of the relation of art to the 
                                                
65 The Complete Essays, trans. by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1987; repr. 2003), p. 1213. 
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world, not by merely satirising two political perspectives, but by critically reframing 
them within the realm of Schein. The freedom thereby attained is necessarily 
illusory⎯and this is what prompts the compulsive repetition of guilt-ridden art⎯but 
without its withdrawal into ironic and playful ambiguity, The End would not be able 
to pose an alternative to a society governed by identity-thinking.  
One of the most disturbing elements of the Novellas is the malice that often 
characterises their irony, a ‘cruelty […] that smiles’ (The Calmative, p. 63), as the 
narrator of The Calmative aptly describes it. Humour, of course, tends to walk hand in 
hand with cruelty; the act of laughing at, say, a man slipping on a banana skin and 
falling over⎯replicated, of course, in Krapp’s Last Tape⎯is fundamentally cruel. 
Hobbes suggested in 1640 that ‘the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden 
glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison 
with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly’,66 attributing to laughter a 
kind of gleeful acknowledgement of one’s mastery over another, however fleeting it 
may be. Salisbury suggests that in the ‘existential humanist’ readings of Beckett 
predominant before the 1980s, ‘comedy and laughter were seen to function as the 
means by which the human condition could be wearily acknowledged and endured’.67 
But this serves to redeem the often problematic cruelty of laughter; it is not directed at 
the falling man per se, but at the human condition. Critchley suggests that ‘[t]his is 
why, melancholy animals that we are, human beings are also the most cheerful. We 
smile and find ourselves ridiculous. Our wretchedness is our greatness’.68 Salisbury 
convincingly argues, however, that this understanding of the relation between humour 
and cruelty tends to be insufficient for a reading of Beckett’s texts, in which we 
struggle to locate what Paul Sheehan characterises as an ‘ethic of redemption’.69  
The Expelled offers the most obvious instance of the uneasy tension between 
humour and cruelty: 
I had to fling myself to the ground to avoid crushing a child. […] I would have 
crushed him gladly, I loathe children, and it would have been doing him a 
                                                
66 Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, ed. by J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994; repr. 2008), pp. 54–5. 
67 Salisbury, p. 5 
68 On Humour (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 111. 
69 Modernism, Narrative and Humanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 153. See 
Salisbury, pp. 3–8. 
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service, but I was afraid of reprisals. Everyone is a parent, that is what keeps 
you from hoping. One should reserve, on busy streets, special tracks for those 
nasty little creatures, their prams, hoops, sweets, scooters, skates, grandpas, 
grandmas, nannies, balloons and balls, all their foul little happiness in a word. 
(The Expelled, pp. 51–2) 
The narrator’s diatribe is directed against a proportion of the population that 
customarily elicits unconditional love or disinterested tenderness⎯or, at least, is 
hardly deemed to merit anathema. His words can neither be taken wholly seriously 
nor dismissed as a joke: they exude an uneasy irony. There seems to be two reasons 
why the narrator dislikes children. First, they embody potential: they secure the 
continuation of humanity, which, for the narrator, ‘keeps you from hoping’⎯a 
thought that is further developed in Endgame, where the presence of a flea prompts 
Hamm’s fear that ‘humanity might start from there all over again!’ (Endgame, p. 
108). This misanthropy is what allows him to rationally infer that crushing the child 
‘would have been doing him a service’. Second, they manifest an assertive 
‘happiness’ that is extended to the varied paraphernalia that so annoys the narrator. 
These reasons, however, do not quite harmonise: the irrationality of the latter, with its 
humorous list detailing the trappings of childhood, undercuts the misanthropic 
rationality of the former. The narrator continues: 
I fell then, and brought down with me an old lady. […] I had high hopes she 
had broken her femur, old ladies break their femur easily, but not enough, not 
enough. I took advantage of the confusion to make off, muttering 
unintelligible oaths, as if I were the victim, and I was, but I couldn’t have 
proved it. They never lynch children, babies, no matter what they do they are 
whitewashed in advance. I personally would lynch them with the utmost  
 
 
pleasure, I don’t say I’d lend a hand, no, I am not a violent man, but I’d 
encourage the others and stand them drinks when it was all done. 
(The Expelled, p. 52) 
Once again, the narrator’s tirade is directed at the essentially harmless: this time, an 
old lady, whom he hurts accidentally but, unaccountably, hopes ‘had broken her 
femur’. His retraction of his claim that he would actually lynch children ‘with the 
utmost pleasure’ in favour of cheering on other perpetrators is at once truly horrific, 
bringing to mind the complicity of ordinary people to heinous crimes in wartime 
Europe, and extraordinarily funny, as the narrator carefully assesses exactly what his 
role would be in this unlikely baby-lynching scenario. His assertion that he is ‘not a 
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violent man’ is particularly difficult to place. What is intriguing about the cruelty of 
the Novellas is that it tends to occur within the realm of possibility rather than 
actuality: in contradistinction to the Trilogy, in which, for example, Molloy savagely 
beats a charcoal-burner for no apparent reason, the narrator of The Expelled hurts the 
old lady by accident and, indeed, actively throws himself to the ground to avoid 
crushing the child. Similarly, in First Love, the narrator deliberates violence towards 
Lulu, but does not enact it: ‘She began stroking my ankles. I considered kicking her in 
the cunt’ (First Love, p. 31). The tender, albeit bizarre, moment of physical intimacy 
is broken by the narrator’s strangely specific desire to attack the defining element of 
her femininity (and, of course, the site of her reproductive organs). In The Calmative, 
the narrator reaches an impasse halfway up the cathedral’s spiral staircase and 
describes it in a peculiarly archaic register that distances us from a full appreciation of 
his murderous intentions: 
I met a man revolving in the other direction, with the utmost circumspection. 
How I’d love to push him, or him to push me, over the edge. He gazed at me 
wild-eyed for a moment and then, not daring to pass me on the parapet side 
and surmising correctly that I would not relinquish the wall just to oblige him, 
abruptly turned his back on me. 
(The Calmative, p. 69) 
It is the very extremity of the narrators’ responses to their situations that is so 
striking⎯the disproportionate reactions to mundane events. For this reason, we are 
unable to take their words at face value. On the other hand, the use of irony does not 
allow us simply to discount the narrators’ words as a joke, meaning the opposite of 
what it says. Instead, we are acutely aware that there is a tension between the 
sentiments the narrators are expressing and the language in which such sentiments are 
expressed, which undermines them without wholly neutralising their sadistic intent.  
In a playful displacement of Bergson’s famous claim that laughter requires 
‘something like a momentary anaesthesia of the heart’,70 Salisbury argues that the 
anaesthetised heart paraded by the narrator of First Love⎯when he callously implores 
Lulu/Anna to abort their baby and speedily retreats after the birth, which ‘finished’ 
(First Love, p. 44) him in an ironic subversion of birth’s usual frame of reference⎯is 
                                                
70 Laughter (Baltimore, ML: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 64. 
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a ‘grotesquely humorous object’ that can be added to the list of his other ailments.71 
However, there is another way in which the text forces together matters of the heart 
and the narrator’s infinite pains: they are also both presented in systematic form: 
I’ll tell them to you some day none the less, if I think of it, if I can, my strange 
pains, in detail, distinguishing between the different kinds, for the sake of 
clarity, those of the mind, those of the heart or emotional conative, those of the 
soul (none prettier than these) and finally those of the frame proper, first the 
inner or latent, then those affecting the surface, beginning with the hair and 
scalp and moving methodically down, without haste, all the way down to the 
feet beloved of the corn, the cramp, the kibe, the bunion, the hammer toe, the 
nail ingrown, the fallen arch, the common blain, the club foot, duck foot, 
goose foot, pigeon foot, flat foot, trench foot and other curiosities. 
(First Love, pp. 32–3) 
But what kind of love was this, exactly? Love-passion? Somehow I think not. 
That’s the priapic one, is it not? Or is this a different variety? There are so 
many, are there not? All equally if not more delicious, are they not? Platonic 
love, for example, there’s another just occurs to me. It’s disinterested. Perhaps 
I loved her with a platonic love? But somehow I think not. Would I have been 
tracing her name in old cowshit if my love had been pure and disinterested. 
And with my devil’s finger into the bargain, which I then sucked. Come now! 
(First Love, p. 34) 
Indeed, the narrator’s taxonomy of love could quite easily be understood as a smaller 
system within the ‘heart or emotional conative’ subsection of his pains. This is 
unsurprising given that Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy⎯a book Beckett 
read and noted, and whose qualities, ‘encyclopaedic in range, learned yet flippant 
about scholarly accuracy, and utterly eccentric’,72 are self-evidently channelled in the 
pseudo-systems of First Love⎯contains an entire section on love within his broader 
classification of melancholy. Indeed, Burton’s intention to ‘examine all the kinds of 
love, his nature, beginning, difference, objects, how it is honest or dishonest, a virtue 
or vice, a natural passion or a disease, his power and effects, how far it extends’,73 is 
not unlike the, admittedly less grandiose, ambition of the narrator of First Love. Here, 
the systematic compulsion⎯the desire to know and to contain⎯is set against and 
undermined by frequent resigned expressions of ignorance. Indeed, there is a 
particular tension between the narrator’s apparent ignorance and the terminology with 
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which he expresses it, from the obscure and overdetermined ‘priapic’ to the allusion 
to Hamlet: ‘the age is grown so picked that the toe of the peasant comes so near the 
heel of the courtier, he galls his kibe’.74 Moreover, what we actually receive in the 
first excerpt is only a précis of the system proper: the narrator describes how he 
would⎯‘someday […] if I think of it, if I can’⎯relate his ‘strange pains’ in a suitably 
methodological way. What is offered is a system in the Romantic sense: self-
consciously partial and eternally incomplete. It is not even wholly correct: neither 
‘goose foot’ nor ‘duck foot’ exist, while ‘pigeon foot’ is a misnomer for ‘pigeon toe’. 
The dissection of the concept of love into its various subcategories is a clear reductio 
ad absurdum of schematism: the narrator is trying to diagnose his particular brand of 
love, the obscure symptom of which is tracing the beloved’s name ‘in old cowshit’. 
The narrator acknowledges his hitherto lack of success in gaining intellectual control 
over his unruly existence, but confides his hopes for the future: ‘Yes, I’ve changed 
my system, it’s the winning one at last, for the ninth or tenth time’ (p. 32)⎯the 
particular lexis recalling the gambler’s frenzied belief that this time the jackpot is his. 
In simultaneously raising and demolishing system after system, the narrator 
emphasises the playful nature of language and the spuriousness of its claims to 
totality.  
 Such claims of ignorance are characteristic of The Calmative, which is 
structured around a fundamental indeterminacy regarding the narrator’s very 
existence: 
I don’t know when I died. It always seemed to me I died old, about ninety 
years old, and what years, and that my body bore it out, from head to foot. But 
this evening, alone in my icy bed, I have the feeling I’ll be older than the day, 
the night, when the sky with all its lights fell upon me. […] I’ll try and tell 
myself another story, to try and calm myself, and it’s there I feel I’ll be old, 
even older than the day I fell, calling for help, and it came. Or is it possible 
that in this story I have come back to life, after my death? No, it’s not like me 
to come back to life, after my death. 
(The Calmative p. 61) 
Speaking in the past tense, the narrator assures the reader that he has, indeed, died, 
but, only a few lines later, insists that ‘it’s not like me to come back to life, after my 
death’. This is paradoxical; he is basing his assessment of the likelihood of returning 
                                                
74 Hamlet, ed. by Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor (London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2006), p. 419 [V. 
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from death on his mortal personality that would perish with him. Or, to put it another 
way, he is positing a post-mortal agency that could not possibly exist. His words raise 
the question of who, exactly, would be likely to come back to life after death⎯the 
logical answer being Jesus, whose crucifixion is referenced a number of times in the 
Novellas.75 In a bathetic image, the narrator of The Calmative imagines himself in 
Jesus’ position, ‘stretched out in the rigor of death, the genuine bodily article, under 
the blue eyes fount of so much hope’ (p. 70)⎯the tragic potential of which is 
immediately dissolved by the glib remark that ‘they would […] put me in the evening 
papers’ (p. 70). Schlegel describes irony as ‘the freest of all licences, for by its means 
one transcends oneself’;76 irony requires a critical detachment from the immediate. 
However, the narrator ironises this liberatory transcendence by observing himself as a 
dead object, acknowledging the tendency towards reification that is always part of art 
as it detaches itself from reality. Irony is the ‘freest of all licences’ not because it 
entirely transcends the empirical world⎯an impossibility⎯but because its playful 
refusal of the terms of that world simultaneously critiques it. Even as it does so, it 
attests to the suffering ‘of which the work is an image’ (AT, p. 49). More so than the 
other novellas, the narrator of The Calmative is alienated from his own discourse. His 
assertion, for example, that ‘I had merely to bow my head and look down at my feet’, 
continues with a trailing and increasingly insecure subordinate clause: ‘for it is in this 
attitude I always drew the strength to, how shall I say, I don’t know’ (p. 66). Irony in 
The Calmative is produced by the narrator’s distrust of language’s ability to 
approximate experience.  
Such distrust takes on a celebratory aspect in the punning opening of First 
Love. Puns are a particularly ironic literary device.77 If irony expresses ‘both sides or 
viewpoints at once in the form of contradiction or paradox’,78 then the polysemy of a 
pun contains a tiny, ironic explosion of play. In the pun, language eschews its 
prescribed task of communication and ceases to be entirely referential. It celebrates 
                                                
75 ‘Personally if I were reduced to making the sign of the cross I would set my heart on doing it right, 
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Noble, 1991), p. 10. 
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Schein by refusing to refer to anything concrete beyond the infinite play of language. 
It distends time by preventing the resolution of meaning and stages the 
purposelessness of art in its own aimlessness, for puns, as Bates emphasises, ‘have no 
point or purpose’.79 This pun on the German Pointe or ‘punch-line’ demonstrates the 
extent to which connections in language ‘pop up when you least expect it’:80 the ideas 
of purpose, punch-line and even the figurative concept of the sharpness of wit are 
elided in the ambiguous and multivalent ‘point’. As Bates argues, the danger lies in 
the critic’s impulse to defuse the subversive moment of the pun: ‘its tendency to 
distort or to extend meaning is dealt with by the interpretative process which, 
however playfully, ultimately restores priority to the serious business of making 
sense, to showing what a pun finally means’.81 However, this hermeneutic 
recuperation relies on two things. First, the puns must be visible deviations from a 
stable, serious discourse. Second, they must elicit interpretative pleasure: the rational 
pleasure of making sense of chaos that Bates associates with play. Both of these are 
undermined in Beckett’s use of the pun in First Love, where the narrator claims that 
the date of his birth ‘remains graven in my memory’, and continues, ‘I have no bone 
to pick with graveyards’ (First Love, p. 25). The novella’s saturation with irony 
means that we have no stable communicative discourse in which to place and resolve 
the puns. The meaning of the narrator’s words is perfectly transparent, but the 
connotative excesses destabilise their relation to an already muddied discourse. 
Moreover, these puns belong to what Bates describes as ‘those troublesome half-way 
houses⎯the subsumed pun, the stupid pun, the unmotivated, meaningless, gratuitous 
pun, puns that are dubious, accidental, or unintended’.82 They are cringingly bad puns, 
perfectly in line with Beckett’s corpus as a whole, which Salisbury describes as 
‘replete with jokes or comic moments that couldn’t properly be called witty⎯jokes 
which hold back from the instant of the comic payoff but are bound to the quivering 
temporality of the almost’83⎯and it is not insignificant here that Schlegel berated 
Kant for ignoring ‘the category “almost” [Beinahe], a category that has surely 
accomplished, and spoiled, as much in the world and in literature as any other’.84 
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81 Ibid., p. 145. 
82 Ibid., p. 146 
83 Salisbury, p. 21. 
84 Philosophical Fragments, p. 10. 
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There is no neat containment of their meaning: by structurally exceeding the restraints 
of a single sense, they become distinctly gratuitous and meaningless. This permits a 
reflective critique of the supposedly serious world’s wholly instrumental use of 
language and thus its blinkered identity-thinking. In art, J. M. Bernstein argues, 
‘[f]reedom appears only as the revealing of the unfreedom of what lies outside art; but 
since every appearance must yield to its comprehension, our grasping at our freedom 
through works immediately ruins it’.85 The puns of First Love elude the critic’s grasp 
by playfully oscillating between meaning and its negation.  
The setting providing sustenance for the narrator’s puns alludes to the famous 
Graveyard scene in Hamlet,86 in which the play’s punning, equivocating and 
digressing reaches its zenith. This ironic intertextuality is directed at a tragedy whose 
excessive linguistic play has traditionally been sidelined in favour of accounts of its 
intense philosophical preoccupations.87 First Love, then, is ironising a canonical text: 
it is hard to read the narrator’s claim that ‘with a little luck you hit on a genuine 
internment, with real live mourners and the odd relict trying to throw himself into the 
pit’ (First Love, pp. 26–7) without remembering (and perhaps cringing a little at the 
memory) Hamlet flinging himself into Ophelia’s grave and brawling with her brother. 
More importantly, however, it is ironising a play that is itself saturated with irony. 
Such intertextuality estranges Hamlet from its own fame, revealing what is important 
to it and, indeed, serious in it: not the supposed birth of subjectivity, but irony’s 
‘infinite jest’.88  
The irony that permeates Beckett’s Novellas resists any final resolution or 
critical mastery. It straddles the realms of lightheartedness and seriousness, attesting 
to their dialectic. Irony is intrinsically playful and is the mode by which these texts 
retreat into what Bates describes as ‘another world, one which, bounded and 
complete, stands at one remove from the world of reality’⎯a world of Schein.89 The 
ironic phrase cannot be taken at face value but neither can it be rejected as a lie; it 
hovers between comprehensibility and incomprehensibility, refusing epistemological 
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stability; and it delights in its interminable play. The Novellas do not simply manifest 
an ironic tone, but push irony to its very limits, challenging the possibility of a stable, 
serious discourse. Such play, in its very refusal to adhere to the identity-compulsion 
of the serious world⎯a compulsion necessarily undermined by irony, which is 
predicated on a denial of the logic of non-contradiction⎯resists the world ‘of 
everything-for-something-else’ by revealing ‘what it itself would be if it were 
emancipated from the schemata of imposed identification’ (AT, p. 110). This triumph 
of possibility, however, is inevitably undermined by the Novellas’ self-confinement 
within the sphere of Schein, in which they are unable to effect any empirical changes. 
For this reason, Adorno argues that ‘the blemish of mendacity obviously cannot be 
rubbed off art; nothing guarantees that it will keep its objective promise. […] Every 
radical art is a lie insofar as it fails to create the possible to which it gives rise as 
semblance [Schein]’ (AT, p. 110). This is ultimately a promise of freedom: freedom 
from the rigid exchange-relation of capitalist society and its concomitant identity-
thinking that reduces everyone and everything to a mere specimen. If the Novellas 
articulate the illusion of freedom, the structural illusion of anything qualitatively 
different to the ‘real world of work, meaning, exchange’,90 then they simultaneously 
attest to the freedom of illusion: ‘the claim that because the nonexistent appears it 
must indeed be possible’ (AT, p. 109).  
                                                
90 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE SCARS OF EVIL 
 
 
⎯ History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake. […] 
⎯ The ways of the Creator are not our ways, Mr Deasy said. All history 
moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God. 
⎯ James Joyce, Ulysses1 
Freedom and evil have been bedfellows since Augustine used the narrative of the Fall 
to justify God’s benevolence, arguing that ‘from the evil use of free will, there arose 
the whole series of calamities by which the human race is led by a succession of 
miseries from its depraved origin’.2 This provided the established answer to the 
problem of evil: it had the merit of exculpating God from any wrongdoing while 
retaining human freedom, in light of which, of course, individuals could be held 
morally accountable for their actions and condemned accordingly. Some 1500 years 
later, in the work of Adorno, the relationship between freedom and evil is as close as 
ever, though the events that desecrated the twentieth century made it philosophically 
and, indeed, morally necessary to reconsider their connection. The question of evil 
was no longer ‘how can we justify the goodness of God in the face of evil?’, but the 
far simpler and yet more radically uncertain: ‘how can we understand the presence of 
evil per se?’ The wrongful execution of free will simply didn’t seem an appropriate 
rationale for such events as the Holocaust, in which evil was not a consequence of the 
actions of a few, but a systematic network of horror that marked everyone as 
complicit. ‘Evil, therefore’, Adorno argues, ‘is the world’s own unfreedom’ (ND, p. 
219). It is to society, rather than the individual will, that we should turn in order to 
interrogate the concept of evil.  
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The concept of society itself is, however, not unequivocally transparent, an issue 
Adorno addresses in his 1968 lecture series, Introduction to Sociology. Against those 
sociologists who ‘consider that this term is no longer usable’ (IS, p. 28), Adorno 
insists on its enduring utility, although, as an abstract term in constant dialectical 
relation with lived reality, it cannot be seen as a ‘legal term definable once and for all’ 
(IS, p. 28). What Adorno has in mind when he speaks of society is something beyond 
a ‘descriptive concept’ (IS, p. 33) of ‘basic types of arrangement by which people 
gain their livelihood and which define the forms of their coexistence’ (IS, p. 29). 
Instead, he argues that society ‘in the strong sense’ (IS, p. 29) is the existence of a 
‘functional connection’ (IS, p. 29) between people that ‘leaves no-one out, a 
connectedness in which all the members of the society are entwined and which takes 
on a certain kind of autonomy in relation to them’ (IS, p. 30). Fundamentally, this 
interrelationship is rooted in exchange, the structural equivalence of which 
corresponds to the presentation of society’s ‘individual elements […] as relatively 
equal, endowed with the same faculty of reason. They appear as atoms stripped of 
qualities, defined only by their self-preserving reason’ (IS, p. 30). Adorno’s concept 
of society is, then, essentially modern, in that it is predicated on capital and the 
specific inter-personal relations it fosters. 
 Adorno is not renowned for his theorisation of evil. For this reason, only a few 
articles and book chapters dwell on his contribution to the topic,3 while larger works 
on the subject of evil tend to contain, at best, a brief note on his famous, and often 
misunderstood, remark that ‘[t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’ (P, p. 34).4 
It is nonetheless my contention not only that Adorno’s work is immensely valuable 
for a consideration of evil, but also that such insights can fundamentally affect our 
understanding of freedom. Beckett’s works, too, are rarely associated with evil, 
perhaps unsurprisingly given the solitary use of the term in Ill Seen Ill Said: ‘And 
from it [the cabin] as from an evil core that the what is the wrong word the evil 
spread’ (Ill Seen Ill Said, p. 50). Far from being contained to a cabin in a late work, 
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however, evil exerts a pervasive influence over a number of Beckett’s works⎯a point 
noted by Paul Sheehan, in an unusual consideration of Beckett in relation to evil: 
The world according to Samuel Beckett, before it is anything else, is a place of 
extreme hardship and suffering. More disturbing, however, is the fact that 
when torment is the outcome of human action, the results are nearly always 
nasty, brutish and long-winded. Routine acts of atrocity are performed without 
caveats, and in the absence of the standard reassurances of dramatic logic or 
ethical norms. […] Suffering is both necessary, in that no alternative is 
offered, nor any mitigating circumstances; and it is gratuitous, with a piling-
on of woes that surpasses any reasonable expectation of human forbearance.5 
It is nonetheless true that binaries such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ risk articulating what 
Richard Bernstein describes as a ‘vulgar Manichaeism’ that is not only hopelessly out 
of date in today’s secular world,6 but is also, as Peter Dews notes, dangerous in its 
reduction of ‘the complexities of politics and history to the opposition of “us” and 
“them”’.7 Dews cites George Bush’s State of the Union Address in the wake of the 
11th September terrorist attacks as a ‘notorious example of this abuse’;8 the President 
provocatively declared: ‘I know we can overcome evil with greater good’.9 More 
pertinently, the invocation of the concept of evil is commonly seen to appeal to a 
static idea of the human condition⎯an area from which Beckett studies has, in the 
main, rightly shifted away. Nonetheless, I argue that Adorno’s materialist 
reconception of evil and its root in modern capitalist society resonates acutely with a 
number of Beckett’s more disturbing texts from the 1950s and 1960s. As I will 
demonstrate, evil for Adorno is by no means an unchanging category; rather, he 
emphasises that the twentieth century witnessed a qualitative shift in the very nature 
of evil. Eschewing chronology, this chapter turns first to The Lost Ones and How It Is, 
considering Adorno’s transposition of evil from the individual will into society. I 
argue that the oppressive social worlds depicted in these two texts offer an insight into 
the ways in which manmade structures solidify and circumscribe the lives of those 
who created them. Second, I explore Endgame in relation to Adorno’s critique of 
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Endgame, I argue, subverts 
                                                
5 ‘A World Without Monsters: Beckett and the Ethics of Cruelty’, in Beckett and Ethics, ed. by Russell 
Smith (London and New York: Continuum, 2008), pp. 86–101 (p. 86). 
6 Radical Evil: A Philosophical Investigation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002; repr. 2007), p. 3. 
7 The Idea of Evil (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), p. 1. 
8 Ibid., p. 2 
9 Quoted in Ibid.  
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Hegel’s affirmative universal history and its redemptive narrative of progress by 
acknowledging those ruptures that problematise the fundamental claims of theodicy. 
Nonetheless, it simultaneously exposes the truth of universal history that lies in the 
real unfreedom of an oppressive history that has become second nature⎯a socially 
constructed state that gives the illusion of being natural. 
It is often taken as a given that evil is something that exceeds reason. Jean 
Nabert, for example, characterises evil as ‘the unjustifiable’:10 as Dews elaborates, 
‘[n]o matter how historically inevitable the acts that bring suffering and destruction 
may appear to have been, we respond to them as that which absolutely should not 
have occurred’.11 Susan Neiman, practically verbatim, argues:    
Every time we make the judgment this ought not to have happened, we are 
stepping onto a path that leads straight to the problem of evil. Note that it is as 
little a moral problem, strictly speaking, as it is a theological one. One can call 
it the point at which ethics and metaphysics, epistemology and aesthetics 
meet, collide, and throw up their hands.12 
Accepting that there is something in evil that lies beyond rational comprehension, 
how can we respond to it? Adorno’s concept of the ‘moral addendum [Hinzutretenden 
am Sittlichen]’ is suggestive: 
A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree 
mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not 
repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen. When we want to find 
reasons for it, this imperative is as refractory as the given one of Kant was 
once upon a time. Dealing discursively with it would be an outrage, for the 
new imperative gives us a bodily sensation of the moral addendum⎯bodily, 
because it is now the practical abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony to 
which individuals are exposed even with individuality about to vanish as a 
form of mental reflection. 
(ND, p. 365) 
As I explained in this thesis’ Introduction, the addendum refers to an extra-rational 
‘additional factor’ (HF, p. 183) that supplements the rational will. Even the simplest 
of decisions, Adorno argues, require ‘a sort of jolt’ (HF, p. 228) to be actually 
executed. Essentially, the addendum works as a mediator between the self and the 
world, or the mental and somatic. In this and other passages, Adorno extends the 
                                                
10 Quoted in Ibid., p. 8. 
11 Ibid., p. 8. 
12 Neiman, p. 5. 
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addendum into the realm of morality, arguing that moral decisions cannot be made 
wholly with the dispassionate rationality advocated by Kant. This is what ultimately 
distinguishes Adorno’s ‘new categorical imperative’ from Kant’s famous original: 
‘[s]o act that the maxim of your action could become a universal law’.13 Adorno’s 
imperative is historically contingent, more rudimentary⎯Gunzelin Schmid Noerr 
argues that it is not a principle ‘which could ground morality altogether’, but rather 
grounds only a ‘minimal morality of respect for unafflicted life’14⎯and more 
nebulous, lacking even Kant’s admittedly abstract guideline. However, beyond these 
differences, Adorno’s imperative is grounded in a moral response to Auschwitz that is 
simultaneously rational and somatic: a visceral, but by no means uncritical, 
experience of horror at modern evil.  
In his 1963 lecture series, Problems of Moral Philosophy, Adorno describes 
the moral addendum as an ‘other factor [andere Moment]’: ‘something alien [to] 
moral philosophy, something that does not quite fit, precisely because as a theory 
moral philosophy tends to overlook such matters’ (PMP, p. 8). Significantly, this 
‘other factor’ is necessarily extra-rational or extra-logical; Adorno emphasises that 
rationality alone is not necessarily an adequate response to a situation:   
If we were to attempt to set up an absolute law and to ask the laws of pure 
reason to explain why on earth it would be wrong to torture people, we would 
encounter all sorts of difficulties. […] In all such moral questions, the moment 
you confront them with reason you find yourself plunged into a terrible 
dialectic. And when faced by this dialectic the ability to say, ‘Stop!’ and ‘You 
ought not even to contemplate these things!’ has its advantages. […] If reason 
makes its entrance at this point then reason itself becomes irrational. 
(PMP, p. 97) 
For Adorno, true reason must allow for that which is ostensibly irrational by existing 
standards⎯not least because the rationality upon which our moral compass relies is 
itself responsible for the very catastrophes we are responding to. A few years 
previously, in a discussion following his 1959 paper, ‘The Meaning of Working 
Through the Past’, Adorno had similarly insisted that ‘breaking off rationality at such 
places better serves reason than a kind of pseudo-rationality that erects systems where 
                                                
13 The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 353–604 (p. 520; 6:389). 
14 Quoted in Gehard Schweppenhäuser, ‘Adorno’s Negative Moral Philosophy’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Adorno, ed. by Tom Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 
328–53 (p. 347). 
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it is first and foremost a question of immediate reaction’ (CM, p. 304). He prioritises 
spontaneous reactions in the face of evil: ‘the immediate [unmittelbar], active reaction 
to particular situations’ (PMP, p. 7). This should not, however, be interpreted as a 
straightforward rejection of rationality, as if a wholly unmediated response to a 
situation were possible, but rather as a deliberate deviation from Kant, who 
intractably relies on reason alone in questions of the will. Kant, for whom ‘the 
principle of freedom should itself be nothing but reason, pure reason’ (PMP, p. 71), 
insists that every moral decision is necessarily rational: ‘the kernel of the Kantian idea 
here is that everything that I do not recognize as a purely rational being, and every 
rule that is not derived from my own reason actually restricts the principle of 
freedom’ (PMP, p. 71). Kant could not accept the possibility of what Adorno 
describes as an ‘impulse, intramental and somatic in one’ (ND, pp. 228–9) that adds 
an irrational quality to one’s seemingly rational decisions. As Andrew Bowie argues, 
‘motivation’ for Adorno ‘is not just something initiated by consciousness in the form 
of a norm-governed reflective choice of a course of action. It is also something which 
depends on our primal connection to the natural reality we are that is evident in our 
reflexes and impulses’.15 This is elucidated by an example Adorno offers to his 
students. He cites one of the architects of the plot to kill Hitler in 20th July 1944: 
‘there are situations that are so intolerable that one just cannot continue to put up with 
them, no matter what may happen and no matter what may happen to oneself in the 
course of the attempt to change them’ and comments: 
I believe that this act of resistance⎯the fact that things may be so intolerable 
that you feel compelled to make the attempt to change them, regardless of the 
consequences for yourself, and in circumstances in which you may also 
predict the possible consequences for other people⎯is the precise point at 
which the irrationality, or better, the irrational aspect of moral action is to be 
sought, the point at which it may be located. But at the same time, you can see 
that this irrationality is only one aspect, because on the level of theory the 
officer concerned knew perfectly well how evil, how horrifying this Third 
Reich was, and it was because of his critical and theoretical insight into the 
lies and the crimes that he had to deal with that he was brought to the point of 
action. If he had not had this insight, if he had had no knowledge of the vile 
evil that prevailed in Germany at the time, he would quite certainly never have 
been moved to that act of resistance.  
(PMP, p. 8) 
                                                
15 Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 127. 
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Adorno is careful to emphasise through this commentary that moral judgement is not 
merely irrational, but that the addendum mediates between mind and natural being. 
Through it, ‘freedom extends to the realm of experience’ (ND, p. 229) in a ‘union of 
reason and nature’ (HF, p. 237). Adorno is affirming the necessity for a response to 
evil that, precisely by including this extra-rational, somatic impulse, is free. The 
significance of the addendum to aesthetic experience allows us to consider art as the 
locus of such freedom. What Adorno describes in Aesthetic Theory as the ‘shudder’ 
(AT, p. 437) is a spontaneous response to the artwork through which the individual is 
able ‘to experience the true horror of the world for what it is’.16 It is for this reason 
that Adorno is able to declare that ‘[c]onsciousness without shudder is reified 
consciousness’ (AT, p. 437); without it, there is no access to the truth: the disclosure 
of the world’s evil.   
 
I 
 
The term ‘radical evil’ has an established place in common philosophical parlance, 
due in no small part to Hannah Arendt’s vivid and powerful definition of it as ‘a 
phenomenon that […] confronts us with its overpowering reality and breaks down all 
standards we know’.17 However, as Arendt acknowledges, the term derives from 
Kant, who utilised it in a very different sense, namely, to describe the ‘natural 
propensity [Hang]’ of mankind to evil⎯a propensity that is ‘not any the less brought 
upon us by ourselves’ (R, 6:32). This apparent contradiction between, on the one 
hand, an insistence on human freedom to choose between good and evil, and, on the 
other, an acknowledgement that there is ‘a radical innate evil in human nature’ (R, 
6:32), forms the basis of both Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
and Adorno’s critique in Negative Dialectics and the History and Freedom lecture 
course of 1964–65. To understand the latter⎯and therefore to establish Adorno’s own 
theory of evil⎯it is important to delineate Kant’s own position.     
                                                
16 Finlayson, p. 81. 
17 Quoted in Bernstein, p. 11. 
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 For Kant, as for Augustine, evil is located in free will (Willkür) alone,18 rather 
than in ‘natural impulses’ (R, 6:21). He emphasises that however persuasive natural 
inclinations may be, they exert no power over a human being unless he wilfully 
incorporates them into his maxim. This is fundamental to Kant, for if such impulses 
could be held responsible for one’s actions, ‘the entire exercise of freedom could be 
traced back to a determination through natural causes⎯and this would contradict 
freedom’ (R, 6:21). The preservation of freedom, then, lies at the heart of Kant’s 
consideration of evil, resulting in the attribution of complete responsibility to human 
agents. This responsibility, however, is not for one’s actions, but for the maxims 
chosen⎯or, more precisely, for one’s particular hierarchy of maxims. For, as Kant 
makes clear, external circumstances force one’s maxims to compete for ascendancy: 
Hence the difference, whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in 
the difference between the incentives that he incorporates into his maxim (not 
in the material of the maxim) but in their subordination (in the form of the 
maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other. 
(R, 6:36) 
To be evil, human beings must merely freely choose to elevate a maxim of self-love 
above the maxim of duty to the moral law. However, this implies that a person is 
neither wholly evil nor wholly good⎯that sometimes they subordinate the moral law 
to their maxim of self-love and sometimes do the opposite: an interpretation that Kant 
definitively rules out. Rather, one’s hierarchy of maxims attests to one’s disposition 
(Gesinnung), or moral character. While this was freely chosen, no inquiry can be 
made into its ground without warranting an infinite regress, and, for this reason, Kant 
describes it as an ‘innate characteristic’ (R, 6:25). This disposition, moreover, is 
further circumscribed by human beings’ propensity to evil⎯the radical evil that 
inheres within the human⎯a propensity that Kant declines to prove in light of ‘the 
multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades before us’ 
(R, 6:33). Using the empirically somewhat dubious analogy of ‘savages’, who ‘have a 
propensity for intoxicants’ (whether or not they are originally inclined towards it), 
                                                
18 ‘The human Willkür […] is the faculty of free spontaneous choice. Or, more accurately, it is that 
aspect of the faculty of volition that involves unconstrained free choice. […] The Willkür, the 
name we give to the capacity to choose between alternatives is neither intrinsically good nor 
intrinsically evil; rather, it is the capacity by which we freely choose good or evil maxims. In the 
Religion it is clear that Wille (in its more technical, narrow sense) does not act at all; it does not 
make decisions. Wille refers to the purely rational aspect of the faculty of volition’. Bernstein, p. 
13. 
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Kant insists that ‘Propensity is actually only the predisposition to desire an enjoyment 
which, when the subject has experienced it, arouses inclination to it’ (R, 6:29). 
Radical evil, then, in no way exonerates the human being from responsibility for their 
disposition, despite the fact that it ‘corrupts the ground of all maxims’ (R, 6:37). 
 This brief summary attests to Kant’s oscillation between his commitment to 
freedom as the basis of morality and his belief that humans are radically evil. As I will 
explore, Adorno’s response to this paradox is twofold: first, he translates the Kantian 
picture from its place in the individual will to society; second, within this social 
context he insists upon the very real unfreedom faced by the individual. The specific 
relation between the individual and the world is addressed in Adorno’s 1969 essay 
‘Subject and Object’, in which he argues for the mutual mediation of subject and 
object. In this, he is affirming the Idealist claim that reality is necessarily mediated by 
human consciousness and, beyond this, insisting that we as humans are equally 
mediated by the objective world. This world is not conceived, as in naïve Realism, as 
that which neutrally always already merely exists. Rather, it should be seen as the 
sum of the social structures that have sedimented into second nature, those structures 
that are constituted by humans but at the same time stand in opposition to them. In 
light of this, Adorno’s argument for the ‘primacy of the object’ (CM, p. 249) in lived 
experience emphasises the oppressive weight these social structures take on. In 
Negative Dialectics, he insists that ‘to a subject that acts naively and opposes itself to 
its environment, its own conditioning is nontransparent’ (ND, p. 220). The subject, 
that is, conceives of the social world as merely existing⎯as natural⎯and this very 
blindness prevents his insight into his predicament and neuters the capacity to change 
it.  
This dialectic between subject and object is the basis of Adorno’s critique of 
Kant’s concept of evil. He insists that Kant’s attempt to subtract the world from the 
question of free will is fatally flawed: ‘countless moments of external⎯notably 
social⎯reality invade the decisions designated by the words “will” and “freedom”’ 
(ND, p. 213). If subject and object are continually mediated, it is impossible to 
untangle the knots that bind our decisions to the outside world. This, Adorno 
concludes, ‘is why the attempt to localize the question of free will in the empirical 
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subject must fail’ (ND, p. 213). For this reason, he rephrases the problem that so 
preoccupied Kant: 
The trouble is not that free men do radical evil, as evil is being done beyond 
all measure conceivable to Kant; the trouble is that as yet there is no world in 
which⎯there are flashes of this in Brecht’s work⎯men would no longer need 
to be evil. Evil, therefore, is the world’s own unfreedom. Whatever evil is 
done comes from the world. 
(ND, pp. 218–9) 
While Kant situates the problem of evil in the human will, Adorno relocates it to 
society. In so doing, he avoids Kant’s paradox, in which Kant attempted to reconcile 
human freedom with radical evil⎯one’s innate propensity to evil that ‘corrupts the 
ground of all maxims’. For Adorno, freedom is not primarily a question of the will; 
rather, it is a socio-political issue. Moreover, within a social context, freedom is rare, 
fleeting and by no means inevitable. Collapsing one end of Kant’s paradox, Adorno 
firmly roots evil in society⎯society, which, of course, is not only an abstract and 
impersonal menace but which ‘consists also of men themselves’ (ND, p. 219). For 
Kant, there is no possibility of moral responsibility without freedom: humans are held 
accountable not only for their evil maxims, but also for their propensity towards evil. 
For Adorno, the choice is not a simple one between freedom and moral responsibility, 
on the one hand, and unfreedom and no accountability, on the other. The complexity 
and non-transparency of the social realm, which is nonetheless a manmade structure, 
obscures the neat dichotomy Kant erects. Ultimately, Adorno rejects both sides of 
Kant’s paradox: he refuses to acknowledge the universality of freedom and he denies 
the existence of radical evil, in which he perceives ‘the echo of that revolting 
adaptation of the theological doctrine of original sin, the idea that the corruption of 
human nature legitimates domination, and that radical evil legitimates evil’ (HF, p. 
159). 
 It is significant that Adorno retains the term ‘evil’. After all, evil seems to be 
inextricably entwined with the idea of intention. Given Adorno’s insistence on the 
dominance of society and the real unfreedom of the individual, it would be tempting 
to give up on the concept of evil altogether, viewing it as a Romantic anachronism 
that has no room in an administered society. And, indeed, Adorno muses on this very 
question: 
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we must ask whether the entire moral sphere […] in which it is meaningful to 
speak of good and evil, has not approached a threshold at which it is no longer 
meaningful to apply these terms. If that were the case, it would undoubtedly 
help to explain some of the antinomies and aporias that we constantly 
encounter in discussions of Auschwitz. One such is that here we necessarily 
apply yardsticks of good and evil to behaviour that, as if in fulfilment of a 
dreadful prophecy, already belongs to a state of mankind in which, negatively, 
the entire sphere of morality has been abolished, instead of being elevated, 
positively, into a higher sphere that is equally free of both repression and 
morality.  
(HF, p. 207) 
Nonetheless, Adorno continues to employ moral terminology, though he insists that 
‘[a]fter Auschwitz there is no word tinged from on high, not even a theological one, 
that has any right unless it underwent a transformation’ (ND, p. 367). If the concept of 
evil is retained, it must be transposed from its original context and reconsidered in 
relation to existing circumstances. Evil, then, is qualitatively different in a post-
Auschwitz world.  
It is of this revised conception of evil that we should be mindful when 
considering two of Beckett’s more disquieting texts of the 1960s: The Lost Ones and 
How It Is. These two prose works are conspicuous in the Beckett corpus for offering 
the broad outlines of a social world. The Lost Ones lacks realism, defined characters 
and any discernible plot. Nonetheless, it does, if obscurely, present the abstract 
mechanisms of a society: a community of ‘lost bodies’ (The Lost Ones, p. 202) who, 
at least primitively, interact within a systematic framework. Moreover, it does so 
within the constraints of a third-person narrative, the narrator ambiguously located at 
once inside and outside the cylinder, in which the inner world privileged in other 
prose works of this period⎯the Novellas, the Trilogy, the Texts for Nothing⎯is 
eschewed in favour of surfaces and objectivity. How It Is is somewhat more 
ambiguous. As Russell Smith argues, interpretations of the text fall broadly into two 
main camps, based upon different understandings of its final few pages. Some critics 
‘take the narrator at his word here’ and accept that ‘the entire text⎯Krim, Kram, Bim, 
Bom and the others⎯has been nothing more than figments created and discarded by a 
solitary imagination’.19 Others ‘take this final negation as no more determining than 
any of the others that precede it’,20 allowing the possibility of the narrator’s 
                                                
19 ‘Bearing Witness in How It Is’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 19 (2008), 351–60 (p. 352). 
20 Ibid. 
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description of events throughout the text to be ‘how it was how it is how most 
certainly it will be’ (How It Is, p. 147). While Smith focuses on the text as ‘bearing 
witness to alterity’ through the narrator’s encounter with the other,21 I am more 
interested in the narrator’s depiction of a systematic framework of tormentors and 
victims (later significantly condensed in What Where) and its similarities to the more 
definitive social world of The Lost Ones. 
For all their manifold differences, then, The Lost Ones and How It Is are alike 
in their stress on the mechanisms of social life, however abstracted, rather than the 
individual. While, admittedly, this is not evident in How It Is until Part III, it is 
possible to read this final section as offering an entirely new and thus estranging 
perspective on the more personal narrative that has preceded it.22 Moreover, both texts 
exhibit a mismatch between their aesthetic mode of non-representation and the 
world(s) to which this alludes. This is all the more significant when we consider how 
the texts resonate with Nazi concentration camps (The Lost Ones) and Irish history 
(How It Is).23 In his brief account of Endgame in his (even briefer) biography of 
Beckett, Andrew Gibson suggests that the play is defined by a ‘split between 
historical markers and ahistorical claims’.24 References to the Cold War ‘disappear, 
then reappear’25⎯a point also made by Adorno, who insists that ‘Endgame is neither 
a play about the atom bomb nor is it contentless’ (AT, p. 325). This oscillation 
between universalising and particularising is equally manifest in The Lost Ones and 
How It Is, and is accentuated by their abstraction of form, which opens up a gap with 
the historical worlds indicated but never concretised. Such abstraction permits a 
radically unsettling dialectic between universal and particular: both texts make a 
certain claim for the comprehensive nature of the experience they articulate, most 
obvious in the title of How It Is, but this is always counterposed by their acute sense 
of affinity with a concrete, historical world. Such a dialectic corroborates Adorno’s 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Andrew Gibson similarly argues that ‘How It Is […] is not obviously best read in linear fashion, like 
a novel’, though he suggests that ‘we should […] read it from the second part, “with Pim”, 
outwards, because the second part is quite distinct from the first and third’. ‘The Irish 
Misanthropic Tradition’, Misanthropy [Forthcoming]. 
23 I will return to the texts’ post-Holocaust significance later in this chapter. For a detailed analysis of 
the ‘non-confrontations’ between How It Is and Irish colonial history, see ‘The Irish Misanthropic 
Tradition’. 
24 Samuel Beckett (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), p. 137. 
25 Ibid. 
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claim, within a discussion of Beckett, that ‘[a]rt emigrates to a standpoint that is no 
longer a standpoint at all because there are no longer standpoints from which the 
catastrophe could be named or formed’ (AT, p. 325). Neither a localised, historical 
perspective nor a universal and totalising one is able to name what Adorno here calls 
the catastrophe, but elsewhere describes as evil.   
The ‘obscured form’ (AT, p. 296) in which society appears in The Lost Ones 
and How It Is manifests Adorno’s conception of the primacy of the object: that 
manmade structures oppress and circumscribe the lives of individuals. The bleak 
social structure of the cylinder and the ‘thousand thousand nameless solitaries’ (How 
It Is, p. 125) that constitute ‘life in the mud’ (p. 151) offer a depiction of evil 
horrifyingly apposite to its modern context. The allusion to Paradise Lost in The Lost 
Ones renders only too clear the extent to which modern evil deviates from its classical 
conception:26 evil in this short prose work is as far removed from the Miltonic Satan’s 
‘unconquerable will’ as is conceivably possible.27 Iago’s careful cultivation of his will 
so as to direct it with greater accuracy toward evil is equally not comparable: 
IAGO      […] Our bodies are our gardens to the which our wills are gardeners. 
[…] If the beam of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another 
of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to 
most preposterous conclusions; but we have reason to cool our raging 
motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts.28 
Such instrumental use of reason for one’s own evil ends is strikingly absent in a 
Beckettian universe, where such an exertion of will is barely comprehensible. Even 
the torture of How It Is is listless and impersonal, carried out in line with an abstract 
and reified ‘justice’ (How It Is, p. 121).  
Kant disavows the possibility of diabolical evil, insisting that ‘[t]he human 
being (even the worst) does not repudiate the moral law, whatever his maxims, in 
rebellious attitude (by revoking obedience to it)’ (R, 6:36). He goes on to clarify that 
human evil cannot involve ‘a disposition (a subjective principle of maxims) to 
incorporate evil qua evil for incentive into one’s maxim (since this is diabolical)’ (R, 
                                                
26 The narrator suggests that ‘violation’ of ‘the fundamental principle forbidding ascent more than one 
at a time’ would ‘soon transform the abode into a pandemonium’. The Lost Ones, p. 209. 
27 Paradise Lost, ed. by John Leonard (London: Penguin, 2000; repr. 2003), p. 5 [Book I, 106]. 
28 Othello, the Moor of Venice, ed. by Michael Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 235–
6 [I. 3. 316–26]. 
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6:37). Evil is not undertaken for the sake of evil; rather, its roots lie in a broad 
conception of self-love, which is wrongly prioritised above the infinite claims of the 
moral law. This preserves the innate freedom of every person (to choose to obey the 
moral law) and therefore their very humanity itself. For Kant, there are no monsters 
per se: no figures who will evil. As we have seen, however, Adorno has no need to 
insist upon the unconditional freedom of every human being; on the contrary, he 
argues compellingly that freedom is contingent and rare. This would allow him, 
logically, to accept the possibility of diabolical evil where Kant cannot⎯and, indeed, 
in the wake of Auschwitz, this would be a tempting proposition. ‘A world without 
monsters, just imagine!’ (Rough for Radio II, p. 280), the Animator of Rough for 
Radio II laughs, and it is easy to share his incredulity. However, this does not form 
the basis of Adorno’s conception of evil. He instead observes: 
wicked people of the kind you meet in literature no longer exist, Iago, say, or 
Richard III, to name only the most famous literary prototypes. Such radically 
evil people are no longer to be found, for the radical evil of the kind postulated 
[and denied] by Kant presupposes a strength of character, energy, and a 
substantiality of the self that is made impossible by a world that calls for more 
or less dissociated achievements that are separated from the self. 
(HF, p. 206) 
This otherwise clear passage is complicated by what I take to be Adorno’s confused 
terminology. It should be self-evident that by ‘radical evil’ he means, in Kant’s terms, 
diabolical evil: evil for the sake of evil. Radical evil, as we have discussed, means (for 
Kant) merely mankind’s propensity to evil and is in no way confined to such literary 
figures as Iago and Richard III. This confusion of terms is unsurprising given 
Arendt’s well-known concept of radical evil that, in reality, has far more to do with 
Kant’s (logically impossible) diabolical evil. That Adorno was aware of Arendt’s 
work is clear: he cites her later work on the banality of evil in his 1965 Metaphysics: 
Concepts and Problems lecture series. Adorno can be seen to be claiming that while 
diabolical evil is not impossible, it has all but disappeared in modern capitalist 
society. Kant and Adorno, then, reach similar conclusions through wholly different 
means. If, for Adorno, evil is no longer diabolical, but still exists, it must be sought in 
an entirely different guise. Figures of diabolical evil such as Iago are no longer useful 
models with which to conceive of modern day evil. Moreover, Adorno is anxious to 
resist locating evil in the will as Kant does; the absolute moral responsibility that 
radical evil entails is, for Adorno, an abhorrent and inappropriate response to a world 
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in which freedom is by no means assured. In light of this, The Lost Ones stages an 
imaginatively pared back image of communal suffering without an agent instigating 
such pain, while in How It Is every mud-dweller is perpetrator and victim: ‘what the 
fuck I quote does it matter who suffers’ (How It Is, p. 144). This, for Adorno, is the 
evil that characterises modern society: the systematic propagation of suffering and 
unfreedom that ultimately cannot be traced back to one guilty human agent. This is 
the primacy of the object that demolishes all naïve attempts to posit the power of the 
subject. 
 The specific form of the subject-object dialectic described by Adorno is 
particularly evident in the image of the constraining cylinder that incarcerates the 
‘two hundred bodies’ (The Lost Ones, p. 204) of The Lost Ones. In 1983, Enoch 
Brater painstakingly established the various mathematical flaws in the text: the 
narrator’s figures, he claimed, ‘are approximate at best, misleading or even erroneous 
at worst’.29 For Brater, this confirms the unreliable nature of the narrator, of whom we 
should be suspicious. I suggest, however, that the cylinder’s enigmatic measurements 
can also attest to its continually shifting dimensions, which render it unfathomable. In 
this I am following Ulrika Maude’s insight that ‘despite the machine connotations of 
its shape, the cylinder has a distinctly natural constitution’.30 While Maude dwells on 
the cylinder’s tactile resemblances to the body⎯its ‘heat and light fluctuations 
reminiscent of the rhythm of heartbeat or of respiration’ and the rubbery surface 
similar to that of skin31⎯I suggest that the organic elements of the cylinder attest to 
its status as a manmade institution that nonetheless represses and imprisons the bodies 
it contains. This is even more crudely painted in How It Is, where the narrator 
suggests in a moment of brilliance: ‘quick a supposition if this so-called mud were 
nothing more than all our shit’ (How It Is, p. 58). If the mud that constitutes the world 
of How It Is is indeed the shit of its inhabitants, then, in a particularly disgusting way, 
the dwellers have physically created the world that oppresses them and from which 
they draw their meaning. 
                                                
29 ‘Mis-takes, Mathematical and Otherwise, in The Lost Ones’, Modern Fiction Studies, 29 (1983), 93–
109 (p. 97). 
30 ‘Mingled Flesh’, European Joyce Studies, 16 (2005), 91–107 (p. 101). 
31 Ibid. 
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 The environments of the two texts are particularly hostile, though the mud of 
How It Is is expansive and apparently endless, while the cylinder of The Lost Ones is 
finite and restrictive. Life in How It Is is reduced to ‘the sack the tins the mud the dark 
the silence the solitude’ (How It Is, p. 9). In the cylinder, meanwhile, the continually 
oscillating temperature, as the narrator dispassionately notes, prevents any sustained 
rest: 
Out of the eight seconds therefore required for a single rise and fall it is only 
during a bare six and a half that the bodies suffer the maximum increment of 
heat or cold which with the help of a little addition or better still division 
works out nevertheless at some twenty years respite per century in this 
domain. 
(The Lost Ones, p. 215) 
The source of such fluctuating temperatures⎯or, indeed, of the ‘omnipresen[t]’ (p. 
202) yellow light⎯is undisclosed. The rubbery texture of the cylinder⎯almost like a 
padded cell⎯prevents any indent or impression. The cylinder is wholly unresponsive 
to the needs or desires of its inhabitants, imposing its predetermined structures 
indiscriminately. As an inanimate object that nonetheless takes on an oppressive role, 
it demonstrates the dual nature of society. 
 Such oppression is, however, not merely limited to the physical environments 
of the two texts. In The Lost Ones, rules and regulations dominate the lives of the 
bodies. They may constitute the mere vestiges of a society, but they do possess a 
broad moral code, elaborately detailed by the narrator. The use of the ladders, for 
example, ‘is regulated by conventions of obscure origin which in their precision and 
the submission they exact from the climbers resemble laws’ (The Lost Ones, p. 207). 
More specifically, a general precept ‘not to do unto others what coming from them 
might give offence’ is ‘largely observed’ (p. 222), paraphrasing the commonly cited 
Biblical decree: ‘[a]nd as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them 
likewise’.32 Given the scarcity of communication in the cylinder, this system of ethics 
appears to conform to Kant’s claim that knowledge of the moral law is innate. We 
should, however, be cautious of attributing such knowledge to Beckett’s characters. 
When discussing what he knows ‘about men and the ways they have of putting up 
with it’ (The Unnamable, p. 7)⎯‘it’ being pointedly unspecified⎯the Unnamable 
                                                
32 Luke 6. 31. 
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considers the foundation of his insights: ‘Can it be innate knowledge? Like that of 
good and evil. This seems improbable to me’ (The Unnamable, p. 8). The 
improbability of ‘innate knowledge’ could semantically refer just as much to the 
awareness of ‘good and evil’ as to the understanding of men. The Unnamable’s 
scepticism about the possibility of inherent cognition is particularly germane when 
considering the extent to which man engenders the very laws and strictures to which 
he then submits himself with resentful or oblivious humility. In How It Is, too, the 
narrator’s methods of torture mimic the strategies of behaviourists, most famously 
evident in the experiment of Pavlov’s dog: ‘it’s not yet second nature but it will be’ 
(How It Is, p. 76), he celebrates. This, beyond all else, marks the behaviour of the 
narrator and the ‘millions’ (p. 123) of others as learned, not innate. The 
communication system first encountered in Molloy⎯‘One knock meant yes, two, no, 
three I don’t know, four money, five goodbye’ (Molloy, p. 14)⎯is here intensified in 
its sadism and stripped of its purpose: an unlikely aesthete, the narrator plays upon 
Pim like an instrument:33  
table of basic stimuli one sing nails in armpit two speak blade in arse three 
stop thump on skull four louder pestle on kidney 
 
five softer index in anus six bravo clap athwart arse seven lousy same as three 
eight encore same as one or two as may be.  
(How It Is, p. 76) 
The narrator insists that all he says is quoted from a voice inside his head and muses 
‘that’s the speech I’ve been given part one before Pim question do I use it freely it’s 
not said or I don’t hear’ (p. 19). In a world of social unfreedom, the narrator’s evil 
actions can neither be excused as an inevitable part of a bad totality nor condemned as 
the actions as an individual agent. He explains: ‘at the instant I reach Pim another 
reaches Bem we are regulated thus our justice wills it thus fifty thousand couples 
again at the same instant the same everywhere with the same space between them it’s 
mathematical it’s our justice in this muck’ (p. 121). Within this network of suffering, 
evil is pervasive but indeterminable. It is, moreover, inescapable. The narrator notes 
dispassionately that ‘the wish for something else no that doesn’t seem to have been 
                                                
33 ‘In How It Is the notion of phonic control exuberates far beyond a mere on/off switch: the human 
body simulates a whole electronic console or mixing-board. Each mud-crawler with his can 
opener treats the man in front of him as if he were a radio, making him speak or sing or cry out 
through a system or learned responses⎯there is even a protocol for volume control’. Daniel 
Albright, Beckett and Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 120. 
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given to me’ (p. 12). In a Sadean twist he associates ‘the birth of hope’ with ‘Pim the 
lost tins the groping hand the arse the two cries’ (p. 25): hope is reduced to the 
possibility of inflicting pain on another and thereby maintaining one’s preordained 
role within the social totality.  
 In contrast, the possible existence of a ‘way out’ (The Lost Ones, p. 206) of 
the cylinder is one of the more provocative elements of The Lost Ones, offering as it 
does the prospect of freedom from the infernal dwelling described in such detail. Such 
a belief seems at first glance to represent a moment of defiant liberation in the midst 
of the otherwise oppressive and totalitarian nature of the cylinder, which 
circumscribes the inhabitants’ very movements with its unwritten laws and 
conventions. It is such an alluring possibility that even those who have given up hope 
‘are not immune from believing so again’ (p. 206). However, the chance of freedom is 
instantly curtailed by the bodies themselves. The narrator explains that of the two 
opinions regarding the whereabouts of the way out⎯a ‘secret passage branching from 
one of the tunnels’ and ‘a trapdoor hidden in the hub of the ceiling’ (p. 206)⎯the 
latter is gaining in popularity, precisely due to the impossibility of testing it. The 
elusive way out is revealed to be a false hope, a chimera preventing any real change 
from taking place. We cannot, however, agree with the narrator’s odious description 
of such a belief as a ‘fatuous little light’ (p. 207), as the desire itself⎯to discover a 
paradisiacal realm in which ‘the sun and other stars would still be shining’ (p. 
206)⎯is the only indication we are given that the bodies are not resigned to their 
lives. Their mistake, however, is in believing that freedom lies beyond the confines of 
the cylinder, when the cylinder itself is only a manmade institution. Dwelling on the 
pseudo-problem of how to escape only serves to reconcile them to their existing social 
conditions.  
A number of critics have noted the parallels between the cylindrical world of 
The Lost Ones and the concentration camps⎯Gary Adelman, for instance: 
No cattle cars, crematoria, factories, no lethal gas, or I. G. Farben, no SS, or 
thirty-eight camps attached to the main Auschwitz camp, no Arbeit Macht 
[sic] Frei, no death begins with the shoes, or parades, or striped rags, or 
tattoos, or ersatz coffee, or cutaneous endemas, no boils, leg ulcers, abcesses, 
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suppurating sores, no dysentery, no roll calls. Yet that world is called into 
being by the cylinder.34 
Similar parallels could be made of How It Is: Liesel Olson argues that ‘the master and 
servant suffering of How It Is resonates against the historical reality of concentration 
camps’,35 while Russell Smith’s reading of the text invokes Agamben’s Holocaust-
inspired paradox of ‘how can the true witness be the one who by definition cannot 
bear witness?’36 Adelman’s parallel, however, goes at once too far and not far 
enough. As Adorno claims, ‘Beckett has given us the only fitting reaction to the 
situation of the concentration camps⎯a situation he never calls by name, as if it were 
subject to an image ban. What is, he says, is like a concentration camp’ (ND, p. 380). 
The cylinder and the endless mud are not allegories of Auschwitz; rather, they testify 
to the insidious similarities between the camps and society. This may seem to be a 
contentious claim that minimises the horrific suffering of the Holocaust, and must 
therefore be understood in the context of Adorno’s argument that Auschwitz was not 
an aberration from but rather the culminating moment of a society dominated by 
instrumental reason and identity-thinking. In light of this, correspondences between 
the concentration camps and the world surrounding it, while horrific, are nonetheless 
evident. The Lost Ones and How It Is are all the more effective because they strip 
away the paraphernalia described above by Adelman⎯those horrifying details we, in 
a post-Holocaust society, are only too intimately aware of⎯leaving only the stark 
imprint of evil.  
Science and mathematics⎯the tools of an instrumental reason that cannot envisage 
their use for any other purpose than domination⎯are utilized by the narrator of The 
Lost Ones as a means of objectively fathoming the cylinder and its inhabitants; we are 
presented with an array of figures that attempt to pin down the life that dwells therein. 
                                                
34 ‘Fearful Symmetry: Beckett’s The Lost Ones’, Journal of Modern Literature, 26 (2003), 164–9 (p. 
167). See also David Houston-Jones, ‘From Contumacy to Shame: Reading Beckett’s 
Testimonies with Agamben’, in Beckett at 100: Revolving It All (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), pp. 54–67; and Mary F. Catanzaro, ‘No Way Out: The Effect of Surveillance in The 
Lost Ones’, in Beckett in the Cultural Field / Beckett dans le champ culturel, ed. by Jürgen Siess, 
Matthij Engelberts and Angela Moorjani (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013), pp. 183–196 (pp. 192–3). 
35 Modernism and the Ordinary (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2009), p. 110. Jackie Blackman 
similarly comments that ‘How It Is (begun in 1958), an abstract work notoriously difficult for 
Beckett to write, evokes the mud, abject violence, and numbering system of the camps’. 
‘Beckett’s Theatre “After Auschwitz”’, in Samuel Beckett: History, Memory, Archive, ed. by 
Seán Kennedy and Katherine Weiss (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 71–88. 
36 Quoted in Smith, p. 355. 
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From measurements—the environment is a ‘flattened cylinder fifty metres round and 
sixteen high’ (The Lost Ones, p. 202)—to timings—the temperature ‘falls rapidly 
from a maximum of twenty-five degrees approximately to a minimum of 
approximately five whence a regular variation of five degrees per second’ (p. 206)—
the text is saturated with references to mathematical certainty and analysis. In a 
sickening reminder of the concentration camps, the bodies are categorised into types 
according to their mobility: ‘[f]irstly those perpetually in motion. Secondly those who 
sometimes pause. Thirdly those who short of being driven off never stir from the 
coign they have won and when driven off pounce on the first free one that offers and 
freeze again’ (p. 204). Analysed in such a disinterested manner, the bodies lose their 
humanity; the description could be of different types of particles. Along these lines, 
the narrator of How It Is dispassionately and tentatively identifies physical elements 
of Pim⎯‘the cries tell me which end the head but I may be mistaken’ (How It Is, p. 
60)⎯and demonstrates pleasant surprise at the similarities between their forms: 
‘having rummaged in the mud between his legs I bring up finally what seems to me a 
testicle or two the anatomy I had’ (p. 60). The Lost Ones further divides the bodies 
according to how much space they occupy, with no regard for discrepancies: ‘[o]ne 
body per square metre or two hundred bodies in all round numbers’ (The Lost Ones, 
p. 204). The ‘dearth of floor space’ (p. 223) is returned to later in the text when the 
narrator explains that, for reasons of space, ‘Lying down is unheard of in the cylinder’ 
(p. 222): that luxury is denied to the bodies. The objective conditions of the cylinder 
block the fundamental human needs it should be alleviating. While such an appraisal 
of humans, who throughout the text are reduced to the status of ‘bodies’, is acutely 
consistent with the treatment of Jews and other ‘undesirable’ groups of people, The 
Lost Ones resists being pinned down to a mere imaginative representation of a 
concentration camp. Its scope is broader: it reveals the very weight of social coercion 
that allows people to be reduced to specimens. 
Despite the seeming precision of the scientific register, confident that ‘in the 
cylinder alone are certitudes to be found and without nothing but mystery’ (The Lost 
Ones, p. 216), it is ‘littered with modifiers [...] that undermine the assertive tone. [...] 
Doubt, therefore, is always already built into the register that at first appears so firm 
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in its convictions’.37 One particularly pertinent example of this is the vanquished 
woman who ‘is the north [...] because of her greater fixity’ (p. 221). The ironic 
possibility, implied by the use of the comparative ‘greater’, that ‘north’ may, at any 
time, move around the cylinder and destabilise the system based on her immobility, 
suggests the absence of security at the heart of the scientific discourse of the text. The 
Lost Ones therefore testifies to the impossibility of reducing the bodies, even in their 
most degraded and non-human state, to figures in a mathematical equation or objects 
of scientific analysis, without a remainder. This remainder is suffering, the suffering 
of the searchers and the vanquished alike, which ‘remains foreign to knowledge’ (AT, 
p. 18). The possible allusion to the title of Primo Levi’s 1947 book If This is a 
Man⎯‘there he stirs this last of all if a man and slowly draws himself up and some 
time later opens his burnt eyes’ (p. 223; my italics)⎯extends the inhumanity of the 
concentration camps, well-documented in Giorgio Agamben’s theorisation of the 
Muselmänner,38 to the broader social world. The man’s ‘burnt eyes’ attests to the 
bodies’ inability to adapt to their continually fluctuating environment: 
It might safely be maintained that the eye grows used to these conditions and 
in the end adapts to them were it not that just the contrary is to be observed in 
the slow deterioration of vision ruined by this fiery flickering murk and by the 
incessant straining for ever vain with concomitant moral distress and its 
repercussion on the organ. 
(The Lost Ones, p. 214) 
Submitting to the conditions of the cylinder as though they are natural and 
inescapable, the bodies passively accept the hellish nature of their dwelling, barely 
subsisting in an environment that destroys them. The ‘fiery flickering murk’ echoes a 
classic conception of hell. Once again, however, despite the myriad of Dantean 
allusions in both The Lost Ones and How It Is⎯explored in detail in Daniela Caselli’s 
Beckett’s Dantes: Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism39⎯neither text presents 
hell or purgatory. Rather, they depict in stark form the social world: as Adorno insists, 
‘socially produced evil has engendered something like a real hell’ (M, p. 105). 
Mephistopheles’ resigned acknowledgement in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus that ‘this 
                                                
37 Maude, p. 104. 
38 Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 1999). 
39 Beckett’s Dantes: Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 183–200; pp. 148–82. 
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is hell, nor am I out of it’ captures the essence of Adorno’s claim.40 Hell is not a 
specific location from which it is possible to escape. In Doctor Faustus, hell is the 
absence of God’s grace and the ‘eternal joys of Heaven’;41 for Adorno, however, it is 
the sum total of the man-made structures that take on an autonomous life of their own, 
preventing humans from alleviating their needs and compelling them to take on cold 
and instrumental relations with one another. 
Is, then, ‘all […] for the best’ (The Lost Ones, p. 216) in the cylinder, as the 
narrator of The Lost Ones insists? Is this the Leibnizian ‘best of all possible 
worlds’?42 Leibniz’s Theodicy aimed to justify God’s goodness in the face of manifest 
evil by claiming that ‘all the Creator’s actions in fact happen for the best’.43 Time 
alone⎯and with it the development of human capability⎯will reveal the inherent 
reason of the world. However, echoing and tacitly undermining the end of the Gloria 
Patri⎯‘As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be: world without end. 
Amen’44⎯the narrator admits that ‘[a]ll has not been told and never shall be’ (p. 219; 
my italics). The Christian narrative posits a continuity of past, present and future that 
is perceptibly lacking in The Lost Ones, where ‘the beginning’ is as ‘unthinkable as 
the end’ (pp. 212–3). The cylinder may exist ‘for the sake of harmony’ (p. 202), but 
such harmony is at odds with the individuals who are oppressed by its indiscriminate 
domination. It is here that the perspective of the narrator⎯and thus the 
reader⎯becomes of vital importance. The narrator claims to possess knowledge of 
the system that is denied to the bodies themselves because of their immersion within 
it. This gives us a privileged perspective from which we can construct ‘a perfect 
mental image of the entire system’ (p. 204), witnessing the crushing objectivity that 
weighs down upon the inhabitants. At the same time, however, as Caselli argues, the 
hermetic nature of the environment means that ‘the observer has no openings from 
which to peruse the closed cylinder’.45 Our god’s eye view compromised, we are 
forced to confront our more limited perspective within both the cylinder of the text 
                                                
40 Doctor Faustus, in The Complete Plays, ed. by Frank Romany and Robert Lindsey (London: 
Penguin, 2003), pp. 341–95 (p. 356 [III. 78]). 
41 Ibid. [III. 80]. 
42 Neiman, p. 68. 
43 Ibid., p. 21. 
44 The Book of Common Prayer: The Texts of 1549, 1559, and 1662, ed. by Brian Cummings (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 242. 
45 Caselli, p. 185. 
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and our own dominating structures, structures that must be rendered transparent if the 
possibility of a way out is to remain anything but a false hope. 
This disjunction is equally apparent in How It Is. We are given the pervasive 
sense of a condition that has not significantly changed since the dawn of time. In Part 
I, particularly, the narrator muses on this: ‘fleeting joys and of sorrows of empires that 
are born and die as though nothing had happened’ (How It Is, p. 13). He emphasises 
the transitory nature of ‘empires’ with their ‘joys and sorrows’ and their 
insignificance from a broader perspective: ‘centuries I can see me quite tiny the same 
as now more or less only tinier quite tiny’ (p. 19). This sense of perspective is what 
enables the narrator to contextualise his suffering and to rationalise the evil he 
perpetrates: ‘the fuck who suffers who makes to suffer who cries who to be left in 
peace in the dark […] it’s someone each in his turn as our justice wills’ (p. 144). Such 
justice, in the face of which there is ‘nothing to be done’ (p. 135)⎯an echo of the 
refrain of Waiting for Godot⎯is, the narrator hesitantly posits, presided over by ‘one 
not one of us an intelligence somewhere a love who all along the track at the right 
places according as we need them deposits our sacks’ (p. 150). The attributes of God 
are here listed: intelligence, love, ‘exceptional powers’ (p. 150). Nonetheless, the 
narrator claims that this is ‘the place without knowledge’ (p. 134) and notes that ‘of 
the four three quarters of our total life only three lend themselves to communication’ 
(p. 143): he is unable to speak in his ‘quality of victim’ (p. 143). These narrative holes 
prohibit us from comprehending the entire system; like the narrator, we are 
floundering in the mud. Moreover, the cyclical nature of the text prevents us from 
accepting it as complete; even the narrator’s acknowledgement of this ends mid-
sentence: ‘assuming one prefers the order here proposed namely one the journey two 
the couple three the abandon to that to those to be obtained by starting with the 
abandon and ending with the journey by way of the couple or starting with the couple 
and ending with the’ (p. 126). Thrust in media res, our reading is just as partial and 
limited as the narrator’s. Perhaps the most revealing statement of the text comes early 
on: ‘we follow I quote the natural order more or less’ (p. 7). This very equivocation 
attests to the intense difficulties of penetrating the façade of naturalness that shrouds 
society and its destructive circularity. 
II 
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Theodicies offer the means by which the existence of evil is justified in the face of a 
benevolent divinity. As Peter Dews argues, we are therefore confronted with a 
paradoxical situation in which the ‘problem of theodicy […] should have disappeared 
for us, who live after Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God’, and yet ‘the 
problem of theodicy seems in some sense to have outlived the explicit belief in a 
divine creator that first gave rise to it’.46 The human compulsion towards theodicy 
should therefore be seen as part of a wider project of rendering evil comprehensible 
and tending to nullify it by getting it in some kind of supposed ‘proportion’. Such a 
project is no less applicable in a rational, secular age than an explicitly religious one. 
The drive to understand evil is one with which we can sympathise⎯as Neiman puts 
it, it demonstrates an urge ‘to face evil in the world without giving in to despair’;47 
nonetheless, there is a fine line between evil’s comprehension and its rationalisation. 
The latter has a number of worrying implications: not least among them the risk of 
accepting evil as an inevitable and ultimately trivial if regrettable moment in the 
wider scheme of things and thereby neutralising real human suffering. Theodicy, then, 
has not died with God, but continues to inform not only contemporary debates about 
evil but also, as I will demonstrate, Beckett’s Endgame. This play’s very title conjures 
up the Cold War stalemate that lurked ominously over the 1950s, as well as evoking 
the possibility of the end of history⎯an utterly serious proposition in light of 
potential nuclear annihilation. Hamm and Clov wait in the ‘old refuge’ (Endgame, p. 
126) for everything to come to an end, their predicament constructing an alternative 
history to that of theodicy, in which all evil is redeemed. Specifically, Endgame can 
be situated in opposition to Hegel’s theodicy as depicted in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of World History, which, as Adorno claims, offers an essentially 
affirmative view of history in which all evils are sublated by triumphant Spirit 
[Geist].48 While acknowledging the truth content in the concept of universal history, 
                                                
46 ‘“Radical Finitude” and the Problem of Evil: Critical Comments on Wellmer’s Reading of Jonas’, in 
Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. by María Pía Lara (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001), pp. 46–53 (p. 47). 
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Adorno emphasises its inherent discontinuity and non-identity that are ignored only in 
the course of writing history from the perspective of the victors. Endgame explores 
this twofold nature of history. By accentuating the ruptures that subvert Hegel’s 
account of Spirit’s progression towards freedom, it offers an alternative history from 
the perspective of its victims, freeing humans from preordained roles in a constrictive 
narrative of progress. At the same time, it manifests the real unfreedom faced by 
individuals in light of the tangible oppression of history.  
Hegel’s Lectures set out, as he himself acknowledges, a theodicy in the 
tradition of Leibniz, which ‘should enable us to comprehend all the ills of the world, 
including the existence of evil, so that the thinking spirit may be reconciled with the 
negative aspects of existence’.49 This theodicy is traditional in its justification of evil 
as a necessary moment in a providentially ordained design: according to such logic, 
God is good, and ‘no force can surpass the power of goodness or of God or prevent 
God’s purposes from being realised’.50 Hence, in a reiteration of Leibniz, this is, or 
will at least prove to be, the best of all possible worlds. Moreover, for Hegel, the plan 
of providence is revealed in world history, to which humans have unique access 
through their faculty of reason. So far, this is perfectly in accord with other theodicies. 
However, Hegel’s employment of such theological terms as ‘providence’ and ‘God’ 
should not blind us to the more secular⎯specifically Enlightenment-informed⎯thrust 
of his theodicy.  
                                                                                                                                      
the real into what can be articulated in concepts’ (p. 55). Adorno’s identification of a grand 
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Hegel reinterpretations along a non-metaphysical line, see also Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Terry 
Pinkard, Hegel's Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Martin Schuster, Autonomy After Auschwitz: Adorno, German Idealism, 
and Modernity (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), pp. 134–67; and Robert B. 
Pippin, ‘Finite and Absolute Idealism: The Transcendental and the Metaphysical Hegel’, in The 
Transcendental Turn, ed. by Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), pp. 159–72. 
49 Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1975; repr. 1984), p. 42. 
50 Ibid., p. 67. 
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 Hegel takes as an a priori truth the idea that world history is governed by 
reason⎯this, he claims, is manifestly evident ‘in the study of world history itself’⎯ 
and thus progresses rationally in line with its internal telos.51 He uses the image of a 
seed as a paradigm for such a development: ‘just as the seed bears within it the whole 
nature of the tree and the taste and form of its fruits, so also do the first glimmerings 
of spirit contain virtually the whole of history’.52 However, the movement of history 
is not linear⎯a steady progression towards perfection⎯but dialectical. Hegel 
demonstrates this through the concrete image of nations rising and falling as the 
national Spirit ‘has been absorbed into another and higher principle’ and, rather more 
poetically, through the metaphor of the Phoenix, which ‘for ever constructs its own 
funeral pyre and is for ever consumed upon it, only to rise again from the ashes as 
fresh and rejuvenated life’.53 In this way, a ‘rejuvenation of the spirit’ takes place.54 
Thus Hegel conceives of history as a continual negation and sublation, embodying 
Spirit’s ‘conquering march’ towards freedom.55 Within this progression of Spirit, evil 
occupies a problematic position. According to its own premises, Hegel’s theodicy is 
equipped to deal with any number of evil deeds: such particular events can only be 
seen within the context of an affirmative narrative of progress: 
From this beginning, we proceeded to define those same events which afford 
so sad a spectacle for gloomy sentiment and brooding reflections as no more 
than the means whereby what we have specified as the substantial destiny, the 
absolute and final end, or in other words, the true result of world history, is 
realised.56  
Indeed, as Hegel emphasises, it is not that individual suffering is an unfortunate by-
product of Spirit’s progression; rather, ‘it is from this very conflict and destruction of 
individual things that the universal emerges, and it remains unscathed itself’.57 As 
Bernstein neatly puts it, ‘evil is a necessary stage in the realization of Spirit’⎯a stage 
                                                
51 Ibid., p. 28. 
52 Ibid., p. 53. 
53 Ibid., p. 32. 
54 Ibid., p. 33. 
55 Ibid., p. 63. 
56 Ibid., p. 69. Author’s italics. 
57 Ibid., p. 89. 
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that it will, equally necessarily, sublate.58 This is the crux of what Adorno would later 
appropriately describe as Hegel’s ‘theodicy of conflict’ (HF, p. 52). 
 I have noted in passing Hegel’s central claim that ‘the aim of the world spirit 
in world history is to realise its essence and to obtain the prerogative of freedom’.59 
Hegelian theodicy, then, is intimately caught up with the concept of freedom, which, 
indeed, provides its terminus ad quem. The question is, however, what this freedom 
actually amounts to. Hegel follows Kant in arguing that human freedom can only be 
understood as the freedom to act in accordance with the law. The law, however, is no 
longer the Kantian moral law that is innately known by all mankind;60 rather, it is the 
rational course of the world Spirit: ‘we are free in so far as we recognise it as law and 
follow it as the substance of our own being; the objective and the subjective will are 
then reconciled, forming a single, undivided whole’.61 This reconciliation of the 
objective and the subjective is paramount for Hegel; if Spirit progresses towards 
freedom, then human freedom only makes sense insofar as it is in tune with this 
development. 
 Adorno’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of World History must be situated in 
its specific historical context: that is, in the twentieth century, for the horrors of which 
Adorno repeatedly uses Auschwitz as a metonym. For Adorno, then, Hegel’s 
affirmative view of history is not only impossible after Auschwitz, but actively 
complicit in the mechanisms of evil: 
Confronted with the fact that Auschwitz was possible, that politics could 
merge directly with mass murder, the affirmative mentality becomes the mere 
                                                
58 Bernstein, p. 5. 
59 Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 63. 
60 Adorno notes that ‘Kant is forced into all sorts of contortions to demonstrate the presence of moral 
consciousness everywhere, even in radical evil, just as he had argued for its presence in the minds 
of evil-doers and scoundrels’ (HF, p. 242). He has in mind Kant’s ‘card-sharp’ (HF, p. 225) in 
the Critique of Practical Reason: ‘He who has lost at play can indeed be chagrined with himself 
and his imprudence; but if he is conscious of having cheated at play (although he has gained by 
it), he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law. This must, 
therefore, be something other than the principle of one's own happiness. For, to have to say to 
himself “I am a worthless man although I have filled my purse” he must have a different criterion 
of judgment from that by which he commends himself and says “I am a prudent man, for I have 
enriched my cash box”’ (5:37). Adorno continues: ‘Had he not done so he would have been 
compelled to admit that these periods and stages of human development that lacked a so-called 
sense of morality did not deserve to be called human. For an adherent of Rousseau […] this 
would have been intolerable’ (HF, pp. 242–3). 
61 Ibid., p. 97. 
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assertion of a mind that is incapable of looking horror in the face and thereby 
perpetuates it. 
(HF, p. 7) 
Adorno’s critique is similar to the objections commonly levelled at Kant’s refusal to 
countenance the possibility of diabolical evil: Hegel simply did not conceive of an 
evil so pervasive that it could not be overcome by Spirit⎯that, indeed, it was not part 
of Spirit’s necessary movement of progress towards freedom. Hegel insists that ‘[t]he 
wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind’,62 but, for Adorno, Auschwitz 
attests to the truth that some wounds are simply too deep to be alleviated by any 
amount of development. Ultimately, for Adorno, Hegel ends up ‘glorifying history’ 
(HF, p. 113), tracing its apparent progress as though it were some ‘kind of infernal 
machine’ (HF, p. 113).  
 As this image of indiscriminate destruction would suggest, the crux of 
Adorno’s critique of Hegel is that, in the latter’s admittedly compelling account of the 
vast sweep of history, he prioritises the universal over the particular. Adorno terms 
this a ‘philosophical history from the standpoint of the victor’, emphasising that Hegel 
‘justifies or vindicates the universal as it asserts itself’ (HF, p. 41). Adorno 
acknowledges that Hegel attempts to do justice to the individual by emphasising that 
Spirit does not operate over the heads of mankind, but operates through them, but 
claims that at every step the individual is sacrificed for the sake of the universal. 
Marxism inherits this prioritisation of the universal in its belief that ‘when ultimately 
the universal takes over and the concept is victorious, individuals will indeed come 
into their own⎯and this factor will ensure that all the suffering and the wasted 
individuality of history will somehow be made good’ (HF, p. 44). The pertinent 
question for Adorno is whether ‘the sufferings of a single human being can be 
compensated for by the triumphal march of progress’ (HF, p. 8); whether it is possible 
to erase the past in such a totalising way. Moreover, Adorno argues that Hegel 
opposes the individual and the universal, the subjective and the objective, in an overly 
simplistic way. He fails to note the element of objectivity within the individual that 
allows him to critique existing conditions in a way that is more than merely 
subjective: ‘the figure of the universal in which the particular possesses the universal 
to a substantial degree is in actual fact the process of thought in which the particular is 
                                                
62 Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 407. 
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raised to the level of the universal’ (HF, p. 64). Characteristically, Hegel’s synthesis 
claims to reconcile the particular and the universal, but at the expense of the non-
identical, which is incorporated into the all-encompassing identity of Spirit with no 
remainder. This prioritisation of the universal, Adorno claims, attests to how the 
world actually is: time and time again, individuals are subordinated to the ‘blind, 
heteronomous and potentially destructive’ (HF, p. 28) universal. However, Hegel 
simply accepts such a reality as a given, refusing to submit it to scrutiny, and insisting 
that the universal that always takes precedence is synonymous with reason. 
 Indeed, Hegel’s concept of reason⎯the guiding force of his Enlightenment-
inspired theodicy⎯is equally problematic for Adorno, who argues that ‘history can be 
called rational only if we know for whom it is rational’ (HF, p. 41); rationality cannot 
exist without a subject employing it. A similar abstraction is evident in Hegel’s 
understanding of freedom, which, Adorno insists, must be seen as ‘tied to the 
individual’ (HF, p. 84), a point neglected in Hegel’s depiction of Spirit’s necessary 
‘progress in the consciousness of freedom’. Adorno therefore identifies a clash 
between the supposedly absolutely rational ‘tangle of historical events and processes’ 
and the ‘legitimate rationality of individual human beings’ (HF, p. 113). In Hegel’s 
theodicy, reason becomes synonymous with fate. It has its own independent telos, 
proceeding with disregard for humans and treating them ‘only as instruments to 
further its own progress’.63 The course of such apparent progress is, however, not 
smooth, but decidedly conflict-ridden. For Adorno, Hegel extrapolates from the fact 
that ‘mankind has survived not just in spite of but because of conflict’ (HF, p. 51) to 
the erroneous and morally suspect conclusion that ‘life can be reproduced only by 
virtue of conflict’ (HF, pp. 51–2). Far from being peripheral, this belief is deeply 
rooted in Hegelian dialectics, in which ‘the positive is the quintessence of all 
negativities’ (HF, p. 52). Spirit relies on conflict in order to sublate it and reach a 
higher principle. Such conflict is therefore necessary rather than incidental; Hegel, 
rightly observing that the history of the human race is one of conflict, hypostatises 
this state of the world, insisting that things simply could not have been otherwise. The 
implications of such a claim extend not only to a valorisation of the present but 
further to an incapacitation of both the ability and drive to change existing conditions. 
The belief that conflict is an inevitable and actually necessary part of human existence 
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renders any attempt to live another way pointless; moreover, it leads directly to a 
political quietism. This conservative identification with the world as it is, Adorno 
argues, is equally evident in Hegel’s insistence that the world Spirit is the reality of 
human existence. In so doing, he ‘conflate[s] possibility and reality’ (HF, p. 68), 
impeding the chance of change or improvement. 
 Given Adorno’s at times caustic critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history, it 
would seem inevitable that he should reject the concept of a universal history 
altogether. However, his position is rather more nuanced. Despite the manifest flaws 
in the concept of universal history, he argues, ‘there is a lot that can be said in its 
favour’ (HF, p. 81). It is certainly the case that the historical processes that human 
beings as a whole shape and develop nevertheless seem to coalesce into a rigid force 
inflicting its unbending will upon the supposedly free lives of individuals. With this in 
mind, Adorno suggests that ‘we can only properly experience the objective nature of 
history, as opposed to its supposed subjective “shaping”, once we realize that we are 
its potential victims’ (HF, p. 23). It is for this reason that Adorno rejects the claim 
made by positivists that ‘there is no such thing as a unified, continuous process of 
history’ (HF, p. 81). He insists that attending to the ‘facts’ alone is insufficient; such 
facts are not as transparent as they may at first seem. They are intimately caught up 
with their wider context, which cannot be neglected if any insight is to be gleaned. 
Another response to the predicament is that of Schopenhauer, whose ‘denial of 
history’ (HF, p. 81) was fiercely directed against Hegel’s system of thought. For 
Adorno, however, this belief that ‘throughout all endless change and turmoil, [one] 
confronts the same unalterable being, who acts in the same way today as he did 
yesterday and always’,64 only serves to justify the status quo, or ‘leap to the assistance 
of individual evil in the world’ (HF, p. 8), by impeding the possibility of change.65  
                                                
64 Arthur Schopenhauer, quoted in Paul Gottfried, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer as a Critic of History’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 36 (1975), 331–8 (pp. 336–7). 
65 ‘Schopenhauer […] was a pessimist in the usual sense and vehemently opposed the affirmative 
character of metaphysics […], especially in its Hegelian form. Nevertheless, in his work he 
turned even this negativity into a metaphysical principle, the principle of the blind Will which, 
because it is a metaphysical principle and therefore a category of reflection, contains the 
possibility of its own negation by human beings. Thus, he also posits the idea of the denial of the 
Will to Live, a denial which, in view of what has been and continues to be perpetrated on the 
living and can increase to an unimaginable degree, is an almost comforting idea. I meant that in a 
world which knows of things far worse than death and denies people the shot in the neck in order 
to torture them slowly to death, the doctrine of the denial of the Will to Live itself has something 
of the innocence for which Schopenhauer criticized the theodicies of philosophers’. MCP, p. 105. 
  135 
 Adorno’s own position, then, is characteristically dialectical and also 
paradoxical: ‘the task is both to construct and deny universal history’ (HF, p. 93). Or, 
to consider it in a different light, the element of discontinuity or non-identity in 
history should be emphasised, without, that is, incorporating it wholly into the 
universal as in Hegel. Such a history emphatically rejects the perspective of the 
victors, with its concomitant idolization of the way the world happens to be. Universal 
history is evident, but it cannot be unproblematically assimilated with concepts of 
reason, progress or freedom. Adorno clarifies this with the concrete example of 
‘progress from the slingshot to the atom bomb’ (HF, p. 12). The technological 
development in such an instance is painfully apparent⎯‘the age of the bomb is the 
first in which we can envisage a condition from which violence has disappeared’ (HF, 
p. 159)⎯even as we revolt from acknowledging the greater capacity for destruction 
as progress.  
It is tempting to view Endgame as an expression of Schopenhauerian 
pessimism.66 Indeed, Paul Gottfried’s claim that Schopenhauer ‘denied the feasibility 
of social improvement and the rationality of man’67 is all too frequently said of 
Beckett, whose texts were originally seen⎯and still are, at times⎯to demonstrate 
some universal condition of suffering humanity in an ahistorical and amoral world. 
Even more recent and nuanced criticism is apt to underplay the radicalism of 
Beckett’s work: Matthew Feldman, for instance, argues that ‘Schopenhauer’s unique 
and profound legacy in Beckett’s art is, above all, an acceptance of suffering’.68 I 
suggest, however, that a rejection of Hegel’s triumphant Spirit does not necessitate an 
acceptance of Schopenhaurian ‘resignation’:69 Endgame is far more complex than a 
mere rejection of universal history would suggest. It interrogates the concept of 
history by at once emphasising the element of discontinuity or, as Adorno would put 
it, non-identity, in history and, at the same time, revealing the dialectic between 
                                                
66 For recent readings of Beckett and Schopenhauer see Eric Tonning, ‘“I am not Reading Philosophy”: 
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67 Gottfried, p. 331. 
68 Feldman, pp. 190–1. 
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nature and history: exposing history as a second nature that acts, to an extraordinary 
degree, over the heads of human beings. In this double movement it plays out the 
Adornian paradox that ‘[u]niversal history must be construed and denied’ (ND, p. 
320). This compressed dialectic has considerable repercussions for the possibility of 
freedom. The identification of universal history in the manner of Hegel makes a 
mockery of human freedom, while its absolute rejection causes an impotent blindness 
to the real unfreedom caused by a dominant totality. 
Endgame gives us reason to return to Hegel’s contentious claim that ‘[t]he 
wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind’. The scars of the play are as 
patently visible as they are incurable. The darkly symbiotic relationship between 
Hamm and Clov is premised upon the base instinct of self-preservation. Hamm alone 
has access to the food supply, concealing the combination to the larder, but is in turn 
blind and lame, thus utterly dependent on Clov to subsist. This cold, functional 
relationship underlies the lightness and ironies of the dialogue, emerging only at times 
when the frustrations of such dependence surface: 
HAMM: I’ll give you nothing more to eat. 
CLOV: Then we’ll die. 
HAMM: I’ll give you just enough to keep you from dying. You’ll be hungry   
all the time. 
CLOV: Then we shan’t die.   
(Endgame, pp. 94–5) 
Tethered to Clov by an instinct for self-preservation that belies his insistence that 
everything ought to end, Hamm resorts to cruelty⎯the only kind of torture that is in 
his power. His threat is to maintain Clov in a continual state of near-starvation, to 
which the weary Clov is only able to acknowledge the truth that, in that case, despite 
it all, ‘we shan’t die’. Clov is not the only character to bear the brunt of Hamm’s 
cruelty; his parents are notably kept in dustbins, placed in sawdust or sand like 
animals, and Hamm coldly instructs Clov to ‘Screw down the lids’ (p. 103). Mother 
Pegg is another, though absent, victim: 
 
CLOV: (Harshly) When old Mother Pegg asked you for oil for her lamp and 
you told her to get out to hell, you knew what was happening then, no? 
(Pause) You know what she died of, Mother Pegg? Of darkness. 
(Endgame, p. 129) 
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The cryptic horror of dying of darkness⎯engulfed, perhaps, by heavy blackness in a 
manner similar to drowning⎯is rendered all the more abhorrent given that Hamm had 
it within his power to save Mother Pegg, but instead callously refused that most basic 
of needs. Clov’s tirade, however, is inconsistent with his earlier coldness when 
discussing the subject: 
HAMM: Is Mother Pegg’s light on? 
CLOV: Light! How could anyone’s light be on? 
HAMM: Extinguished! 
CLOV: Naturally it’s extinguished. If it’s not on it’s extinguished. 
HAMM: No, I meant Mother Pegg. 
CLOV: But naturally she’s extinguished! [Pause.] What’s the matter with 
you today? 
HAMM: I’m taking my course. (Pause) Is she buried? 
CLOV: Buried! Who would have buried her? 
HAMM: You. 
CLOV: Me! Haven’t I enough to do without burying people? 
HAMM: But you’ll bury me. 
CLOV: No I shan’t bury you. 
(Endgame, p. 112) 
Kindness has wholly given way to self-preservation. Clov is neither surprised nor 
distressed that Mother Pegg has been ‘extinguished’ as simply and quietly as her 
lamp. He denies responsibility for her burial⎯on the dubious grounds that he has 
‘enough to do’ in this wasteland of indolence⎯as easily as he does for Hamm’s. 
Hamm himself would be easy to paint as a classic diabolical villain, 
committing evil for the sake of evil, were it not for his abjectly impoverished state. To 
an extent he fits Arendt’s characterisation of banal evil⎯evil that ‘possesses neither 
depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world 
because it spreads like a fungus on the surface’.70 Arendt’s famous identification of 
the banality of evil was first formulated in her 1963 report on the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann. She was struck by her uneasy awareness that despite the degree of the 
crimes committed, ‘the doer was neither monstrous nor demonic, and the only 
specific characteristic one could detect on his part […] was something entirely 
negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic inability to think’.71 While 
                                                
70 Quoted in Bernstein, p. 218. 
71 Ibid., p. 219. 
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Adorno and Arendt cannot be unproblematically allied,72 there are striking similarities 
in their thought on evil⎯not least their mutual recourse to the same literary figures to 
emphasise the qualitative change in the nature of evil: 
wicked people of the kind you meet in literature no longer exist, Iago, say, or 
Richard III, to name only the most famous literary prototypes.  
(HF, p. 206) 
Eichmann was not lago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been farther 
from his mind than to determine with Richard III ‘to prove a villain’.73 
Both Arendt and Adorno are responding to their own personal confrontations with 
evil, to a ‘phenomenon which stared one in the face’:74 the fact that it is no longer 
possible to locate evil in the will; that a bureaucratic or ‘administered’ society dulls 
the very capacity for evil; and that evil is nonetheless shockingly apparent. Arendt’s 
report on Eichmann demonstrates with alarming detail the nature of twentieth-century 
evil, though, as Craig Reeves notes, it ‘sees the banality of evil as a specific problem 
of totalitarianism’.75 In tracing the bureaucratic web of National Socialism, it at once 
convicts the defendant of participation in heinous crimes and acknowledges the 
impossibility of utilising traditional concepts of evil to account for them⎯a problem 
with which Adorno too was wrestling. In Endgame, Hamm’s specific form of 
evil⎯far from exhibiting any ‘diabolical or demonic profundity’⎯is seen to be 
peculiarly systematic. His evil deeds are fostered by a cold and cruel social milieu 
propagated by his father; as Paul Sheehan notes, ‘the most monstrous act of cruelty in 
the play is actually perpetrated against Hamm’:76 
NAGG: Whom did you call when you were a tiny boy, and were frightened, 
in the dark? Your mother? No. Me. We let you cry. Then we moved you 
out of earshot, so that we might sleep in peace. (Pause) I was asleep, as 
happy as a king, and you woke me up to have me listen to you. It wasn’t 
indispensable, you didn’t really need to have me listen to you. Besides I 
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didn’t listen to you. (Pause) I hope the day will come when you’ll really 
need to have me listen to you, and need to hear my voice, any voice. 
(Pause) Yes, I hope I’ll live till then, to hear you calling me like when 
you were a tiny boy, and were frightened, in the dark, and I was your 
only hope. 
(Endgame, pp. 119–20) 
This understated yet impassioned moment of utter cruelty situates Hamm within a 
network of evil, unable to shake off the influence that has made him heartless. Such a 
system, however, testifies less to Kant’s belief in an innate radical evil in all 
humanity, and more to Adorno’s concern that evil exists not in the human will but in 
society⎯a society that is loosely sketched out in the master–servant relationship 
between Hamm and Clov and the familial connections between Hamm and his 
parents. Moreover, the wounds or scars that Hegel insists Spirit will heal are here all 
too apparent in Hamm’s almost traumatised repetition of Nagg’s cruelty to Mother 
Pegg. The image of Mother Pegg running out of oil for her lamp has its precedent in 
the Parable of the Ten Virgins, which emphasises the need for readiness in light of 
Jesus’ coming: ‘keep watch, because you do not know the day or the hour’ (Matthew 
25:13). The lit lamp is a symbol of hope, which Hamm denies to Mother Pegg as 
easily as his father withholds it from him. If evil consists here of shutting out hope, 
and we remember Adorno’s claim that evil ‘is the world’s own unfreedom’, then any 
flicker of hope involves a call for freedom. For Adorno, the awareness of 
discontinuity in history provides ‘something hopeful that stands in precise opposition 
to what the totality appears to show’ (HF, p. 91). This element of non-identity offers a 
glimpse of freedom in its resistance to the prevailing totality⎯a totality that is 
acknowledged and even revered in Hegel’s philosophy of history. 
For Adorno, the element of truth in the concept of universal history can be 
established by teasing out the dialectic between history and nature. This dialectic, 
Bowie explains, is ‘based on the idea that in modernity the opposition between the 
terms, where nature is history-less, and history, which is sometimes seen as the realm 
of freedom, is opposed to the static world of natural laws, breaks down’.77 The 
supposed distinction between causality (nature) and freedom (history) is therefore 
rendered suspect. For Adorno, nature must be seen as historical⎯whatever is 
understood as ‘natural’ has come to be so in time⎯while history is recognised as 
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solidified second nature. Hegel’s mistake was in accepting such second nature as first 
nature⎯as an immutable given. Only by rendering transparent the extent to which 
history becomes a dominant and overpowering ‘natural’ force is it possible to resist it. 
For all its stress on discontinuity, then, Endgame repeatedly returns to the idea of 
universal history: specifically, to the concept of a heteronomous force of petrified 
ideological categories pressing down upon the characters. Most pertinently, however, 
the play weaves the concepts of history and nature together, emphasising their 
inextricability. The very first lines attest to the experience of the relentless 
progression of history: 
CLOV: (Fixed gaze, tonelessly) Finished, it’s finished, nearly finished, it 
must be nearly finished. (Pause) Grain upon grain, one by one, and one 
day, suddenly, there’s a heap, a little heap, the impossible heap. (Pause) 
I can’t be punished any more.  
(Endgame, p. 93) 
This image of a growing ‘heap’ of some unidentified substance is a traditional 
metaphor for the passing of time: it recalls the hourglass, in which slowly but surely 
the sand amasses. Clov’s sense of the ‘impossible heap’ emphasises the disjunction 
between universal history and its perception by individuals: each grain added to the 
pile seems to make no difference; it is only by time’s perseverance that the pile 
surreptitiously grows. Somewhat enigmatically, Clov describes this process thus: 
‘Something is taking its course’ (p. 98). The cryptic ‘Something’ could easily refer to 
either history or nature, and it is this slippage throughout Endgame that makes 
transparent the dialectic between the two concepts. Whatever is taking its course, 
Clov suggests, is obscure, its meaning impenetrable and its origins unidentifiable.   
 Hamm and Clov consistently allude to their belief and hope that both nature 
and history are coming to an end: ‘Will this never finish?’ Hamm cries ‘[w]ith sudden 
fury’ (Endgame, p. 103). This takes for granted Adorno’s project ‘to behold all nature, 
and whatever regards itself, as history’ (HF, p. 124): if Clov can declare that ‘There’s 
no more nature’ (p. 97), then nature must take place in time and change accordingly. 
Beyond this, as Deborah Cook notes, ‘philosophy also shows that nature is historical 
[…] because it has been profoundly⎯often negatively⎯affected by human history. 
Adorno’s idea of natural history reveals the dynamic, and potentially catastrophic, 
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interaction between nature and history’.78 Clov’s identification of the liquidation of 
nature offers a pointed reminder of its manipulation by mankind: far from nature 
having ‘forgotten’ (p. 97) them, as Hamm bemoans, it has been actively destroyed. 
Despite everything, however, nature and history limp on⎯adding, grain by grain, to 
the ‘impossible heap’. To his horror, Clov identifies a flea on his person and a ‘rat in 
the kitchen’ (p. 118)⎯not to mention the elusive ‘small boy’ outside the refuge (p. 
130)⎯prompting Hamm’s fear that ‘humanity might start from there all over again. 
Catch him, for the love of God’ (p. 108). In eagerly awaiting, and, indeed, actively 
encouraging, the end of history, Hamm and Clov interrogate the eschatological claims 
of universal history. The alarm clock that Clov sets to inform Hamm whether he is 
gone or dead is said to be ‘[f]it to wake the dead!’ (p. 115)⎯presaging the end of 
history according to the Christian narrative. While Clov insists that ‘The end is 
terrific!’, Hamm ‘prefer[s] the middle’ (p. 115). They are, of course, speaking of the 
sound of the alarm, but their words could equally ironically refer to history itself, a 
history whose end is, like the unreliable alarm clock, at once terror-inducing and 
unlikely.  
Shortly afterwards, Clov, perhaps inspired by his own reference to judgment 
day, returns to the question of the end of history: 
CLOV: Do you believe in the life to come? 
HAMM: Mine was always that. 
(Endgame, p. 116) 
Within Hamm’s humorous retort⎯based on a wilful rejection of the redemptive 
possibility of Clov’s words⎯lies the serious point that ‘life does not live’ (quoted in 
MM, p. 19): Hamm’s life, like his death, is always postponed. Another explicit 
reference to the end of history comes in Hamm’s story of the madman, who, as 
Thomas Dilworth and Christopher Langlois have noted, strikingly ‘resembles the 
madman in Nietzsche’s The Gay Science’:79  
HAMM: I once knew a madman who thought the end of the world had come. 
He was a painter⎯and engraver. I had a great fondness for him. I used 
to go and see him, in the asylum. I’d take him by the hand and drag him 
to the window. Look! There! All that rising corn! And there! Look! The 
                                                
78 Adorno on Nature (Durham: Acumen, 2011), p. 1. 
79 ‘The Nietzschean Madman in Beckett’s Endgame’, The Explicator, 65 (2007), 167–71 (p. 168). 
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sails of the herring fleet! All that loveliness! (Pause) He’d snatch away 
his hand and go back into his corner. Appalled. All he had seen was 
ashes. (Pause) He alone had been spared. 
(Endgame, p. 113) 
Dilworth and Langlois dwell on what they perceive to be the contrast between the 
affirmative perspective of Nietzsche’s madman⎯he declares: ‘There has never been a 
greater deed [than the death of God]; and whoever is born after us⎯for the sake of 
this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto’80⎯and Beckett’s 
repudiation of such a ‘farcical delusion’: ‘Absence of God is the absence of meaning 
and precludes real or lasting happiness. In Beckett, all that is left to Godless humanity 
is absurdity and despair’.81 However, this conclusion not only runs the risk of 
attributing to Beckett’s works some illusory conception of a universal human 
condition, but also glosses over the significant references to history and nature in the 
short section. In the post-Holocaust world he inhabits, the madman is blind to the 
physical rejuvenation that has taken place in nature and society⎯‘that rising corn!’ 
and ‘[t]he sails of the herring fleet!’. With the privileged perspective of the artist, he is 
aware only of the metaphysical implications of the events that have torn open the 
belly of the world, and sees such implications in physical form: as ‘ashes’. Therein 
lies his affinity to Nietzsche’s madman, who hysterically recounts the ramifications of 
the death of God: ‘Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging 
continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions?’82 Susan Neiman 
perceptively notes that the philosophical significance of the Holocaust lies in the way 
it rendered obsolete our conceptual tools for understanding the world. While the 
Lisbon earthquake of 1755 ‘revealed how remote the world is from the human; 
Auschwitz revealed the remoteness of humans from themselves’.83 Despite their 
manifest differences, Lisbon and Auschwitz are analogous in the scale of the tremors 
they sent through contemporary assumptions about the world. Beckett’s madman sees 
the effects of such tremors as scars wrought upon the surface of the world. For him, 
the course of history has come to an end, but there is no ‘life to come’, no triumphant 
sublation of past evils. The unity of universal history has collapsed into a gray 
sameness that continues beyond its end-date. Hamm’s elusive statement that ‘He 
                                                
80 The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 181. 
81 Dilworth and Langlois, pp. 169–70. 
82 Nietzsche, p. 181. 
83 Neiman, p. 240. 
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alone had been spared’ at once refers to the madman’s conviction that he alone was 
destined to live in a world after the destruction of nature and history⎯not unlike the 
situation Clov and Hamm consider themselves to be in⎯and, more interestingly, 
Hamm’s own belief that the madman had been ‘spared’ the suffering of continuing 
with existence within an oppressive history that takes on all the weight of a natural 
phenomenon. While Hamm can only envisage insanity as an escape from second 
nature, Endgame’s very disclosure of the weight of the world allows us to hope, with 
Adorno, for ‘a situation in which the blind compulsion of material conditions over 
human beings is broken, and the question of freedom will at last be truly 
meaningful’.84  
Endgame, I suggest, raises the admittedly minimal possibility of freedom that 
results from the paradoxical rejection and acknowledgement of universal history. 
While the rejection of the very real presence of universal history marks a naivety that 
refuses to countenance the extent of actual unfreedom, its ingenuous acceptance risks 
establishing a narrative of progress that nullifies human suffering. Endgame’s 
response to the dilemma of history⎯one brought in terrifying proximity by the Cold 
War⎯is singular and complex, positioning Hamm and Clov as non-identical 
remnants unsubsumable by the march of progress, yet also acknowledging the bleak 
horror of a continuity leading from ‘the slingshot to the megaton bomb’ (ND, p. 320). 
Its hope lies in its insight into the petrified categories that, when identified as the 
second nature they are, can be impeded.  
                                                
84 Quoted in Cook, p. 16. Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie zur Einleitung, 2 vols 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), II, p. 198. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
VIRTUAL FREEDOM 
 
 
Beckett and Adorno seem to approach technology from utterly opposing perspectives. 
Beckett’s media plays⎯utilising radio, film and television⎯represent a substantial if 
under-considered part of his literary output. Between 1956 and 1982 he wrote six 
radio plays, one film and five television plays⎯not including the various authorized 
adaptations of theatre plays to television or his adaptation of Robert Pinget’s radio 
play, La Manivelle. Adorno, on the other hand, is renowned for his resistance to what 
he considered to be the various media of the Culture Industry. His substantial output 
on the subject of the mass media and his consistent suspicion of its supposedly 
liberating and democratising ideals have led to accusations of elitism. For the most 
part, this chapter circumvents the endless indictments and rebuttals that make up a 
substantial part of any discussion of Adorno and the mass media. Adorno’s diatribes 
against so-called popular culture are not necessarily very helpful when considering 
Beckett, whose work in no way fits the mould of the Culture Industry. For this reason, 
I have generally sidestepped Adorno’s more straightforward readings of radio, film 
and television to consider more interesting connections. In so doing, I have avoided a 
wholly pessimistic attitude towards the technologies I have discussed, while retaining 
Adorno’s suspicion of their supposedly emancipatory status.  
 Rather than being a fault, I take Adorno’s scepticism regarding radio, film and 
television to be a useful point of departure for considering Beckett’s media plays. 
Adorno’s critiques may seem exaggerated or petty, but they at least shock a modern-
day reader out of the complacency that necessarily sets in when such media gain an 
anaesthetising familiarity. In the same way, Beckett’s media plays explode our 
understanding of what constitutes normal radio, film and television⎯perhaps even 
more so now than when they were first broadcast. Beckett may not share Adorno’s 
suspicion of mass media’s complicity in maintaining the status quo, but he certainly 
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does not take his medium for granted. Indeed, his plays are inextricably tied to their 
medium, appropriated for another only at great loss. 
Beyond his localised critiques of the Culture Industry, Adorno considers 
technology as primarily a mode of domination: the means by which the subject can 
more efficiently control nature. It is, then, not technology per se that is problematic, 
but its role within humanity’s compulsive habit of mastery: mastery over both the 
natural world beyond the subject and its inner nature. As Heinz Paetzold argues, 
however, ‘technology may have a totally different meaning from the socially 
established, one-dimensional role of control or domination’.1 It is this very possibility, 
I suggest, that Beckett explores in his media plays. The prospect of ‘liberating nature 
through technological means’2 takes on a significance beyond its immediate 
environmental application⎯though this can hardly be understated given current 
global trends3⎯when we consider Adorno’s insistence that our context of domination 
over nature is as detrimental to the subject as it is to the object.  
This chapter begins by considering Beckett’s radio plays in light of Adorno’s 
intriguing correlation between the aesthetic domination of material in music and the 
technological domination of nature in the social world. In contrast to the inevitable 
repression of nature in the latter, Adorno suggests that control over aesthetic material 
is, paradoxically, a precondition for aesthetic freedom. Such freedom, moreover, 
offers a model of subject-object relations that is not premised on mutual destruction, 
and therefore points to a radically different use of technology. In his radio plays, 
Beckett experiments with methods of control and constraint, bringing his work ever 
closer to the sphere of music. These plays, insistently self-reflexive, stage an 
interrogation into existent and possible relations between subject and material, 
whether aesthetic or natural.  
                                                
1 Heinz Paetzold, ‘Adorno’s Notion of Natural Beauty: A Reconsideration’, in The Semblance of 
Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, ed. by Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 213–35 (p. 227). 
2 Ibid., p. 230. 
3 Deborah Cook’s book-length study on Adorno and nature includes a large discussion on Adorno’s 
relevance to major trends in radical ecology. Adorno on Nature (Durham: Acumen, 2011), pp. 
121–54. Paetzold also compares Adorno’s understanding of natural beauty to two recent thinkers, 
Gernot Böhme and Martin Seel, who approach the acute modern problem of ‘the crisis in 
humanity’s relationship with the environment’ (p. 222). 
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Moving onto Beckett’s cinematic collaboration with Alan Schneider, I suggest 
that Film engages with the mechanisms of idolatry that permeate the nature of film 
itself as a visual medium, as well as the film industry as a whole. Advancing beyond 
the  prevailing and perfunctory view of Adorno as exhibiting a mandarin disdain for 
Hollywood, I argue that he consciously engaged with film as an art form that⎯for 
him⎯habitually fell short of its potential. Film’s very failures and technical flaws 
preserve it from conforming to the exacting standards of an industry that seeks to 
whitewash all cracks and blemishes, while its self-reflexivity and lack of realism 
distort rather than reflect reality. In this way, it is able to offer an alternative cinematic 
gaze that subverts film’s prevailing mode of idolatry.  
Beckett’s television plays, finally, take an inward turn, rooting themselves in 
the domestic world where television has its home. In his rarely-considered 
Habilitation, Adorno reads Søren Kierkegaard’s imaginative recourse to the 
bourgeois intérieur as representative of his inward-facing philosophy: the subject’s 
isolation in his fortress of mind, as embodied in the domestic sphere, means that ‘the 
world only appears to him reflected by pure inwardness’ (K, p. 41). This is a more 
subtle and insidious form of domination: the reduction of everything external to the 
mind’s ultimate sway. Through Ghost Trio’s alienated and etiolated version of a 
domestic interior, Beckett exposes the skewed subject-object relations within a 
modernity characterised by the domination of nature: as Adorno describes it, ‘[t]he 
abstract self, which alone confers the legal right to record and systematize, is 
confronted by nothing but abstract material’ (DE, p. 20). By depicting the situation in 
its extremity, the play demonstrates the extent to which subjectivity is dependent on 
the very objectivity it attempts to bring under its own control. Nacht und Träume, the 
last of Beckett’s plays explicitly conceived for television, has a wholly different tone, 
resonating strongly with the mute gaze of iconography, in which the human beholder 
is overwhelmed and disoriented by the icon’s revelation of divinity. In this play, 
Beckett accentuates the two-dimensionality of television and brings the moving 
images to a point of near-stasis in order to approach the depthlessness of the icon. 
Through a productive yet evanescent correspondence between Adorno and Jean-Luc 
Marion, I argue that Nacht und Träume, in reversing the conventional gaze of the 
controlling subject, can be understood as the wordless, overwhelming expression of 
the non-subjective that reminds the subject of their own natural being. Beckett’s 
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radical use of television here disrupts the dominative norms of technology, reminding 
the viewer of nature within and without. 
 
I 
 
Unsurprisingly, given that music consistently occupied a dominant place in his 
thought, Adorno wrote significantly more about radio than other technological media. 
The late 1930s and early 1940s saw him in a frenzy of writing on the subject of radio 
music. The proliferation of texts that resulted must be seen in relation to the 
spectacularly increased popularity of radio in the United States,4 as well as more 
specifically to Adorno’s participation in the Princeton Radio Research Project 
between 1938 and 1941.5 However, these texts generally met with disfavour from 
critics and publishers alike⎯perhaps justifiably⎯and few were published until the 
2005 collection of Adorno’s radio works, entitled Current of Music. Indeed, the texts 
are often disappointing in their repetitive critique of popular culture twinned with a 
stubborn refusal to envisage any way out of the impasse of generic and reactionary 
American radio programming. From these rarely read essays there are, unfortunately, 
very few insights to be gleaned. 
It is for this reason that I turn to a less obvious text to begin my discussion of 
radio: namely Adorno’s Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction, a collection of 
notes written sporadically through the 1940s and 1950s. Adorno’s brief discussion of 
coloratura, the ‘ballet of the voice’ (TMR, p. 132), or the ‘elaborate ornamentation of 
                                                
4 Robert Hullot-Kentor notes that ‘where only ten thousand families owned [radio] sets in 1922, 27 
million families⎯out of 32 million in the United States⎯owned sets by 1939’. ‘Second Salvage: 
Prolegomenon to a Reconstruction of “Current of Music”’, Cultural Critique, 60 (2005), 134–69 
(p. 138).  
5 While this project is seldom mentioned in Adorno studies, it actually provided the necessary 
rationalisation for Adorno’s relocation from Oxford to New York. For a detailed account of 
Adorno’s affiliation with the Rockefeller Foundation-funded project, see Hullot-Kentor; and 
Thomas Y. Levin and Michael von der Linn, ‘Elements of a Radio Theory: Adorno and the 
Princeton Radio Research Project’, Musical Quarterly, 78 (1994), 316–24. 
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melody’,6 as the more prosaic Concise Oxford Dictionary of Opera has it, can be 
extended beyond its local referent to apply to the wider problem of technology:  
[Coloratura] is not simply control over nature as dominion over the material 
and the playing mechanism; rather, it loses its power and its severity by 
playing with that control⎯through its perfection⎯becomes imagination and 
is thus reconciled: dominion over nature appears ‘natural’, and becomes aware 
of itself as nature.  
(TMR, p. 133) 
Coloratura, as a musical technique, involves the domination of nature that Adorno and 
Horkheimer associate with the progress of a repressive and destructive rationalization 
that attempts to set up the subject as the locus of absolute meaning and power; ‘[w]hat 
human beings seek to learn from nature’, they argue in Dialectic of Enlightenment, ‘is 
how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings’ (DE, p. 2). Adorno 
emphasizes the naivety of the belief that art somehow transcends this context and 
remains unaffected by it; on the contrary, ‘[w]hat art in the broadest sense works with, 
it oppresses: This is the ritual of the domination of nature that lives on in play’ (AT, p. 
65). While the coloratura singer, however, acts, in line with this domination, as ‘a sort 
of harnesser, a tamer’ (TMP, p. 117) of the material, she simultaneously moves 
beyond mere control: ‘[t]he most difficult thing must sound “easy”, effortless, never 
merely realized. It belongs to the feeling of controlling nature that the ability should 
not be equal to the task, but rather exceed it’ (TMR, p. 132). This excess is significant 
because it is disproportionate to the control that is strictly necessary to manage the 
aesthetic material. In his discussion of this passage, Andrew Bowie argues that 
freedom emerges in the space between the apparent domination of nature and its very 
excess: 
[F]reedom has to do with the realisation that in certain cases our subjective 
command of something initially appears as an overcoming of nature, but can 
be the opposite. Freedom in this sense is nature itself in us […] but in a form 
which transcends self-preservation.7 
Adorno continually emphasises that the subject’s control of outer nature results in a 
repressive domination over one’s inner nature. However, in the reproduction of 
music, the subject’s control over the material does not necessitate a denial or 
                                                
6 John Warrack and Ewan West, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Opera (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p. 99. 
7 Music, Philosophy and Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 313. 
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repression of his own nature: quite the opposite, in fact. This is primarily because 
Adorno does not see nature as exclusively the realm of necessity, set against and 
mastered by the autonomous subject. We have already seen in Chapter 3 that nature is 
inherently historical rather than static and lifeless, but, beyond this, to be human is to 
be a piece of nature, for all that human beings recoil uncomfortably from this truism. 
Ironically, as Bowie points out, ‘if, as evolutionary epistemology and other 
scientistically oriented theories want to insist, human beings are to be seen purely 
naturalistically, they ought to conclude, as Schelling did, that nature, far from being 
reducible to determinism, must inherently involve what can move beyond 
determinism and develop reflexive self-determination’.8 Paradoxically, then, for 
Adorno, ‘we are no longer simply a piece of nature from the moment we recognize 
that we are a piece of nature’ (PMP, p. 103); or, less elusively: ‘what transcends 
nature is nature that has become conscious of itself’ (PMP, p. 104). In a radical 
deconstruction of the binary of freedom and nature, Adorno suggests that 
freedom⎯the transcendence of nature’s determinism⎯is only possible through an 
acknowledgement of our own natural state, one that emphatically does not entail a 
regression to the condition of primitive man. Bowie argues that this dialectic offers a 
‘glimpse of a way of being both beyond mere technical domination and beyond a 
failure to live up to human creative possibilities⎯possibilities which necessarily 
involve technical command’.9 If radio is an instance of the domination of nature 
through technology, the implications of which are, for Adorno, decidedly detrimental 
to both subject and object, then it is at least provisionally possible to use radio in such 
a way that the excess of control, in Adorno’s words, ‘appears “natural”, and becomes 
aware of itself as nature’.  
For Adorno, the paradox by which the excessive control of nature leads to 
aesthetic freedom can be envisioned in musical notation. Against the ‘seemingly 
natural, reasonable attitude that musical notation arose as an aid to memory’ (TMR, p. 
52), Adorno argues that notation represents ‘not so much the preservation of 
something already present in tradition as the disciplinary function of the traditional 
exercise’ (TMR, p. 171). That is, in what he describes as ‘primitive music’ (TMR, p. 
                                                
8 Between Idealism, Romanticism, and Pragmatism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 
389. 
9 Music, Philosophy and Modernity, p. 314. 
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172), no notation is required because the music is in a constant state of flux, not a 
finished product that is fixed and repeated. The ‘rational element’ of notation is the 
objectification and concomitant reification of such music, ‘the spatialization of 
experience for the purpose of controlling it’ (TMR, p. 53). The paradox is, as Bowie 
neatly encapsulates it, that ‘this form of repression of memory is also what makes 
possible modern Western music culture’.10 Musical notation, which on the one hand 
‘regulates, inhibits, and suppresses whatever it notates and develops’ (TMR, p. 53), is 
on the other a precondition for the very development of music itself: ‘[a]utonomy and 
fetishism are two sides of the same truth’ (TMR, p. 53). ‘Through the domination of 
the dominating’, Adorno argues, ‘art revises the domination of nature to the core’ 
(AT, p. 182): precisely the control of nature that exceeds its own bounds leads to an 
‘aesthetic freedom’ (TMR, p. 53) that is not attained at the expense of lifeless 
material, but through a dialectical relationship between subject and object. This 
paradox is certainly not confined to music; Adorno emphasises in Aesthetic Theory 
that ‘[i]n the most authentic works the authority that cultic objects were once meant to 
exercise over the gentes became the immanent law of form. The idea of freedom, akin 
to aesthetic autonomy, was shaped by domination, which it universalised’ (AT, p. 23). 
Freedom here emerges from the formal domination of aesthetic material. Notation 
provides a provocative concrete model through which Beckett’s radio plays can be 
considered. 
The pathos of musical notation for Adorno is that ‘“[a]ll reification is a 
forgetting”⎯making available what has passed at once makes it irretrievable’ (TMP, 
p. 53). Notation preserves that which has temporally passed, but in so doing loses 
something crucial. Adorno’s consequent claim that ‘[a]ll music-making is a recherche 
du temps perdu’ (TMP, p. 53)⎯a desperate yet impossible endeavour to salvage that 
which has been constrained by notation⎯resonates with Beckett’s penultimate radio 
play, Words and Music, which follows Croak, an old feudal Lord, in his attempt to 
summon the memory of the elusive ‘Lily’ (Words and Music, p. 292) with the aid of 
his two servants, Joe and Bob, or ‘Words’ and ‘Music’ respectively. I contend that 
Croak’s instructions to his servants can be seen as rudimentary forms of notation.11 
                                                
10 Ibid., p. 319. 
11 This is in contradistinction to Elissa S. Guralnick’s claim that radio, ‘[c]onceived as a species of 
electronic music, in which phonemes take the place of notes, […] can neither be written nor 
scored: it exists, by definition, solely in performance’ (p. xi). While Guralnick is attentive to 
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He offers them themes, indicates dynamics and controls their relation to each other, 
directing them to come ‘[t]ogether’ (p. 289). He uses his servants instrumentally, 
undermining his original address of ‘My comforts!’ (p. 287) with his ‘Violent thump 
of club’ (p. 288) and exhortation: ‘Together, dogs!’ (p. 289). Music-making in Words 
and Music is quite literally a ‘recherche du temps perdu’⎯one which cannot 
unequivocally succeed. Like Orpheus, the archetypal musician, Croak is unable to 
gaze upon his beloved, to ‘retrieve the irretrievable’ (TMP, p. 53). Adorno’s Proustian 
allusion is of particular relevance given Beckett’s own enduring interest in the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory, overtly considered in his 
monograph Proust. While Kevin Branigan claims that Croak ‘remains open to the 
impact of painful involuntary memory’, which is freed in the collaboration of Words 
and Music,12 I would claim that Croak’s efforts cannot be seen through a simple 
opposition between voluntary and involuntary memory. He indeed hopes to unleash 
his involuntary memory through a particular combination of words and music, but he 
attempts to do so by an act of will, namely in his instrumental control of his servants. 
He therefore only succeeds in objectifying the music by means of his primitive 
notation. Nonetheless, as we have seen, it is possible for such domination of musical 
material to have a surprising effect. In Words and Music, Croak’s unbending will 
eventually leads to a moment of revelation, painful though it may be, as he glimpses 
the lost Lily.  
 The script for Words and Music, along with two other radio plays, Rough for 
Radio I and Cascando, is inherently incomplete; that is, it lacks precisely that which 
is so central to its thematic concern: music. Beckett, like Croak, offers a form of basic 
musical notation, particularly indicating variances in tone, as, for example: ‘Soft 
music worthy of foregoing, great expression’ (Words and Music, p. 288) and ‘warmly 
sentimental’ (p. 291). These rudimentary indications are, in themselves, insufficient; 
as Morton Feldman, the composer for the 1987 American radio production of Words 
and Music, explained: ‘I know what it [a particular emotional characterisation] is in 
terms of Puccini. If Beckett says he wants something sentimental, I have no idea what 
                                                                                                                                      
radio’s affinity with music, she fails to recognise the corollary of this: that is, the tension between 
script/score and performance. Sight Unseen: Beckett, Pinter, Stoppard, and Other Contemporary 
Dramatists on Radio (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1996). 
12 Radio Beckett: Musicality in the Radio Plays of Samuel Beckett (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 145. 
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that means’.13 The music is therefore notated for a second time by the composer, 
based on Beckett’s own version but crucially new. Musical notation, then, can be seen 
as synonymous with Beckett’s own exacting stage directions and notoriously precise 
written and verbal performance instructions.14 Although these are conspicuous in all 
Beckett’s plays, radio offers the most appropriate medium for an absolute control of 
material that exceeds domination; Thomas Mansell suggests that Beckett’s 
dissatisfaction with performances of his theatre plays could be attributed to the 
‘messy aspects of theatrical work’⎯to those human elements that cannot be strictly 
controlled, since the very nature of theatre is its repetition under different 
conditions.15 This messiness is, if not eliminated, significantly reduced in radio work: 
the performance can be edited before it is broadcast; there are considerably fewer 
competing performances; and, with visual distractions stripped away, radio operates 
in a world of pure sound⎯a world that, arguably, Beckett was intent upon perfecting 
throughout his career. As Ruby Cohn elucidates: 
Midway during the rehearsal period [of Endgame] […] Beckett held a 
rehearsal for tone, pitch, rhythm. Especially in the last two weeks, he tended to 
comment in musical terms⎯legato, andante, piano, scherzo, and a rare 
fortissimo. Often he spoke of ‘reine Spiel’, pure play.16 
Mansell argues that Beckett’s envy of ‘what he considered the greater subtlety and 
precision of musical notation’ in comparison to stage directions was due to an 
unconscious desire for authenticity that would render all subsequent performances of 
his plays inadequate.17 He suggests that ‘Beckett’s envy of the alleged accuracy of 
musical notation bespeaks a desire to fix performances of his plays to the 
specifications of their texts’.18 Contra Mansell, I would suggest that Beckett’s 
extreme attentiveness to sound and his attraction to musical vocabulary is due to his 
appreciation of the complex relation between a text (or score) and its reproduction, 
                                                
13 Quoted in Catherine Laws, ‘Music in Words and Music: Feldman’s Response to Beckett’s Play’, 
Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 11 (2000), 279–90 (p. 282). 
14  James Knowlson notes Beckett’s reputation as a ‘tyrannical figure, an arch-controller of his work, 
ready to unleash fiery thunderbolts onto the head of any bold, innovative director, [sic] unwilling 
to follow his text and stage directions to the last counted dot and precisely timed pause’, and 
although he insists that ‘the truth of his position was more complex’, it is certainly the case that 
Beckett insisted on metronomical precision from his actors. Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel 
Beckett (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), p. 691. 
15 ‘Beckett’s Theatrical Conduct’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 15 (2005), 225–239 (p. 229). 
16 Just Play: Beckett’s Theater (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 241. 
17 Mansell, p. 220. 
18 Ibid., p. 230. 
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itself dependent on an understanding of the score as inherently and necessarily 
liberating through its restrictions. Bowie, following Adorno, notes that ‘in the writing 
down of music, the difference of what is written from what is performed is 
“constitutively established at the same time”’.19 There is necessarily a gap between 
score and performance (a gap that did not exist before notation), and this gap cannot 
be overcome either by viewing the score as a rigid set of instructions to be adhered to, 
or the performance as the true and liberated expression of the work. The non-identity 
between score and reproduction must be acknowledged and accentuated so as to 
preserve the work’s objectivity from subjective expression, on the one hand, and 
subjective freedom from the score’s rigidity, on the other. When Adorno suggests that 
successful artworks ‘rescue over into form something of the amorphous to which they 
ineluctably do violence’ (AT, p. 65), he is referring to this non-identical element. Its 
salvage is significant because it attests to the possibility of a non-subsumptive 
relationship between subject and object⎯one that was gestured to earlier by the 
subject’s acknowledgement of his own natural being.  
 A number of critics have noted that Beckett’s six radio plays get progressively 
shorter and more oblique. Elissa S. Guralnick argues that ‘the more conspicuously 
[Beckett’s] radio plays aspired to the condition of music, the shorter they grew’; 
narrative is gradually (but never completely) ousted from the texts in an attempt to 
suppress the referential quality of language.20 This is certainly an interesting reading, 
in keeping with Beckett’s widely acknowledged preoccupation with stories and their 
ends; however, it glosses over the particularly musical nature of this drive towards 
constraint. Both Beckett’s first two radio plays, All that Fall and Embers incorporate 
music into the dramatic action through the use of a gramophone as an invisible stage 
prop. The music emanating from the gramophone is commented upon by Mrs Rooney 
at the beginning of All That Fall and finally identified by Mr Rooney near the end of 
the play as Schubert’s ‘Death and the Maiden’ (All That Fall, p. 197).21 In Embers, 
the gramophone never appears, but Henry draws attention to his habit of carrying it 
around in order to drown out the sound of the sea: ‘I forgot it today’ (Embers, p. 261). 
                                                
19 Music, Philosophy, and Modernity, p. 320. 
20 Guralnick, p. 80. 
21 Branigan argues that in All That Fall, ‘Beckett assimilates musical models from the composer Franz 
Schubert’s Leider for thematic, structural and autobiographical reference’ (p. 83), though he 
acknowledges that ‘The framework of Schubert’s sonata cannot be drawn too rigidly’ (p. 98).  
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These tentative movements towards incorporating music into the radio plays are soon 
superseded by more striking and experimental efforts. Rough for Radio I and Rough 
for Radio II (written early 1960s; first broadcast 1976) are self-reflexively concerned 
with the nature of radio. In both texts, the increasingly desperate⎯and in Rough for 
Radio I, addictive⎯attempts to control nature in the form of sound ultimately lead to 
an impasse of dependence and anguish. Governed purely by the impulse of self-
preservation, the protagonists of these plays exert a tortuous control over their 
material that radically backfires as their own subjective freedom dissolves. In 
Cascando, on the other hand, the use of repetition acts as a principle of constraint by 
which the play can rigorously control and curtail its material in a way that does not 
result in the repression of subject or object. This alternative to a purely instrumental 
domination of nature opens up possibilities for freer subject-object relations that have 
implications far beyond the realm of aesthetics.  
 Rough for Radio I and Rough for Radio II occupy an ambiguous position 
within Beckett’s radio canon; they are treated variously by critics as works in and of 
themselves and as ‘preliminary sketches’, as Martin Esslin puts it, for Words and 
Music and Cascando.22 Their equivocal status is only heightened by the incomplete 
nature of Rough for Radio I, which is not only lacking a musical score but also, more 
crucially, the text of one of the four characters, Voice. These short texts share themes 
of power and control, which, though more overt in Rough for Radio II, are explicitly 
tied to the nature of radio technology in Rough for Radio I. The plot of the latter is, 
characteristically for Beckett, at once simple and oblique. A woman, known only as 
She, visits a man, He, who reluctantly demonstrates a contraption consisting of ‘two 
knobs’ (Rough I, p. 268) that, when twisted, emanate music and words respectively. 
These, to the woman’s great shock, emerge from different sources. Having witnessed 
the phenomenon, She departs, leaving He to phone the doctor’s surgery with the 
anxious claim that ‘they’re ending’ (p. 270). The doctor is unable to attend until the 
following day. The play ends with He alone with his contraption. This machine, 
described so sparingly, bears a striking resemblance to a radio set, with its 
transmission of sound that ‘goes on all the time’ (p. 267), only to be rudimentarily 
controlled by twisting the knobs. Marle Tönnies suggests that Beckett’s radio plays 
                                                
22 ‘Beckett’s Rough for Radio’, Journal of Modern Literature, 6 (1977), 95–103 (p. 100). 
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establish a ‘hierarchical instability’ in depicting an ‘“elicitor”, whose apparent control 
over others turns out to be a sham’: 
The listeners to the radio plays, who are structurally made to share the 
thoughts of the ‘elicitor’, then become implicated in the slipping away of 
control, as it becomes obvious that the master is as dependent on his servants 
as they are on him.23 
In Rough for Radio I, He certainly possesses the power to turn the knobs and thus 
control the transmission of sound. However, this power is presented as purely 
nominal; He is a self-confessed addict, who is crucially unable to control his ‘need’ to 
listen. In a remarkably similar vein, Adorno ascribes a subversive quality to the 
fiddling with radio knobs⎯whether compulsively changing station or attempting to 
get ‘good reception’, insisting, however, that ‘no matter how far the activity of a 
regulating listener may go, he has no real power over the phenomenon. It always 
remains within the framework and within certain proportions of the given material’ 
(CM, pp. 99–100).  
 Rough for Radio II is far more overtly concerned with questions of control and 
domination, presenting as it does the torture of a prisoner, Fox, at the hands of 
Animator, Dick and Stenographer. Animator is nominally in charge and directs the 
torture that is carried out by the mute Dick, while Stenographer transcribes Fox’s 
every word. Despite its apparent contrast to Rough for Radio I, the radio play, as 
Esslin’s early reading suggests, is intimately related to its medium: 
the Animator with his ruler and stenographer and additional acolyte 
reproduces the team of producer, secretary, and technician which Beckett must 
have encountered in his contacts with production teams at the BBC or the 
French radio. (In French animateur is a term used for a radio or television 
producer).24 
Within this structure, Fox, with his incoherent babbling, can be seen to play the part 
of the radio sound itself. Refining Fox’s corporeal being into pure sound, 
Stenographer, at the request of her mysterious superiors, omits the transcription of 
‘mere animal cries’ (Rough II, p. 276) and the ‘play of feature’ (p. 275). Beckett’s 
listeners, however, eavesdrop on this editorial process, witnessing the sound of the 
                                                
23 ‘Players, Playthings and Patterns: Three Stages of Heteronomy in Beckett’s Drama’, Samuel Beckett 
Today / Aujourd’hui, 11 (2001), 194–201 (pp. 198–9). 
24 Esslin, p. 99. 
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‘Swish and thud of pizzle on flesh’ (p. 277) and Fox’s cries of pain. Animator and 
Stenographer relentlessly analyse every syllable of Fox’s output, but they are blind to 
anything beyond their own purposes. The torturers exhibit a dispassionate and coldly 
rational attitude throughout: Animator enquires if ‘Dick functioned?’ (p. 277) as a 
euphemism for his lashing; the mysterious employers ‘note yet again with pain that 
these dicta […] are totally inacceptable’ (p. 276), the Latin serving to distance them 
from the embodied screams and cries issuing from Fox; and both Animator and 
Stenographer register confusion at how to record Fox’s ‘weeping’ (p. 279). Moreover, 
the division of labour, most evident in the inclusion of Dick who, as mute, is utterly 
redundant as a radio character, serves to abstract the torturers from the corporeal 
reality of their actions; they are like workers on a production line, detached from the 
complete picture. The supposed control of the torturers, however, is strongly 
undermined by the end of the play. Their desperation to uncover the right word from 
Fox’s stream of consciousness reveals their own unfreedom as helpless listeners. Like 
He in Rough for Radio I, they are compelled to listen, this time by an external agency 
that provides scathing reports and inspires such fear that the Animator himself 
amends the record of Fox’s words, angrily demanding: ‘What the devil are you 
deriding, miss? My hearing? My memory? My good faith? [Thunderous] Amend!’ (p. 
284). 
 In these drafts, then, the extreme control exerted first by He over the knobs 
that nonetheless dominate his life, and second by Animator, Stenographer and Dick 
over Fox, who supposedly holds the key to their freedom, only serves to bind those 
who are supposedly in command. Crucially, excessive constraint cannot lead to 
freedom within these texts, because in neither is the control exerted aesthetic: it is 
purely technological. This is apparent in the miserable futility of the knob turning in 
Rough for Radio I and the inhuman torture in Rough for Radio II. This control is 
exerted for the sake of self-preservation alone, whether due to the addict’s insistence 
that the control is necessary, or the employees’ fear of the repercussions of failure. 
And, just as Adorno recognizes, ‘self-preservation forfeits itself’ (MM, p. 230). The 
very self these characters attempt to preserve disintegrates: He is a husk confined to 
his own home, while Animator, Stenographer and Dick remain in the Dantean 
Purgatory Animator alludes to, in which ‘all sigh, I was, I was’ (Rough II, p. 278). 
These two preliminary works certainly thematically demonstrate the perils of non-
  157 
aesthetic control of nature, but they are formally less advanced than the later works, 
which is perhaps unsurprising given their draft status.  
 Beckett’s final radio play, Cascando, represents the culmination of his drive 
towards control and constraint. It can be seen in many ways as a rewrite of Rough for 
Radio I, and also contains deep affinities with Words and Music. However, as will 
become evident, Beckett’s interest in control is so developed in Cascando as to 
wholly structure the text in a way that he did not attempt in either previous play. The 
plot, such as it is, follows Opener, who ‘open[s]’ and ‘close[s]’ (Cascando, p. 197) 
Voice and Music in a manner reminiscent of the knob-twisting in Rough for Radio I. 
A number of critics, including Clas Zilliacus in his seminal 1976 text, Beckett and 
Broadcasting, have noted the musical quality of the text spoken by Voice. This is 
usually attributed to the disintegration of an already perfunctory narrative, or, as 
Zilliacus describes it, the ascendancy of the ‘élément soi’⎯Voice’s metatextual 
musings about the need to finish the ‘right’ (p. 297) story⎯over the ‘élément 
histoire’⎯the narrative that follows Woburn.25 Zilliacus also notes Beckett’s 
indications that Voice should speak extremely quickly, supporting the primacy of 
sound over content.26 What, however, is neglected in such arguments is the prevailing 
feature of Voice’s text: repetition. Voice’s text is clearly divided into short phrases, 
which are separated by ellipses. Over 30% of these phrases are repeated at least once, 
some up to seventeen times. Repetition therefore accounts for an overwhelming 
proportion of the text; indeed, so much so that when Opener opens Voice for the final 
time, the passage is comprised almost entirely of recycled phrases, the only original 
material being the slightly revised ‘a few more’ (p. 304) and ‘it was him’ (p. 304), 
even these seen previously in slightly varied form: ‘just a few more’ (p. 304) and ‘it’s 
him’ (p. 300; p. 301). The incessant repetition within Cascando is, I suggest, what 
renders it truly musical. Music, unlike the more expansive quality of language,27 is 
necessarily limited to a finite quantity of notes that can be combined in various ways. 
Though unable to imitate harmony, Voice’s text has an affinity to a musical score in 
its combinations of a limited number of phrases.  
                                                
25 Beckett and Broadcasting: A Study of the Works of Samuel Beckett For and In Radio and Television 
(Abo: Abo Akademi, 1976), p. 129. 
26 Ibid., p. 128. 
27 It is certainly the case that a remarkably small number of distinct words are actually utilised in any 
given text; nonetheless, the deliberate patterning and unusual amount of repetition is distinct 
enough in Cascando for my claim to be valid. 
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This sense is encapsulated in Adorno’s concrete image of ‘a child at the piano 
searching for a chord never previously heard’: ‘This chord, however, was always 
there; the possible combinations are limited and actually everything that can be 
played on it is implicitly given in the keyboard. The new is the longing for the new, 
not the new itself’ (AT, p. 41). Adorno specifically utilises this image to explore his 
claim that utopia must be a determinate negation of the already existing. However, the 
musical nature of the image has a resonance beyond its explicit purpose: it indicates 
the broader dialectic of constraint and freedom that characterises music. The child has 
to learn that freedom must necessarily be accessed through the constraint of musical 
form⎯here evident in the very concrete restriction of a finite number of notes on a 
piano.28 In Cascando, the musical quality of repetition acts as a mechanism by which 
Beckett controls his text, forcing it to restrict itself to progressively fewer new 
phrases. Beckett’s very choice of title attests to the increasing constraint of the text. 
Zilliacus notes the musical associations of the Italian term⎯‘calando, diminuendo, 
decrescendo’⎯and remarks that all ‘concern volume as well as tempo’.29 The word 
Cascando therefore signifies not only the necessary control involved in a gradual 
reduction of sound, but also more broadly the inherent constraint derived by 
diminishing.  
In this final radio play, Beckett is experimenting with constraint in a way that 
brings his work closer to the sphere of music. A number of critics have noted Voice’s 
typically Beckettian quest to reach the end of all storytelling by completing the ‘right 
one’ (Cascando, p. 299)⎯the story that will set him free. Zilliacus, for example, 
suggests that: 
Cascando is paradigmatic insofar as the play, in model form, expresses a 
desire which pervades the entire Beckettian oeuvre: the desire not merely to 
finish a story but to find that story which, when finished, and being the right 
one, would absolve its teller of the need to go on, and thus make peace 
possible.30 
This is hardly a controversial claim: Voice admits that ‘…if you could finish it…you 
could rest…sleep…not before’ (p. 297). However, what is more interesting is 
                                                
28 Adorno suggests as an aside that piano-playing ‘in a certain sense is also a “writing” of music, its 
imitation through the accents of the keys’ (TMP, p. 175), and therefore a form of the 
spatialization of time that, as seen in notation, ‘is by its nature controllability’. TMP, p. 173. 
29 Zilliacus, p. 123. 
30 Ibid., p. 119. 
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Beckett’s parallel attempt to achieve, in this case, aesthetic freedom, through the very 
same mechanisms of constraint that Voice uses in order continuously to refine his 
narrative into the correct one.  
Within the text, the control exerted by Opener is qualitatively different to that 
of Rough for Radio I, Rough for Radio II and even Words and Music. He ‘open[s]’ 
and ‘close[s]’ Voice and Music in a far less authoritative way than the other texts, and 
seems to have a more nuanced relationship with his material:  
What do I open? 
They say, He opens nothing, he has nothing to open, it’s in his head. 
They don’t see me, they don’t see what I do, they don’t see what I have, and 
they say, He opens nothing, he has nothing to open, it’s in his head. 
I don’t protest any more, I don’t say any more, 
There is nothing in my head. 
I don’t answer any more. 
I open and close. 
(Cascando, p. 300) 
The opener here takes on the role of the modernist musician, whose compositions are 
incomprehensible to others: ‘they don’t see what I do’. More significantly, his being 
is utterly caught up with his role as ‘Opener’: ‘They say, That is not his life, he does 
not live on that. They don’t see me, they don’t see what my life is, they don’t see what 
I live on’ (p. 300). Opener does not understand his nature as qualitatively distinct 
from the material he manipulates, though he is careful to separate subject and object 
by insisting that ‘[t]here is nothing in my head’. He is not intent upon achieving a 
specific, instrumental goal⎯unlike any of Beckett’s previous radio plays⎯but upon 
bringing Voice and Music to fruition: ‘As though they had linked their arms’ (p. 303).  
While the question of Voice’s success or failure in reaching the right narrative is 
ultimately suspended in the silence, or dead air-time, that finishes the play, Beckett’s 
achievement is evident in Cascando itself. Just as the development of Western music 
exceeds the rational control inaugurated by notation, the freedom gestured to by 
Cascando emerges from the gradual curtailment of possibilities within its very form. 
Most significantly, as Paetzold suggests, ‘integrating technology into the work of art 
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may still be seen as a means to a new kind of experience of technology’.31 Works 
such as Cascando and Words and Music⎯and, indeed, their more ambivalent draft 
forms Rough for Radio I and Rough for Radio II⎯inaugurate a way of thinking about 
technology from an aesthetic perspective⎯one that, crucially, does not obliterate 
external or internal nature. 
 
II 
 
While Beckett’s 1963 foray into cinema with the aptly named Film represents a 
logical shift into a technological medium that had captured his imagination early in 
his career,32 Adorno’s residence in the heart of the Hollywood community from 1941 
to 1949 seems bizarrely incongruous with his deep-seated distaste for American 
culture. Ehrhard Bahr has captured this sense of disconnect in his study of the 
emerging German exile culture in 1940s Los Angeles: he notes, somewhat wryly, that 
‘the German exile writers were living in bungalows or flats, surrounded by lush 
gardens that some of them resented with a vengeance’.33 Nonetheless, as David 
Jenemann has demonstrated, it would be a mistake to assume that Adorno distanced 
himself from the ‘dream factory’; on the contrary, he had an ‘intimate knowledge of 
the practice and personnel of the U.S. film industry’34⎯one that actually extended to 
the aborted development of an experimental film that aimed to research patterns of 
anti-Semitism.35 Given this, it is unsurprising that Adorno’s 1966 essay, 
‘Transparencies on Film’, seems, as Miriam B. Hansen suggests, to ‘suspend some of 
                                                
31 Paetzold, p. 231. 
32 As has been noted by a number of critics, Beckett read a great deal on cinema in 1936 and even 
wrote a letter to Eisenstein asking ‘to be considered for admission to the Moscow State School of 
Cinematography’. See The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929–1940, ed. by Martha Dow Fehsenfeld 
and Lois More Overbeck, 4 vols (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
I, p. 317 (2 March 1936). J. M. B. Antoine-Dunne argues that in 1937 ‘Beckett was immersed in 
Soviet film aesthetics’ and traces Eisenstein’s influence throughout Beckett’s career. J. M. B. 
Antoine-Dunne, ‘Beckett and Eisenstein on Light and Contrapuntal Montage’, Samuel Beckett 
Today / Aujourd’hui, 11 (2001), 315–23 (p. 315).  
33 Weimar on the Pacific: German Exile Culture in Los Angeles and the Crisis of Modernism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), p. 10. 
34 Adorno in America (Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 108. 
35 For more information see Jenemann, pp. 128–46; and Miriam Bratu Hansen, Cinema and 
Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012), pp. 208–9. 
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the major fixations of Adorno’s theory on [the] Culture Industry’,36 instead permitting 
a more nuanced⎯and, indeed, aesthetic rather than sociological⎯account of film. 
 This section will discuss Beckett’s Film in relation to what Miriam Hansen 
quite justifiably characterises as a ‘regulative idea’ of Adorno’s aesthetic theory:37 das 
Bilderverbot⎯a German compound noun combining ‘die Bilder’ (pictures) and ‘das 
Verbot’ (ban)⎯or ‘theological ban on images’ (ND, p. 207), as Adorno defines the 
term. The Bilderverbot derives its scriptural authority from Exodus 20:4–5, the 
second of the Ten Commandments: ‘Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, 
or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or 
that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor 
serve them’. The Commandment not only proscribes positive representations of 
God⎯of ‘any thing that is in heaven above’⎯but images more generally. Such 
images are idolatrous because they hypostatize that which has been made by human 
hands into something eternal and immutable. I will argue that Adorno’s secularisation 
of the Bilderverbot is instrumental in penetrating the complexities of Beckett’s 
enigmatic Film, which both engages with and subverts mechanisms of idolatry that 
Adorno associates with cinema. For Adorno, film’s repudiation of the Bilderverbot 
not only limits its emancipatory potential but also renders it complicit in maintaining 
an unfree and alienating status quo. In contrast, what Beckett describes as the 
‘strangeness and beauty of pure image’ in Film can be read as a negative image of 
reality that, in respecting the demands of the Bilderverbot, frees it from the delusions 
of idolatry.38 This is the possibility of technology that, far from confirming the status 
quo and fixing it in place, radically subverts our vision of uninterrupted domination. 
 Adorno’s concept of the Bilderverbot is firmly rooted in the Old Testament 
proscription of idolatry. However, his secularisation of the term also owes a debt to 
Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism. Marx defines fetishism as the process by 
which ‘the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with 
life of their own’⎯the same reversion of the subjective into the objective that is 
                                                
36 ‘Introduction to Adorno, “Transparencies on Film” (1966)’, New German Critique, 24/25 (1982), 
186–98 (p. 186). 
37 ‘Culture as Hieroglyphic Writing: Adorno, Derrida, Kracauer’, New German Critique, 56 (1992), 
43–73 (p. 45). 
38 No Author Better Served: The Correspondence of Samuel Beckett and Alan Schneider, ed. by 
Maurice Harmon (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 188. 
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evident in idolatry.39 Despite their almost identical definitions, idolatry and fetishism 
are drawn from completely different contexts. ‘Fetish’ is now overdetermined with 
Marxist connotations, while the biblical origins of ‘idol’ are fast being superseded by 
the pop- and film-idols of the Culture Industry. Since these disparate contexts are 
relevant to Adorno’s understanding of the modern significance of the Bilderverbot, it 
is important to retain both terms. 
As David Hawkes claims in his groundbreaking study of idolatry in early 
modern England, ‘for the Judeo-Christian tradition as a whole, idolatry is not merely a 
theological problem but rather an all-encompassing view of the world’.40 This is 
certainly true for Adorno, who secularises the Bilderverbot to refer to the idols of 
contemporary society.41 He makes a number of direct references to the ban throughout 
his philosophy; however, it acts more broadly as a regulative idea, particularly of his 
aesthetics, which can be encapsulated in his enigmatic claim that ‘artworks are 
imageless images’ (AT, p. 364): as ‘images that do not contain replicas of anything’, 
they ‘are imageless’ (AT, p. 368). In Negative Dialectics, Adorno explains that 
materialism ‘comes to agree with theology’ in its ‘longing to grasp the thing’: ‘it is 
only in the absence of images that the full object could be conceived’ (ND, p. 207). In 
Exodus, God prohibits the construction of images because they fetishize that which is 
made by human hands into something eternal and given, qualities that belong only to 
God himself. Such idols attempt to objectify God, fixing him into one form. Similarly, 
materialism forbids ‘Utopia to be positively pictured’ (ND, p. 207). This 
correspondence between theology and materialism provides the basis for Adorno’s 
understanding of the Bilderverbot and its implications for modernity. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, he argues: 
The right of the image is rescued in the faithful observance of its prohibition. 
Such observance, ‘determinate negation’, is not exempted from the 
enticements of intuition by the sovereignty of the abstract concept, as is 
scepticism, for which falsehood and truth are equally void. Unlike rigorism, 
determinate negation does not simply reject imperfect representations of the 
                                                
39 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. by Ben Fowkes, 3 
vols (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), I, p. 164. 
40 Idols of the Marketplace: Idolatry and Commodity Fetishism in English Literature, 1580–1680 (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 6. 
41 As James Gordon Finlayson argues, ‘Adorno shows a rather cavalier lack of interest in the religious 
significance of these prohibitions, and freely and radically reinterprets them’. ‘On Not Being 
Silent in the Darkness: Adorno’s Singular Apophaticism’, Harvard Theological Review, 105 
(2012), 1–32 (p. 8). 
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absolute, idols, by confronting them with the idea they are unable to match. 
Rather, dialectic discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from its 
features the admission of falseness which cancels its power and hands it over 
to truth.  
(DE, p. 18) 
This extremely dense passage offers an explanation for the continuing relevance of 
the Bilderverbot beyond its Judeo-Christian usage. This explanation relies on a 
familiarity with Adorno’s oft-used terms: ‘abstract negation’ and ‘determinate 
negation’. Abstract negation is here associated with scepticism, following Hegel, who 
argued that in neither does Aufhebung take place, as they both ‘halt at the merely 
negative result of dialectics’ (quoted in ND, p. 16). In this case, abstract negation 
‘entails an indiscriminate negation of any and all images of the divine’, and is 
therefore uncritical and empty.42 Determinate negation, on the other hand, can be 
defined as the process of ‘confronting concepts with their objects and, conversely, 
objects with their concepts’ (LND, p. 25). It differs from abstract negation in that it, 
first, measures the image or idol up to what it purports to be, rather than some 
absolute, and, second, critically negates those images that, in their falseness, 
perpetuate the bad totality by presenting it as immutable. The determinate negation of 
the image crucially retains a critical power, which allows us to read from the image 
the damaged world’s ‘admission of falseness’. Thus, as Elizabeth A. Pritchard claims, 
‘instead of veiling the divinity, the Bilderverbot must unveil fallen reality’.43 
Adorno’s adherence to the Bilderverbot can thus be seen to assume an ethical and 
political resonance. Hawkes claims that ‘the condition of mind that these people [in 
Reformation England] called “idolatry” has, in our time, achieved a triumph so 
complete as to render itself imperceptible’.44 In light of this, Adorno’s ‘prohibition on 
invoking falsity as God, the finite as the infinite, the lie as truth’ (DE, p. 17) can be 
seen as an emancipatory act of unveiling the falsity that dominates the world.  
Adorno’s concept of determinate negation, then, ensures that a materialist 
translation of the Bilderverbot does not necessitate the indiscriminate rejection of all 
images. And, indeed, in critiquing film’s idolatrous representation of the world, he is 
merely holding cinema up to the same exacting standards that he insists upon in all 
                                                
42 Elizabeth A. Pritchard, ‘Bilderverbot Meets Body in Theodor W. Adorno’s Inverse Theology’, The 
Harvard Theological Review, 95 (2002), 291–318 (p. 302). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hawkes, p. 6. 
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art:45 ‘Aesthetic images stand under the prohibition on graven images. To this extent 
aesthetic semblance […] is truth’ (AT, p. 137). Art’s refusal either to directly 
represent the world as it is⎯idolizing it as the only possible world⎯or to offer 
‘images of a reconciled social reality’46⎯betraying the very possibility of 
reconciliation⎯is what constitutes its status as art. Indeed, for Adorno, film’s 
tendency towards idolatry can be seen as the defining characteristic distinguishing it 
from art. While art, ‘rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying 
as something “socially useful’, […] criticizes society by merely existing’ (AT, p. 296), 
film (generically) fetishises the world as it is and ‘ensures an affirmative stance 
towards the whole system’,47 thus actively preventing emancipatory change. The 
possibility of creating a non-idolatrous film⎯film as ‘imageless image’⎯is, 
therefore, the very possibility of film as art. It is with this in mind that we turn to 
Beckett’s Film, which, I suggest, not only engages with the question of idolatry but 
actively attempts to overcome it. When discussing Film, it is important to note that 
there are two texts to take into consideration: the written script and its execution. 
Although for the most part, the film follows the directions of the script, there are a 
few notable exceptions. The film itself begins with a close-up shot of a reptilian eye, 
which opens and closes, eventually fading into the similar texture of a wall. This does 
not appear in the written script, which instead begins with a street scene (compressed 
in the film itself). Moreover, Beckett appends a number of explanations to the 
beginning of his script, an indulgence necessarily absent in the film itself: 
 Esse est percipi. 
All extraneous perception suppressed, animal, human, divine, self-perception 
maintains in being. 
Search of non-being in flight from extraneous perception breaking down in 
inescapability of self-perception. 
No truth value attaches to above, regarded as of merely structural and dramatic 
convenience. 
In order to be figured in this situation the protagonist is sundered into object 
(O) and eye (E), the former in flight, the latter in pursuit. 
                                                
45 Here I agree with Jenemann, who argues that ‘Adorno⎯in very nuanced ways⎯conceives of cinema 
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46 Brian O’Connor, Adorno (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 157. 
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It will not be clear until end of film that pursuing perceiver is not extraneous, 
but self. 
Until end of film O is perceived by E from behind and at an angle not 
exceeding 45˚. Convention: O enters percipi = experiences anguish of 
perceivedness, only when this angle is exceeded. 
(Film, p. 323) 
This unusually detailed explication provides a structural framework for Film, based 
on Berkeley’s concept that being is being perceived.48 According to this framework, 
the film follows the protagonist, O, in his attempt to escape his perceiving self, E, 
whose point of view is the camera’s. O runs through the street, always careful to keep 
his face hidden. At moments, the point of view changes to that of O, recognisable by 
the use of a lens gauze. After the short street sequence, O runs into a set of flats, 
avoiding the gaze of an old woman with flowers walking down the stairs. At the sight 
of E, the old woman collapses with a look of horror on her face. O enters a flat and, 
after locking the door, walks around it, again hiding his face. Seeking to limit 
extraneous perception, he closes the curtain, covers the mirror and the goldfish bowl, 
takes down an image of God⎯in reality an image of the Sumerian God Abu⎯and 
shuts out the dog and the cat. Sitting down on a rocking chair, he takes seven 
photographs from his briefcase and, after perusing them carefully, tears them up. 
While he falls asleep in his chair, E takes the opportunity to infiltrate the angle of 
perceivedness. As we see O’s face for the first time, he awakens and stands up with a 
horrified expression. The camera angle switches to O’s point of view and reveals E as 
the same man, this time expressionless. This ‘Investment proper’ (Film, p. 328), as 
Beckett defines it, lasts a few minutes as the perspective continues to switch between 
O and E. The script ends here, while the film itself returns to the opening image of an 
eye opening and closing.  
I contend that Beckett’s Film exceeds its own clearly delineated structural 
framework⎯as Simon Critchley suggests, ‘to interpret an artwork in terms of a pre-
existing philosophical or conceptual grid is not to encounter an artwork, it is simply to 
confirm that pre-existing grid. It is to see through the artwork and not to see 
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it’49⎯and can be usefully understood in relation to Adorno’s conception of the 
Bilderverbot. Before discussing this further, it is imperative to understand Adorno’s 
association between film and idolatry. A useful point of departure here is the question 
of what Hansen describes as ‘film’s photographically based claim to immediacy and 
verisimilitude, its inherent pull toward iconic representation’.50 Adorno’s distrust of 
film lies precisely in its idolization of reality, its method of embalming or 
mummifying that which is and presenting it as second nature⎯as unchangeable. 
Moreover, Adorno contends that, in a broader sense, film participates in and 
contributes to a culture of idolatry. His 1938 essay ‘On the Fetish Character in Music 
and the Regression of Listening’ provides an interesting analysis of the role idolatry 
plays in so-called popular culture. For Adorno, in an extension of Marx’s concept of 
commodity fetishism to the realm of culture, the ‘world of […] musical life […] is 
one of fetishes’ (CI, p. 31). He includes among these fetishes people⎯such as 
conductors and composers⎯works, melodies, voices and instruments. To take but one 
of these examples, in the ‘cult of the master violins’ (CI, p. 33), Adorno notes the 
rapturous response of the public at the ‘well-announced sound of a Stradivarius or 
Amati, which only the ear of a specialist can tell from that of a good modern violin, 
forgetting in the process to listen to the composition and the execution’ (CI, p. 33). A 
violin⎯whatever its brand⎯is created by humans for the purpose of producing 
music. In the culture of idolatry of contemporary society, however, ‘[m]eans and ends 
are inverted’ (MM, p. 15) and the violin becomes hypostatized as an end in itself, to 
the detriment of the music it produces. 
 In his rather specialized exploration of the fetish character of music, Adorno 
gestures towards the wider culture of idolatry that, of course, makes the Culture 
Industry possible in the first place: 
The consumer is really worshipping the money that he himself has paid for the 
ticket to the Toscanini concert. He has literally “made” the success which he 
reifies and accepts as an objective criterion, without recognizing himself in it. 
But he has not “made” it by liking the concert, but rather by buying the ticket. 
(CI, p. 34) 
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Money is the ultimate object of fetishistic consciousness and is treated accordingly by 
Marx in Capital: ‘[t]his physical object, gold or silver in its crude state, becomes, 
immediately on its emergence from the bowels of the earth, the direct incarnation of 
all human labour. Hence the magic of money’.51 As Hawkes claims, ‘[f]inancial value 
is an alien meaning imposed upon nature’:52 gold and silver, as mere objects, have no 
intrinsic financial value. Value is ascribed to them by humans, who then fetishize the 
apparently inherent value of money. Marx explicates this in his Comments on James 
Mill: 
It is clear that this mediator thus becomes a real God, for the mediator is the 
real power over what it mediates to me. Its cult becomes an end in itself. 
Objects separated from this mediator have lost their value. Hence the objects 
only have value insofar as they represent the mediator, whereas originally it 
seemed that the mediator only had value insofar as it represented them.53  
Money, supposedly a mediator between commodities, becomes an end in itself. 
Originally, it represented the value contained in those commodities and was valuable 
only insofar as it mediated between them. A reversal takes place, however, in which 
the supposed carriers of values, the commodities, obtain their value from money 
itself. In the same way, in Adorno’s example, the money that should represent the 
ticket to the Toscanini concert becomes the carrier of value.  
Beckett’s Film engages with the Bilderverbot through its anti-realism, its 
subversion of the status of the idol, and its foregrounding of the image. First, then, 
Beckett’s Film refuses realism: O’s movements are stylized, as are the reactions of the 
couple he bumps into, particularly their hyperbolic expressions of horror at the sight 
of E. The fast camera pan as E catches up with O has a cartoon feel to it. The setting 
of the street scene itself seems to be imbued with realism; however, as Sidney 
Feshback notes: 
[Beckett’s] derelicts are based not on the poor or the clochards, despite 
resemblances, or having lived that life out of necessity, but on representations 
in paintings, movies, and philosophical models. His derelicts are constructs 
that are ‘comic and unreal’. Economics may be there, but the characters’ 
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background, their environment, their clothing and their few roots for food are 
formal, artistic, and aesthetic.54 
The unreal quality of the film reaches a peak as O enters the flat. Beckett himself 
described the room as a ‘trap prepared for him, with nothing in it that wasn’t trapped. 
There is nothing in this place, this room, that isn’t prepared to trap him’,55 and, 
indeed, the layout of the objects in this stark room seems deliberate and poised. The 
image of God stares dramatically with enormous black pupils. The comic superfluity 
of animals in the room⎯a ‘large cat and small dog’ (Film, 326), a parrot and a 
goldfish⎯succeeds in establishing the ‘extremely unreal’ quality Beckett intended.56 
Eric Tonning argues that despite Beckett’s intentions, Film does not escape 
realism. First, the nature of film ensures its rootedness in reality. As Stanley Cavell 
explains, ‘We might say: A painting is a world; a photograph is of the world. […] 
You can always ask, pointing to an object in a photograph […] what lies behind it, 
totally obscured by it. […] This generally makes no sense asked of a painting’.57 Film, 
unlike painting, necessarily captures a slice of the empirical world. Second, the lack 
of such techniques as montage prevents Film from resisting this realism. On the first 
of these grounds, Adorno would be in complete agreement. He insists that film’s 
‘elements, however abstract, always retain something representational; they are never 
purely aesthetic values’ (CI, p. 182) and concludes that ‘[b]y virtue of this 
relationship to the object, the aesthetics of film is thus inherently concerned with 
society’ (CI, p. 182). Hansen notes Adorno’s wariness of abstract film, which ‘ends 
up disavowing the (photographic) character of its material and the immanent aesthetic 
principles that might be derived from it’: its ‘experimental play with purely geometric 
figures thus merely sidesteps the crisis of semblance that modern art must confront; in 
Adorno’s view, it risks regressing into harmlessness’.58 By its nature, film cannot 
avoid representing the world; however, it can avoid idolising the world: presenting 
the world as a fixed given that cannot be changed. Tonning’s second claim is a 
response to Beckett’s perhaps surprising decision⎯given his ‘early interest in 
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Eisenstein’59⎯to prioritise his point-of-view shots of E and O, rendering montage 
impossible and, for Tonning, limiting the potential of the film.60 Indeed, Adorno 
suggests in ‘Transparencies on Film’ that montage can be utilised to ‘negate […] the 
affirmative appeal of the image’;61 montage, as Hansen explains, ‘would fracture the 
illusionist self-identity of the moving image and make it an object of immanent 
construction, figuration and deciphering’,62 allowing film to fulfil the demands of the 
Bilderverbot. Despite this guarded positive appraisal of the technique, however, 
Adorno manifests an awareness of the possible capitulation of montage.63 As David 
Bordwell argues, while ‘Soviet montage cinema constituted a challenge to classical 
narrative and decoupage on almost every front’, Hollywood’s assimilation of the 
technique castrates it by prioritising continuity over disjunction.64 Film’s absence of 
montage, moreover, is perhaps less surprising when the technique’s dynamism is 
contrasted to Beckett’s aesthetic tendency towards stasis; in the film, the long shots 
and relatively few cuts give an overwhelming sense of unescapable surveillance⎯one 
that would be further developed in the television play Eh Joe.   
Film engages with idolatry quite literally in its depiction of two idols. The first 
is the image of God, which O tears down, depicting in microcosmic form what the 
film accomplishes more broadly. The second is both internal and external to the film: 
the figure of Buster Keaton, a spectacular example of a film idol⎯a star venerated by 
millions of fans. As Adorno notes of this idolisation within the sphere of music, ‘[t]he 
star principle has become totalitarian. The reactions of the listeners have no relation to 
the playing of the music’ (CI, p. 31). The music or, in our case, the film, is subsumed 
under the all-important question of who is performing. The film star is not a means to 
an end⎯the production of a film⎯but an end in himself. Moreover, the film idol does 
not really exist. As David Hawkes points out, when St. Paul states: ‘We know that an 
idol is nothing in the world’, he uses the Greek word ‘eidolon’, the ‘Homeric word for 
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“ghost”, “phantom”, or “hallucination”’.65 An idol is quite literally nothing because 
its seemingly objective nature has actually been wrought by human hands; this is just 
as true of a film star as it is of a statue of the Virgin Mary. All the qualities held by 
the film star have in reality been projected upon them by their adoring fans. For this 
reason, Adorno situates film stars firmly within the Culture Industry’s mechanisms of 
control. Like all idols, they are manufactured. As Adorno perceptively notes, 
‘[b]ecause of his ubiquity, the film star with whom one is supposed to fall in love is, 
from the start, a copy of himself’ (DE, p. 112). He is a copy of what he is supposed to 
be. Feshback suggests that Beckett and Schneider were in a problematic position in 
their casting of Keaton: 
a worry about such a plan and about the film itself was that it would become a 
“Keaton”, which meant, to spell out the obvious, at least three things⎯the 
movie would express Keaton’s interests as a director and performer, it would 
be saturated with Keaton’s celebrity personage, and it would trigger 
associations with Hollywood and silent movies, exceeding and obscuring what 
Beckett saw as his innovation, all of which did come into play when the movie 
was first shown.66 
However, I argue that these elements, rather than being difficulties to be negotiated 
and ultimately eliminated, form integral tensions within the film itself. The very fear 
that the film ‘would become a “Keaton”’ testifies to the culture of idolatry I have 
discussed: the privileging of the film star over the film. Indeed, Schneider’s very 
reflection that ‘I feel the film is more Beckett than Buster, but both work’,67 is very 
much rooted in this culture of idolatry in its reduction of the film to one person. 
Beckett self-consciously plays with Keaton’s star status; as Keaton himself claimed at 
the press conference after the preview of Film at the Venice Film Festival, ‘The 
camera was behind me all the time. I ain’t used to that’.68 Having their back to the 
camera and, by extension, the viewers, could be interpreted by any star as derisive, 
even blasphemous, but it is particularly so for Keaton, who earned his fame from his 
deadpan expression. For this reason, he ‘felt it a waste, perhaps insulting, their not 
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using his face’.69 Not only, then, does Beckett devise a film which almost wholly 
avoids the protagonist’s face, but he casts ‘the Great Stone Face’ to play him.70 
By its very title, Film draws attention to its status as film: to its status as a 
mediation of the external world. It does not set up its image as the truth, as an idol. It 
occupies an elusive middle ground between the silent film and the talkie⎯not only 
because of the verbalisation of ‘sssh!’ (Film, p. 325) in the otherwise complete 
silence, but also because, in this very silence, it eliminates the attendant music of 
silent cinema. Most importantly, on the level of content it depicts a fragmented self, 
which resonates well with the abstraction in other areas of film. Beckett’s schema, as 
I have already discussed, indicates clearly what the fragmentation of E and O is 
supposed to represent. However, as Adorno notes, ‘the potential gap between [the 
intentions of a film] and their actual effect […] is inherent in the medium’ (CI, p. 
181). Beckett himself recognized that the film’s execution was markedly different 
from his original intentions: 
It does I suppose in a sense fail with reference to a purely intellectual schema, 
that is in a sense which only you and I and a few others can discern, but in so 
doing it has acquired a dimension and a validity of its own that are worth far 
more than any merely efficient translation of intention.71 
I am on the whole pleased with the film, having accepted its imperfections, for 
the most part only perceptible to insiders, and discern how in some strange 
way it gains by its deviations from the strict intention and develops something 
better. The last time [I watched Film] I found myself submitting, far from the 
big crazy idea, to a strangeness and beauty of pure image.72  
Beckett acknowledges that while the ‘intellectual schema’ provided by Berkeley 
offered a useful ‘overall direction and motivation’,73 it does not account for the 
‘strangeness and beauty of pure image’ that the film presents. For Gertrud Koch, 
‘fragmentation, the image as “unsensuous likeness”, successfully generates such 
mimesis as would be compatible with the Bilderverbot’.74 Film’s central image of 
fragmentation amidst a setting of abstraction successfully attests to the fragmented 
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world that it cannot help but represent, but can resist idolizing. The horror of the final 
‘investment’ lingers long enough for an audience to question the world that, as Cavell 
insists, is implied in the very limits of the film screen.75 Rather than idolizing society, 
Beckett’s ‘shabby, damaged world of images is the negative imprint of the 
administered world. To this extent Beckett is realistic’ (AT, pp. 39–40). 
 With particular reference to the Obenhausen Group, established in the 1960s 
by young German filmmakers, Adorno suggests that, as contrasted with autonomous 
art, 
vis-à-vis the culture industry⎯whose standard excludes everything but the 
pre-digested and the already integrated, just as the cosmetic trade eliminates 
facial wrinkles⎯works which have not completely mastered their technique, 
conveying as a result something consolingly uncontrolled and accidental, have 
a liberating quality. 
(CI, p. 179) 
Adorno emphasises that, unlike autonomous art, which must be relentlessly modern in 
its use of technique, film can gain a measure of freedom by refusing to keep up with 
the latest technical innovation. He praises the ‘uncontrolled and accidental’ in film, 
which is capable of resisting idolatry in its provisionality and lack of mastery because 
it is a reminder of the imperfections intrinsic to sublunary existence. Read in this 
light, Film can be seen to embody this ‘liberating quality’. A number of critics have 
noted its lack of technical finesse: due to what Jonathan Bignell diplomatically 
describes as ‘[p]roblems of lighting, performance quality and continuity’,76 and 
William Martin more forcefully puts down to Alan Schneider’s ‘failure as a director’ 
and general inexperience,77 a proportion of the initial street scene was unusable and 
had to be cut. I have already noted Beckett’s own acknowledgement that Film ‘fail[s] 
with reference to a purely intellectual schema’ and his concomitant insight that the 
film gained ‘a strangeness and beauty of pure image’ in the process. In this 
connection, Beckett’s understanding of Film as a ‘pure image’ corresponds with 
Adorno’s ideas about the powers of negative images to escape the Bilderverbot. For 
Adorno the ‘pure’ image is a negative or ‘imageless’ image, freed from representing 
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what positively is; it is, therefore, ‘strange’ because it throws into relief the poverties 
of reality, a reality distorted by an objectifying or idolatrous mindset. Indeed, this 
admission is startlingly similar to Adorno’s acknowledgement that, in Hansen’s 
words, ‘a poverty of means, a self-conscious abstinence from perfection, may be more 
likely to achieve artistic standards of its own’.78 This poverty of means, with its 
overall effect of abstraction and fragmentation, unveils the damaged world it refuses 
to idolize and thus acknowledges the potential of technology to liberate, rather than 
oppress. 
 
III 
 
Domestic spaces persistently resurface throughout Beckett’s corpus, from the Krapps’ 
respectable salon in Eleutheria to Mr Knott’s strange and alienating residence in Watt, 
Murphy’s condemned mew to Krapp’s ‘den’ (Krapp’s Last Tape, p. 215). Molloy’s 
narrative opens with his claim that ‘I am in my mother’s room’ (Molloy, p. 3), a 
conceit echoed in Film, where the ‘[s]mall barely furnished room’ (Film, p. 326), 
somewhat obliquely, given that it ‘need not be elucidated’, ‘obviously cannot be O’s 
room. It may be supposed it is his mother’s room, which he has not visited for many 
years and is now to occupy momentarily, to look after the pets, until she comes out of 
hospital’ (p. 332). The unnamed men in Rough for Theatre II infiltrate the domestic 
space of the man whose right to live they are judging, insisting all the while that ‘This 
is not his home and he knows it full well’ (Rough for Theatre II, p. 240). Homes and 
dwelling-places provide a persistent source of fascination for the narrators of the 
Novellas. Even the more abstract locations of Footfalls and Ohio Impromptu seem to 
be domestic. However, despite the centrality of the interior to a number of texts, it is 
not until the television plays that this space is interrogated and explored in all its 
implications. Television is the domestic medium par excellence. While films offer 
public spectacles⎯and Film is no exception, with its obsession with the logic of 
surveillance⎯watching television is an essentially private activity, taking place 
within the comfort and safety of our own domestic sphere; it is unsurprising, then, 
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that television’s actual content centres on the home, with soap operas as the most 
obvious example. Beckett’s studio-filmed television plays, firmly rooted within the 
domestic, demonstrate a significant shift from the approach of the radio plays, which, 
perhaps inspired by the popularity of the portable transistor radio from the mid-1950s 
onwards, take advantage of radio’s capacity to dissolve ‘[c]orporeal boundaries’,79 as 
Anna McMullan puts it: to encompass any space, or, indeed, none at all. 
Of Beckett’s five television plays, then (discounting those later adapted for the 
medium), four are clearly situated within a domestic setting.80 It is in view of this 
stress on the domestic interior that, rather than considering Adorno’s specific writings 
on television⎯‘Prologue to Television’ and ‘Television as Ideology’⎯I turn to his 
1931 Habilitation: Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic. This text is notable for 
its isolation of the nineteenth century bourgeois intérieur as ‘a metaphor for the nexus 
of [Kierkegaard’s] fundamental concepts’ (K, p. 41). Adorno associates Kierkegaard’s 
repeated recourse to the intérieur with his philosophy of inwardness. He therefore 
scrutinises the minute details of Kierkegaard’s various depictions of the intérieur, 
establishing that the supposedly free and safe space into which Kierkegaard retreats 
from the exterior world is not all it appears. Beckett first explores the unforeseen 
threat of domestic space in Eh Joe, in which the scantily furnished bedroom soon 
takes on a menacing ambience when it is infiltrated by a disembodied female voice, 
which taunts Joe with its presence in his sanctum: ‘Thought of everything? … 
Forgotten nothing? … You’re all right now, eh? … No one can see you now. … No 
one can get at you now’ (Eh Joe, p. 362). Ten years later, in Ghost Trio, Beckett 
considerably reworks and complicates this basic premise. Ghost Trio also takes place 
in a domestic space, though less recognisable as such in its sparse greyness. Unlike 
Joe, who has a name, personality and past, the protagonist of Ghost Trio is nameless, 
known only as F[igure], and blends in with his surroundings, becoming object-like. In 
light of Adorno’s Kierkegaard, I suggest that this play exposes the flawed subject-
object relations lurking under the security of the bourgeois intérieur.  
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 For Adorno, the analogous relationships between subject and object, 
individual and society, are integral to the question of freedom, and he considers these 
relationships in his analysis of the bourgeois intérieur. Adorno insists that the ‘rift’ 
between subject and object is necessary for the very possibility of freedom: ‘we must 
conclude that this allegedly happy time before the divorce between freedom and 
unfreedom had taken place can only have been an unfree condition for the individuals 
who were born into it’ (HF, p. 208). Nonetheless, the relation between subject and 
object in modernity is fundamentally damaged because of the subject’s claims to 
sovereignty⎯a sovereignty manifested philosophically in German Idealism and its 
intellectual aftermath, and materially in the subject’s instrumental control over nature. 
The theoretical and material here support and legitimate each other. As Martin 
Schuster explains, ‘the more of the world that subjectivity seeks to identify and bring 
under its domain’⎯whether theoretically, by stripping meaning from the objective 
world, or physically, by exercising technological domination over nature⎯‘the more 
it destroys its own conditions of possibility and thereby itself. Since all objectivity 
merely becomes the mirror of subjectivity, the distinction between the subjective and 
the objective disappears’.81 The subject becomes hardened and impervious to the 
external world⎯growing, in fact, objectlike. The object, reduced to its exchange-
value in that it represents no other source of meaning for humans, loses its very 
corporeality: it is a mere reflection of the subject. As Adorno insists, ‘it is only as 
something definite that the object becomes anything at all. In the attributes that seem 
to be attached to it by the subject alone, the subject’s own objectivity comes to the 
fore’ (AR, p. 143). For Adorno, the subject’s ‘mental imprisonment’ (AR, p. 145) that 
seeks to seclude itself from the outside world finds its concrete manifestation in the 
bourgeois intérieur of the nineteenth century, a space whose ideological structure is 
still traceable in aspects of the domestic today.  
 Beckett’s Ghost Trio presents the spectre-like remains of the bourgeois 
intérieur. These vestiges estrange the viewer from the very domestic space in which 
he sits. The sparse grey room—first envisioned in Beckett’s stage notes and diagram 
and then described by V[oice]—is a far cry from the comforts and luxuries of 
bourgeois interior design. Nonetheless, it is, we are assured by V, a ‘familiar 
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chamber’ (Ghost Trio, p. 408). We have seen it before, in Murphy’s condemned mew; 
in Molloy’s mother’s room; in Malone’s enigmatic dwelling; in the ‘trap’ that is O’s 
room in Film⎯but also in Kierkegaard, Proust, Flaubert and other masterful 
navigators of the intérieur. The furniture in Ghost Trio is stripped back to a minimum, 
consisting of merely a door, window, mirror, pallet, stool and cassette player. More 
importantly, however, none of these objects are recognisable as such. As barely 
distinguishable grey rectangles of similar sizes, they must all be individually 
identified by V. The ‘chamber’ of Ghost Trio may well seem like the ‘cell’ that The 
Times defined it as in its 1977 review of the play.82 However, there is no evidence of 
any external force compelling F to stay, nor is there anything to suggest that he could 
not leave through the door that he himself opens, if he so wished. The chamber’s 
affinity with a prison cell, however, is by no means unimportant, and can in fact be 
entirely reconciled with my claim that the room is an etiolated domestic space. As I 
will go on to discuss, the bourgeois intérieur that Beckett has stripped bare is a 
‘fortress’ (K, p. 43) in which the individual imprisons himself.  
 There is in fact one more barely distinguishable object that must be identified 
by V: the ‘[s]ole sign of life’ (Ghost Trio, p. 409) in the room: F. The very vocabulary 
choice here is indicative of F’s objectlike status: he is only a ‘sign of life’. A reversal 
has taken place, then, in which subject has become objectlike, just as Adorno 
observes. The objects in this chamber, moreover, have become insubstantial and 
ghostly: they have lost their solidity and referentiality, reduced to exchangeable grey 
rectangles. Adorno argues that Kierkegaard’s inward-facing philosophy is ‘objectless’ 
(K, p. 49). He considers in detail the ‘window mirror’ (K, p. 42) described in Diary of 
a Seducer⎯a common nineteenth century artefact that ‘spies’ (K, p. 42) on the 
outside world by reflecting its objects back into the bourgeois intérieur⎯and claims 
that it ‘testifies to objectlessness—it casts into the apartment only the semblance of 
things’ (K, p. 42). The domestic space accentuates the ghostliness of objects in the 
eyes of an all-dominating subject. In Ghost Trio, the generic grey rectangles are 
reminiscent of a television screen⎯one of Beckett’s moments of self-reflexivity. This 
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twentieth-century object is another vestige of the bourgeois intérieur; Benjamin, 
whose work heavily influenced Adorno’s Kierkegaard, saw the intérieur as a space of 
semblance.83 Adorno draws attention to the domestic flaneur who ‘promenades in his 
room; the world only appears to him reflected by pure inwardness’ (K, p. 41). Here 
imagination is the device by which the individual, as Benjamin puts it, ‘brings 
together remote locales and memories of the past’.84 However, as Tom Gunning 
notes, the intérieur also quite literally contained ‘optical devices and philosophical 
toys of all sorts⎯the stereoscope, the kaleidoscope, the magic lantern⎯that seem to 
open the viewer’s gaze onto a different world, but only under the dominion of the 
image and semblance’.85 Prefiguring Beckett’s very description of television as 
‘peephole art’,86 Adorno notes that here the world ‘can appear only as an optical 
illusion, as through a peephole’ (K, p. 44; my italics). Television is the domestic 
optical device of the twentieth century. Just like the nineteenth-century window 
mirror, it produces only the semblance of objectivity. The grey screen-like objects in 
Ghost Trio, then, attest to their ghostly incorporeality. 
While a number of critics assume that V instructs F’s movements,87 I suggest 
that, on the contrary, she predicts them. The key to this conundrum lies in Beckett’s 
earlier work on Proust, namely in his lengthy discussion of habit. Proust himself 
situates habit within the domestic sphere: 
this mere change of lighting was enough to destroy the familiar impression I 
had of my room, thanks to which, save for the torture of going to bed, it had 
become quite endurable. Now I no longer recognized it, and felt uneasy in it, 
as in a room in some hotel or chalet, in a place where I had just arrived by 
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train for the first time. […] The anaesthetic effect of habit being destroyed, I 
would begin to think—and to feel—such melancholy things.88  
The bourgeois intérieur is the physical location within which Marcel exercises those 
habitual actions that, when removed or destroyed, cause such trauma; this association 
of habit and habitation⎯already etymologically linked⎯is inherited by Beckett, 
whose discussion of habit contains a number of references to rooms and domestic 
spaces:  
our current habit of living is as incapable of dealing with the mystery of a 
strange sky or a strange room, with any circumstance unforeseen in her 
curriculum, as Francoise of conceiving or realizing the full horror of a Duval 
omelette.89 
The habit of friendship for the low ceiling is ineffectual, must die in order that 
a habit of friendship for the high ceiling may be born.90  
As Gunning neatly summarises, ‘[t]he encasing forms of the bourgeois interior, its 
protective shell, are literally shaped by habit’.91 
In light of this, the supposed shift in power from V to F identified by a number 
of critics at the moment when F apparently defies V should rather be seen as a 
spontaneous moment in which F breaks his habitual routine⎯enforced only by 
himself⎯prompting a surprised ‘Ah!’ (Ghost Trio, p. 411) from V.92 It would perhaps 
be more accurate to say that F exceeds V’s prediction: he conforms perfectly to her 
statement: ‘Now to pallet’ (p. 410), only moving unbidden or unpredicted after a 
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pause of five seconds. It is at this moment that he turns towards the wall and ‘looks at 
his face in mirror hanging on wall, invisible from A [the camera angle]’ (p. 410). I 
have already gestured towards the window mirror that plays such an important part in 
Adorno’s analysis of the bourgeois intérieur in Kierkegaard’s works. However, the 
mirror does not simply project ghostly traces of objects into the domestic space. It 
also attests to the very ‘objectification and reification of [the subject’s] own mirrored 
self as a dead or estranged object’.93 When F looks into the mirror, he is confronted 
with his reality as ‘an eviscerated state of second nature’.94 This realisation can be 
seen to prompt another, more deliberated, departure from habit, as he first considers 
his position, standing ‘before mirror with bowed head’, then ‘goes to stool’ (p. 411) 
rather than, as predicted by V, ‘to door’ (p. 411). However, this rupture of habit does 
not last, as the eerie music of his cassette player lulls him back into his routine, the 
‘patter driven’ basis of Ghost Trio.95 
If the bourgeois intérieur is characterized by habit, it is the habit of the self-
exiled individual who isolates himself from the outside world in the hope of 
cordoning off ‘a private sphere free from the power of reification’ (K, p. 47). As 
Gunning argues, the intérieur is conceived as ‘a radical separation from the exterior, 
as a home in which the bourgeois can dwell and dream undisturbed by the noise, 
activity, and threats of the street, the space of the masses and of production, a private 
individual divorced from the community’.96 However, Adorno pointedly notes that ‘as 
a private sphere it itself belongs, if only polemically, to the social structure’ (K, p. 
47). Kierkegaard’s turn to the interior, for example, ‘falls to the mercy of his own 
historical situation, that of a rentier in the first half of the nineteenth century’ (K, pp. 
47–8). The rentier, Adorno goes on to explain, is a pre-capitalist vestige, ‘excluded 
from economic production’ (K, p. 48) by virtue of his inheritance. However, 
Kierkegaard is necessarily unable to free himself from the historical circumstances 
that define his very independence from the accumulation of capital. The ‘fortress’ of 
the bourgeois intérieur⎯already containing the semblances of objects reflected from 
the outside world through optical devices⎯proves to be insufficiently hermetic. This 
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inevitable permeability is a recurrent theme in Beckett’s texts: supposedly closed 
systems leak. In this case, the room is infiltrated by a boy, who clearly belongs to the 
outside world, wearing as he does a ‘black oilskin with hood glistening with rain’ 
(Ghost Trio, p. 413). His only action is to enigmatically ‘shake […] head faintly’ (p. 
413), prompting a critical consensus that his role is a reprisal of the boy in Waiting for 
Godot,97 who conveys the message that Godot ‘won’t come this evening but surely 
tomorrow’ (Waiting for Godot, p. 49). According to this reading, the boy is a 
messenger from ‘her’ (Ghost Trio, p. 410): the mysterious woman that, according to 
V, F ‘think[s] he hears’ (p. 410). However, the whole incident is deliberately 
ambiguous and impossible to pin down into such concrete terms. The space of the 
intérieur in Ghost Trio is an insubstantial, spectral arena in which the skewed subject-
object relations of the domestic sphere are revealed in all their starkness.  
For Adorno, Kierkegaard’s value lies in his ability to present the real situation 
of the world, albeit unwittingly. As Brian O’Connor puts it, ‘idealism is true in that it 
reflects the abstraction of subjectivity from a world in which it might be constitutively 
immersed, but false in that its very hypostatization masks its real lack of freedom’.98 
Kierkegaard’s numerous portraits of the bourgeois subject retreating from the world 
into the apparent safety of the intérieur bear witness to the actual state of affairs⎯the 
false life⎯but equally permit its determinate negation. The images by which 
Kierkegaard betrays himself⎯the window mirror, for instance⎯demonstrate the 
impossibility of maintaining a neat subject-object polarity that results in an ‘objectless 
dialectic’.99 In their very insubstantiality, the grey rectangles in Ghost Trio haunt the 
play, their very presence implying that the subject-object relation could be otherwise.  
Adorno’s reading of the intérieur in Kierkegaard’s work is remarkable in its 
very literariness; he deciphers it as a text, drawing attention to those supposedly 
meaningless details that in reality explode the innocence and cohesion of the domestic 
sphere. Adorno explains his particular procedure thus: 
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The objective images, whose interpretation is the aim of his writing, are 
volatilized into such metaphors under the pressure of his subjectivism. They 
are to be called back out of the imagery to their authentic reality. 
(K, p. 13) 
In this sense, he takes Kierkegaard’s words literally. His precedent for this is 
Kierkegaard’s own reliance on ‘theological Christian exegesis’: ‘the pseudonymous 
Training in Christianity is exegetical; and all the pseudonymous writings are 
interwoven with exegetical sections. No meaningful exegesis can be conceived, 
however, that is not obligatorily bound to the vocabulary of the text’ (K, p. 12). 
Adorno binds Kierkegaard to his own terms, and in the same way we can ‘crack […] 
the surface’ of Beckett’s Ghost Trio by observing the minutiae of his chosen theatrical 
space,100 as well as the medium through which it is exhibited. In the television play, 
Beckett strips bare the bourgeois intérieur, leaving it almost unrecognisable. In so 
doing, he exposes the hardened subject and insubstantial object that Adorno argues 
have developed in modernity. He puts on display a space of unfreedom: not a cell in 
which F is physically imprisoned, but rather an alienated and alienating domestic 
intérieur intimately associated with the voyeurism of television. As with Adorno, 
Beckett’s Ghost Trio offers only the stark image of unfreedom, from which we can 
read freedom only negatively.   
The sparse and alienating space of Ghost Trio could not be further away from 
the tone of Beckett’s final television play, Nacht und Träume. This is, in many ways, 
an anomaly within the Beckett corpus. While it accords with the curtailment of 
language and priority of the image⎯visual or musical⎯characteristic of this period 
of writing, it does so in a way that has left many critics uncomfortable. It is 
characterised by a mute⎯the only words being the sung line drawn from Schubert’s 
Nacht und Träume⎯and deep expressiveness that has been characterised as 
‘sacramental’ and even ‘sentimental’.101 It is singularly spiritual, with explicitly 
Christian symbols and allusions to which I will return. Its overwhelming stasis and 
careful positioning of images render it seemingly incongruous with the medium of 
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television: more at home in an art gallery. Even the remnants of plot in the other 
television plays have been discarded in this calm scenario that depicts nothing more 
overt than a dreamer and his dream. 
 For Adorno, the expression that all artworks contain, but which is intensified 
in Nacht und Träume, is their ‘gaze’ (AT, p. 148). In an inversion of the 
commonsensical view in which a subject gazes at the work, Adorno insists that the 
work does not merely resist this gaze, but actively gazes back, expressing itself in a 
way that defuses our subjective appropriation of it. Catastrophe, written the same 
year as Nacht und Träume, offers a simple elucidation of this link between expression 
and the gaze. At the end of the play, after being manipulated and exploited for 
theatrical purposes, Protagonist, or P, ‘raises his head, fixes the audience’ 
(Catastrophe, p. 461), the audience being both within and without the play itself. ‘The 
applause falters, dies’ (p. 461), the stage notes continue. In this moment, as Sandra 
Wynands summarises, ‘Beckett points toward everyone’s complicity with such 
exploitative structures more effectively and memorably than the evanescent nature of 
wordly eloquence would have been able to’.102 The gaze of P is saturated⎯a term I 
shall return to⎯with expression: expression that is enough to stop a voyeuristic and 
indifferent audience in its tracks. Without dwelling further on Catastrophe itself, I 
would just like to draw attention to this instance in which a literal gaze offers what we 
might call aesthetic expression. In Nacht und Träume, it is the work itself that is 
offering such expression, that gazes so deeply at a (quite probably) disengaged 
audience. 
 Adorno argues that ‘[a]rt is expressive when what is objective, subjectively 
mediated, speaks. […] Expression is the suffering countenance of artworks’ (AT, p. 
146). Two moments are intertwined here. First, expression should not be construed as 
the outpourings of the artist as subject. On the contrary, ‘the model of expression is 
that of extra-artistic things and situations’ (AT, p. 146); expression is the way in 
which the world becomes incorporated into the artwork. Second, the mode of 
expression is suffering. This may seem to contradict Adorno’s insistence that art’s 
‘expression is the antithesis of expressing something’ (AT, p. 147), but this is not the 
case; the natural history that is sedimented within the artwork necessarily expresses 
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suffering because that is its mode of being within a radically dominated and 
dominating world. Hence these two moments are inextricable: the suffering that 
constitutes artworks’ expression is ‘the nonsubjective in the subject’ (AT, p. 
148)⎯and, indeed, outside the subject: internal and external nature alike are damaged 
by an instrumental rationality. This does not mean that art offers immediate access to 
nature, because the aesthetic and the natural are inevitably subjectively mediated: 
‘[y]ou cannot bring non-mutilated nature to speak’, Adorno insists, ‘because this non-
mutilated nature, pure nature, that is a nature that has not gone through society’s 
mediation process, does not exist’.103 However, it does mean that art expresses the 
domination of nature and its concomitant suffering through its ‘mimetic language’ 
(AT, p. 147) that is inherently distinct from meaning-making discursive language. 
‘The true language of art is mute’ (AT, p. 147), even in literature, but ‘art seeks to 
make this muteness eloquent’ (AT, p. 101). It does so through an excess of expression: 
‘Nature is beautiful in that it appears to say more than it is. To wrest this more from 
that more’s contingency, to gain control of its semblance, to determine it as 
semblance as well as to negate it as unreal: This is the idea of art’ (AT, p. 104). 
 Adorno explicitly associates the neglect of natural beauty in post-Kantian 
aesthetics with the ‘burgeoning domination of the concept of freedom and human 
dignity’: ‘in accord with this concept nothing in the world is worthy of attention 
except that for which the autonomous subject has itself to thank’ (AT, pp. 81–2). What 
we see here is a paradox whereby ‘freedom for the subject […] is at the same time 
unfreedom: unfreedom for the other’ (AT, p. 82), and in his Lectures on History and 
Freedom, Adorno quite rightly ‘leave[s] open the question of what that freedom 
amounts to’ (HF, pp. 178–9). Moreover, it would be a mistake to conclude that this 
‘other’ is categorically distinct from the subject: as we have seen, denial of nature 
within the subject carries with it the gradual destruction of the subject itself. With this 
in mind, Adorno argues that ‘the feeling of natural beauty is intensified with the 
suffering of the subject thrown back on himself in a mangled and administered world’ 
(AT, p. 83). Art is able to expose the façade of subjective autonomy and express the 
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anguish of the always dominated non-subjective, without whose liberation no true 
freedom is possible. More than this, indeed, expression, ‘by which nature seeps most 
deeply into art, is at the same time what is not literally nature’ (AT, p. 149), in that it 
anticipates a non-dominated nature that has never yet existed. 
 I would argue that Nacht und Träume is a play preoccupied by the expressive 
gaze that takes on a similarly significant role in the contemporaneous Catastrophe. 
This gaze, moreover, is literally figured within the play through the inclusion of an 
icon: Veronica’s cloth. This object appears within A’s dream, in which R ‘wipes 
gently B’s brow’ (Nacht und Träume, p. 465). According to a cameraman working on 
the Süddeutscher Rundfunk production of the play, Beckett explained that ‘the cloth 
made an allusion to the veil that Veronica used to wipe the brow of Jesus on the Way 
of the Cross. The imprint of Christ’s face remains on the cloth’.104 This cloth, as 
Graley Herren notes, ‘was venerated in the early centuries of the common era as an 
icon of divine origin’.105 While the cloth cannot be indisputably identified as such 
within the television play itself, this allegorical reading is in accord with the other 
major symbol within the dream: a ‘cup’ (p. 465) or chalice, which is held to B’s lips 
by R, and is strikingly reminiscent of the Last Supper and the Eucharistic ceremony in 
which Jesus’ gesture is repeated, with the priest holding a chalice of wine to the lips 
of the communicants.106 The significance of Veronica’s cloth⎯or the vera icon, as it 
came to be known⎯lies, of course, in its iconic status, with the icon defined by its 
ability to ‘exert its own gaze’,107 or, as Jean-Luc Marion describes it, to ‘open […] in 
a face that gazes at our gazes in order to summon them to its depth’.108 I would 
suggest that this allusion to the historical Veronica encourages us to see the 
expression of Nacht und Träume in iconic terms.  
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For Marion, the ‘phenomenological conflict’ between the idol and the icon is 
based on their ‘variations in the mode of visibility’.109 The idol is defined as such by 
the gaze of the human: it ‘consists only in the fact that it can be seen, that one cannot 
but see it’.110 It is absolutely visible: it ‘fills the gaze, it saturates it with visibility, 
hence dazzles it’.111 Even while rescuing the idol as an apprehension of the divine by 
arguing that ‘the idolater never dupes, nor finds himself duped: he only 
remains⎯ravished’, Marion admits that the idol ‘represents nothing, but presents a 
certain low-water mark of the divine; it resembles what the human gaze has 
experienced of the divine’.112 He insists that criticising the idol on the grounds that it 
has been wrought by ‘hands that pray’ misses ‘the essential’: that is, the fact that the 
human gaze is what constructs the idol as idol.113 The question that Adorno muses of 
art⎯‘how something spiritual that is made, in philosophical terms something “merely 
posited,” can be true’ (AT, p. 173)⎯is pertinent here, and the icon offers an answer. 
In the icon, the gaze of the human is supplanted by the gaze of the icon itself, which 
‘unbalances human sight in order to engulf it in infinite depth’.114 Unlike the idol, 
which only exists through its visibility, the icon ‘needs only itself. This is why it 
indeed can demand, patiently, that one receive its abandon’.115 In the face of the icon, 
the human gaze is unsettled and undermined; for this reason, Marion insists that the 
icon ‘is not seen, but appears’.116 Sandra Wynands explains how iconography works 
in practice: 
The image resists being seen, as it were, by persistently coming at the viewer 
instead of presenting itself complacently for consumption. Or else, multiple 
perspectives or viewpoints clash in the same image, producing a similarly 
confusing effect for the viewer by giving her no stable position from which to 
survey the scene in its entirety.117 
While Marion insists that ‘the icon is not the concern […] of the artistic domain’, and 
Adorno himself would not be hugely sympathetic to Marion’s religiosity, I would 
suggest that Adorno’s aesthetics and Beckett’s texts are compatible with a conception 
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of iconography, even while it would be foolish to suggest simplistically that Nacht 
und Träume is an icon. Interestingly, Marion’s claim that the icon ‘never reduces the 
invisible to the slackened wave of the visible’,118 is remarkably similar to Adorno’s 
formulation that art’s ‘darkness […] must be interpreted, not replaced by the clarity of 
meaning’ (AT, p. 35), and Beckett’s profession that true art ‘stirs in the murky waters 
of the inexplicable’.119 Certainly, iconography offers an illuminating and textually 
rooted lens through which to view this late television play. 
 Indeed, the medium of Nacht und Träume and its particular use cannot be 
overlooked. Icons are images and as such bear a closer resemblance to visual art than 
literature. Wynands suggests that ‘Beckett’s late stage images […] literally become 
paintings strangely disturbed by minimal motion: action is reduced to a minimum’.120 
While television necessarily ‘moves along a temporal axis’, Nacht und Träume, like 
the ‘theatrical image[s]’ Wynands discusses, is minimal in its movement and is thus 
‘able to give itself all at once’.121 Moreover, the play has prompted comparisons with 
paintings, primarily religious. While Esslin suggests broadly that ‘this is a kind of 
painting, the creation of an “emblem” to be deciphered by the viewer, except that the 
image moves and has sound’,122 and Enoch Brater characterises the play as almost ‘a 
modernist version of some medieval religious painting’,123 more specific connections 
have been made to Caravaggio, Rembrandt and ‘a schematised, seventeenth-century 
Dutch painting’.124 Beyond these visual art resonances, however, television as a 
medium resembles the depthlessness of icons, in which ‘there is no simulated third 
dimension’:125  
on a television screen, darkness (and in Beckett’s dramas, absolute blackness) 
is flat. If a director wishes to create a sense of recession in a dark television 
image, he or she will provide visual clues as to the image’s depth. […]  In the 
                                                
118 God Without Being, p. 17. 
119 Quoted in Andrea Oppo, Philosophical Aesthetics and Samuel Beckett (Oxford and Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2008), p. 16. 
120 Wynands, p. 36. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Esslin, p. 47. 
123 ‘Toward a Poetics of Television Technology: Beckett’s Nacht und Träume and Quad’, Modern 
Drama, 28 (1985), 48–54 (p. 49) 
124 See, respectively, Kalb, Beckett in Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
pp. 98–100; Herren, p. 183; Knowlson, p. 682. See also Hans H. Hiebel, ‘Beckett’s Television 
Plays and Kafka’s Late Stories’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 6 (1997), 313–28 (p. 313). 
125 Wynands, p. 33. 
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TV plays, darkness is a two dimensional surface, forming an impenetrable 
backdrop to the action; but it is a background that carries none of the 
connotations of darkness on stage⎯of depth, of limitlessness, and of 
infinitude.126 
In reference to the televised version of What Where, with its two-dimensional 
disembodied faces, David Pattie notes that ‘the window through which I watched the 
play had itself begun, uncannily, to shift position’.127 The darkness from which the 
images emerge in Nacht und Träume similarly gives the viewer ‘no stable position 
from which to survey the scene’, instead confronting us with an enigmatic gaze. 
Beckett’s use of television rather than film for his allusion to the veronica is striking. 
The public sphere of film stars and worshipping fans; the penetrative gaze of the 
camera and the eye; the street and the external world: these elements of film locate it 
within the sphere of idolatry, in which ‘the visible dazzles the gaze’.128 The icon, on 
the other hand, is manifested through the domestic and personal medium of television. 
 The iconographic logic of Nacht und Träume is unable to reveal divinity in the 
traditional sense because Beckett’s world is overwhelmingly godless. However, its 
depthless gaze returns us to Adorno’s claim that art’s expression is the non-subjective 
suffering that overflows the work. This ‘more’ is characterised by Marion as 
‘saturation’:  
They are saturated phenomena in that constitution encounters there an 
intuitive givenness that cannot be granted a univocal sense in return. It must 
be allowed, then, to overflow with many meanings, or an infinity of meanings, 
each equally legitimate and rigorous, without managing either to unify them or 
to organize them.129 
Wynands argues that ‘[t]he saturated phenomenon need not be the divine. It can be 
anything that resists being taken in its entirety from a single vantage point because it 
gives itself superabundantly’.130 Adorno’s conception of the ‘primacy of the object’ 
(AT, p. 191) converges with Marion’s saturated phenomenon insofar as it registers an 
excess beyond subjectivity that is nonetheless mediated by the subject. While for 
                                                
126 David Pattie, ‘Coming Out of the Dark: Beckett’s TV Plays’, Journal of Beckett Studies, 18 (2009), 
123–35 (p. 126). 
127 Ibid., p. 125. 
128 God Without Being, p. 12. 
129 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. by Robyn Horner and Vincent 
Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), p. 112. 
130 Wynands, p. 15 
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Adorno all objects can be characterised in this way, art, through its expression, brings 
the appearance of ‘more than what is literally there’ (AT, p. 92) to the level of 
consciousness. The experience of being flooded with expression, powerless in the 
face of its iconic gaze, resonates with Adorno’s re-interpretation of the sublime: 
‘[r]ather than that, as Kant thought, spirit in the face of nature becomes aware of its 
own superiority, it becomes aware of its own natural essence. […] Freedom awakens 
in the consciousness of its affinity with nature’ (AT, p. 356). Just as in Catastrophe P 
overtly and defiantly fixes his gaze upon the audience in a non-discursive expression 
of the domination inflicted upon him, so Nacht und Träume more subtly and less 
dramatically sets its mute and enigmatic gaze upon the viewer in a radically novel use 
of television. What Camilla Flodin describes as ‘the flash-like awareness of what 
freedom would be like’131 is as transitory and indeterminable as A’s longing for the 
dreams in which he is physically transported⎯dreams that he is aware, from his use 
of the subjunctive, may not return: ‘Holde Träume, kehret wieder!’ (‘Fair dreams, 
may you return again’; my translation). 
 
This chapter has sought to sidestep the uninteresting impasse of Adorno’s Culture 
Industry writings in pursuit of a more provocative avenue of inquiry: the role of 
technology as a troubling mediator between humanity and the natural world. Far from 
merely an aesthetic concern, the use of technology in art can offer a model for a 
different relation between subject and nature. This, as Adorno continually emphasises, 
would be the precondition for freedom, as the subject’s instrumental domination of 
nature inevitably rebounds upon its author, damaging both in the process. What 
Adorno has in mind is far greater than localised attempts to deal with the world in a 
less aggressive way; he is calling for a complete overhaul of our dominant ways of 
conceiving the relationship between ourselves and the world beyond the subject. This, 
indeed, is what he has in mind in the Preface to the otherwise bleak Dialectic of 
Enlightenment: ‘The critique of enlightenment given […] is intended to prepare a 
positive concept of enlightenment which liberates it from its entanglement in blind 
domination’ (DE, p. xviii). It is in this sense that Beckett’s media plays are 
                                                
131 Flodin, p. 6. 
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invaluable: in radically reenvisioning the scope of technology and its role beyond the 
instrumental control of nature.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
METAPHYSICS 
 
 
The worst is not  
So long as we can say ‘This is the worst’. 
⎯ King Lear1 
It seems somewhat anachronistic to speak of metaphysics in the twenty-first century, 
not least in connection with Adorno, who insists on the impossibility of holding that, 
on the one hand, ‘the immutable is truth’ and, on the other, that ‘the mobile, transitory 
is appearance’ (ND, p. 361), and Beckett, whose work has been frequently placed in a 
post-structuralist context as marking ‘a transition that manifests itself by the 
increasing capacity to delimit, criticize and undermine metaphysical conceptions’.2 
Adorno himself was acutely aware of the charge of anachronism when he delivered a 
lecture series on metaphysics in 1965:3 he notes almost immediately that ‘[t]oday 
metaphysics is used in almost the entire non-German speaking world as a term of 
abuse, a synonym for idle speculation, mere nonsense and heaven knows what other 
intellectual vices’ (MCP, p. 1). While a good proportion of these lectures is dedicated 
to an exploration of Aristotle’s metaphysics, it would be a mistake to attribute 
Adorno’s interest in the subject to a kind of historical curiosity. ‘Athens and 
Auschwitz’ (MCP, p. 96) form a provocative constellation as Adorno considers with 
                                                
1 William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. by R. A. Foakes (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1997; repr. 
2005), p. 306 [IV. 1. 31–2]. 
2 Steven Miskinis, ‘Enduring Recurrence: Samuel Becket’s Nihilistic Poetics’, ELH, 63 (1996), 1047–
67 (1047). See also Richard Begam, Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1996); Eric Migernier, Beckett and French Theory: The Narrative of 
Transgression (New York: Peter Lang, 2006); and Sarah Gendron, Repetition, Difference, and 
Knowledge in the Work of Samuel Beckett, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2008). 
3 This was delivered ‘in conjunction with his own writings’: namely, Negative Dialectics, published 
only a year later in 1966. While the Lectures and the third model of Negative Dialectics, 
‘Meditations on Metaphysics’, follow a similar trajectory, they are by no means identical and are, 
I suggest, best used in conjunction with each other. Rolf Tiedemann, ‘Editor’s Afterword’, in 
Theodor W. Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by 
Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 191–8 (p. 191). 
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great seriousness the question of the relevance⎯and, indeed, possibility⎯of 
metaphysics today. 
Adorno is self-consciously writing about ‘metaphysics at the time of its fall’ 
(ND, p. 408). What he wishes to salvage⎯adhering to his own claim that metaphysics 
‘is always […] an attempt to rescue something which the philosopher’s genius feels to 
be fading and vanishing’ (MCP, p. 19)⎯is the speculative quality of metaphysics: its 
drive to transcend the given. This shifts the focus from the immutable metaphysical 
ideas that Adorno, following Nietzsche, decries as ideological, to the liberating 
process of thought itself. If Adorno suggests that ‘true thoughts are those alone which 
do not understand themselves’ (MM, p. 192), then this is because thought that does 
not ‘transcend […] itself’ (ND, p. 392) is not really thought at all, but the thoughtless 
duplication of the existing. Such duplication is inherently unfree: 
This speculative surplus that goes beyond whatever is the case, beyond mere 
existence, is the element of freedom in thought, and because it is, because it 
alone does stand for freedom, because it represents the tiny quantum of 
freedom we possess, it also represents the happiness of thought. It is the 
element of freedom because it is the point at which the expressive need of the 
subject breaks through the conventional and canalized ideas in which he 
moves and asserts himself.  
(LND, p. 108) 
This thread between speculation, freedom and happiness is paramount to Adorno’s 
reconception of metaphysics. Speculation, Adorno argues, ‘amounts to the idea that 
one should keep on thinking […] in a motivated, consistent way, going beyond the 
point where one’s thinking is backed up by facts’ (LND, p. 95). This does not, 
however, mean that speculation disappears into the realm of make-believe, or that the 
freedom it represents is illusory, rather that the positivistic distinction between what 
can and cannot be objectively and scientifically known is an unhelpful basis for 
thought.  
Nonetheless, the positivist argument here raises a serious dilemma. The 
metaphysical problem par excellence is that ‘thought, which in its conditionality is 
supposed to be sufficient to have knowledge only of the conditional, presumes to be 
the mouthpiece, or even the origin, of the unconditional’ (MCP, p. 7). This is 
essentially the problem of how the empirical world and the transcendent concepts or 
ideas are mediated: ‘metaphysics’, Adorno insists, ‘cannot be a deductive context of 
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judgments about things in being, and neither can it be conceived after the model of an 
absolute otherness terribly defying thought’ (ND, p. 407). The immanent deduction of 
the metaphysical from the existent would nullify it altogether. However, metaphysics 
as ‘an absolute otherness’ leaves us incapable of perceiving it at all. Adorno’s 
solution is to re-think the concept of transcendence: he argues, as Brian O’Connor 
explains, that ‘we can think against the given without reaching for a realm lying 
outside the historical-material sphere’.4 He insists that the experience of 
transcendence ‘was never located so far beyond the temporal as the academic use of 
the word metaphysics suggests’ (ND, p. 372). The key term here becomes experience: 
‘Is it still possible to have a metaphysical experience [metaphysische Erfahrung]?’5 
(ND, p. 372), Adorno asks, or has experience atrophied to the extent that it is unable 
to register anything beyond the façade? A logically consistent materialism cannot 
tolerate the speculative possibility of a distinction between appearance and essence: 
‘No longer trusting the infinity of its animating essence, it goes against that essence to 
reinforce its own finiteness, to affix itself to the finite’ (ND, p. 383). Duly affixed to 
the finite, the subject rejects even the possibility of that which transcends the existent.  
It is within this context that we can see the significance of Beckett’s late prose, 
which, no more than the rest of his corpus, certainly cannot be affiliated with 
metaphysics in the traditional sense. H. Porter Abbott is uncommon in overtly 
attributing a metaphysical charge to Beckett’s works: 
From beginning to end, Beckett’s art is one long protest. It is written out of a 
horror of human wretchedness and a yearning that this wretchedness be 
lessened. But the overriding sense in Beckett is not that there is something 
wrong with society or with the means of production or with the distribution of 
goods and privileges or with the hegemony of social control, but that there is 
                                                
4 Adorno (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 101. 
5 Martin Jay offers a neat distinction between the ‘very different notions of experience’ designated by 
the words Erlebnis and Erfahrung: ‘Erlebnis contains within it the root for life (Leben) and is 
sometimes translated as “lived experience”. Although erleben is a transitive verb and implies an 
experience of something, Erlebnis is often taken to imply a primitive unity prior to any 
differentation or objectification. […] Erlebnis generally connotes a more immediate, pre-
reflective, and personal variant of experience than Erfahrung. The latter […] activates a link 
between memory and experience’. Songs of Experience: Modern American and European 
Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), p. 11. 
Adorno betrays a characteristic suspicion of the claims of Erlebnis to immediacy, designating 
Erfahrung as ‘experience proper’. Quoted in Jay, p. 340. 
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something massively wrong with the entire arrangement, from birth to death. 
Beckett’s social protest is always shadowed by his metaphysical bafflement.6 
What I would suggest is that the socio-political concerns that Abbott raises are not so 
very far apart from the ‘metaphysical bafflement’ he attributes to Beckett. If, 
following Adorno, we consider that ‘actual events’⎯and by this he means the 
expansion of identity-thinking that culminated in Auschwitz⎯‘have shattered the 
basis on which speculative metaphysical thought could be reconciled with experience’ 
(ND, p. 362), then the ‘horror of human wretchedness’ is at once political and 
metaphysical. This is not to say, however, that Adorno articulates some kind of 
politics of metaphysics: as I shall explore, the glimmers of metaphysical experience 
that do withstand what Adorno describes as ‘the inescapably dense web of 
immanence’ (ND, p. 369) could never be the basis for a normative politics. Beckett’s 
metaphysics, like Adorno’s, is occasional and fragile: it manifests itself in ephemeral 
moments that transcend his otherwise relentlessly dark portrayal of ‘human 
wretchedness’.   
 From the 1960s to his death in 1989, Beckett’s prose is characterised by an 
impulse towards the minimal and enclosed. As S. E. Gontarski suggests, ‘[t]hese 
“closed space” tales not infrequently resulted in intractable creative difficulties, […] 
and that stuttering creative process of experiment and impasse, breakthrough and 
breakdown, was folded into the narratives themselves’.7 These are works that, above 
all perhaps, are in the process of doing or accomplishing something; as such, they are 
provisional and even fragmentary: not unfinished per se, but unfinishable. This is 
most obviously apparent in All Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine, which 
are both, I will argue, driven by the paradoxical aim of imagining a world of pure 
immanence⎯paradoxical, of course, because the imagination that is necessary for 
Beckett’s literary creations would necessarily be nullified within the worlds they 
envision.8 What we witness in these two texts is the gradual curtailment of 
                                                
6 Beckett Writing Beckett: The Author in the Autograph (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1996), p. 147. 
7 ‘Introduction’, in Nohow On: Company, Ill Seen Ill Said, Worstward Ho (New York: Grove Press, 
1980), pp. vii–xxviii (p. ix). 
8 A similar paradox occurs in Malone Dies when Malone writes: ‘In vain I grope, I cannot find my 
exercise-book’ (p. 34) and then later notes: ‘What a misfortune, the pencil must have slipped 
from my fingers, for I have only just succeeded in recovering it after fortyeight hours (see above) 
of intermittent efforts’ (p. 49).  
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metaphysics, as understood in this Adornian context as the ‘joy of elevation, the joy 
of rising beyond what merely is’ (MCP, p. 114). This curtailment and the lack of 
freedom it signifies is figured by the narrator through the physical confinement of a 
body or bodies within a variously sized and shaped structure. In Company, the 
relentless constancy of these earlier works is punctuated by displaced and sourceless 
memories or imaginings. Concealed among these attempts to transcend the dark 
present are glimmers of transcendence: moments of metaphysical experience that 
offer a fleeting and unverifiable promise of happiness that, as Martin Schuster 
suggests, is absolutely ‘necessary to freedom’.9  
 
I 
 
Andrew Gibson, following the path of Alain Badiou, argues that one moment in The 
Lost Ones ‘crystallizes the paradoxical insistence repeatedly evident in Beckett’s later 
work’.10 This moment is described as follows: 
Very rarely, it may happen that one of the vanquished, those who appear 
definitively to have abandoned the search, re-enters the arena. A searcher may 
retire from the search, may definitively give up on his desire, and yet all the 
possibilities continue to exist; which means that the abnegation of desire may 
after all turn out to be miraculously reversible. This encapsulates Beckett’s 
conception of liberty. […] Badiou puts the point simply: it is a cardinal 
Beckettian principle that there is no eternal damnation. The world of The Lost 
Ones is purgatorial rather than infernal.11 
This passage alludes to two significant and well-known phrases of Beckett’s: first, 
what Beckett describes as ‘a wonderful sentence in Augustine’⎯‘Do not despair; one 
of the thieves was saved. Do not presume; one of the thieves was damned’12⎯and, 
                                                
9 Autonomy After Auschwitz: Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity (London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2014), p. 109. 
10 Beckett and Badiou: The Pathos of Intermittency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; repr. 
2008), p. 213. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Quoted in Harold Hobson, ‘Samuel Beckett: Dramatist of the Year’, International Theatre Annual, 1 
(1956), 153–5 (p. 153). This makes its most well-known appearance in Waiting for Godot, where 
Vladimir tells ‘the story’ of ‘Two thieves, crucified at the same time as our saviour. […] One is 
supposed to have been saved and the other …. [He searches for the contrary of saved] … 
damned’ (p. 14). 
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second, Beckett’s claim in ‘Dante … Bruno . Vico .. Joyce’ that, unlike Dante’s 
Purgatory, ‘Mr Joyce’s is spherical and excludes culmination’.13 Augustine’s maxim, 
of course, resonates strongly throughout Beckett’s corpus in his syntax of weakness 
that undermines any movement towards absolute affirmation or absolute negation. 
The spherical condition of Joyce’s Purgatory could likewise be attributed to Beckett’s 
own texts. Gibson astutely suggests that this preservation of possibility⎯‘Do not 
despair’⎯is a distinct feature of the late works, even as there is nothing in their 
resolutely spherical⎯or, indeed, cylindrical⎯shape to guarantee an escape from their 
purgatorial conditions.14  
 It is my claim that this tension reaches its zenith in two short works that 
neither Gibson nor Badiou considers, All Strange Away and Imagination Dead 
Imagine, though in a somewhat different way to that which Gibson identifies in The 
Lost Ones. In these texts, Beckett, I suggest, stages the inherently paradoxical attempt 
to negate the very possibility of possibility in positing the existence of a sphere of 
absolute immanence. Adorno understands immanence as the dialectical opposite to 
transcendence. A perspective that is utterly prescribed by its immediate context would 
take place in a ‘closed complex of immanence’ (P, p. 265). Such an existence fills 
Adorno with horror because it sucks all possibility out of life: without transcendence, 
there is no past, no future, and no other. Immanence is manifested in the eternal 
sameness that Adorno sees encroaching on modern life⎯the result of reason’s refusal 
to admit the existence of anything outside of itself as it consumes and neutralises 
anything remotely different: the ‘belly turned mind’ (ND, p. 23). The self-conscious 
irony of Beckett’s late prose here lies in his attempt to posit absolute immanence 
within an imaginative act: to imagine the death of imagination. In a multi-layered 
narrative, Beckett fictionalises (and thus imagines) a narrator who in turn 
imagines⎯and instructs the reader to do likewise⎯the death of imagination. 
Possibility, then, is preserved in the imaginative origins of the task itself and, indeed, 
in the text’s status as art. Nonetheless, Beckett plumbs the depths of absolute 
immanence and, in doing so, exposes its horror.  
                                                
13 ‘Dante… Bruno. Vico.. Joyce’, in Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. 
by Ruby Cohn (London: John Calder, 1983; repr. 2001), pp. 19–34 (p. 33). 
14 Gibson, p. 214. 
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 Such horror can only be fully understood in relation to its post-metaphysical 
context, in which transcendence has been systematically eroded. For Adorno, the 
zealous process of disenchantment propagated by a not-yet enlightened enough 
enlightenment has come so far that it is practically impossible to posit anything 
outside of the existent.15 It is important to emphasise that this claim does not betray a 
conservative nostalgia for fixed and unchanging metaphysical values. Adorno is 
adamant that traditional metaphysics cannot be sustained in a post-Auschwitz world: 
as I discussed in Chapter 3, he dismisses any affirmative conception of the world as a 
form of betrayal to the victims of history. However, in having ‘lost sight of the 
moment of transcendence’,16 we have all but sacrificed the possibility of changing 
existing conditions or even the freedom to imagine an alternative. In this context, the 
emphasis on imagination in Beckett’s ‘closed space’ stories takes on a deep 
significance. 
 It is primarily to Kant that Adorno turns in his exploration of the philosophical 
justification of immanence. This is partly, but not principally, because of the radical 
significance of Kant’s thought for his successors⎯‘What has gone before and what 
will come after are both largely to be understood in terms of what occurs here’17⎯but 
also, as Bernstein notes, because of the contradictions implicit in Kant’s identification 
of a ‘block’ (KCPR, p. 65) or barrier limiting knowledge, beyond which we cannot 
hope to direct our thoughts without being entangled in contradiction: ‘it both 
legislates radical immanence as the condition for possible knowledge and 
acknowledges the inevitability and necessity of thinking that transcends the bounds of 
                                                
15 In this, as Bernstein notes, Adorno is following Weber’s conception of ‘rationalization’, according to 
which ‘there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather […] one can, in 
principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted’. Quoted in 
J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p. 7. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer insist that the ‘critique of 
enlightenment given […] is intended to prepare a positive concept of enlightenment which 
liberates it from its entanglement in blind domination’ (p. xviii). 
16 J. M. Bernstein, ‘Why Rescue Semblance? Metaphysical Experience and the Possibility of Ethics’, in 
The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, ed. by Tom Huhn and 
Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 177–212 (p. 187). 
17 A. W. Moore, ‘Kant: The Possibility, Scope, and Limits of Metaphysics’, in The Evolution of 
Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
pp. 107–42 (p. 107). 
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experience’.18 This contradiction, indeed, constitutes the very opening of the Critique 
of Pure Reason:  
Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is 
burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as 
problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since 
they transcend every capacity of human reason. 
(CPR Avii) 
I have repeatedly emphasised Adorno’s Hegelian insistence on teasing out the 
contradictions inherent in philosophical thought, along with his resolutely un-
Hegelian refusal to sublate such contradictions in a higher unity. His work on Kant 
and metaphysics is no exception. Characteristically, Adorno neither wholly condemns 
nor celebrates the ‘Kantian block’ (KCPR, p. 75), instead emphasising, on the one 
hand, its ‘terroristic’ element in advocating ‘a ban on all thinking’, and, on the other, 
its preservation of non-identity in maintaining a sphere that is beyond the ravenous 
rage of the ‘belly turned mind’ (ND, p. 23). Ultimately, for Adorno, it is this tension 
in Kant’s philosophy that preserves its significance for the question of metaphysics. In 
contradistinction, post-Kantian Idealism, which ‘proclaimed the mind as the absolute’ 
(ND, p. 276) and thereby abolished the Kantian block altogether, is ultimately one 
giant tautology: 
knowledge directed at natura naturata is no knowledge at all; for such 
knowledge possesses nothing in its object but the knowing subject itself. In 
consequence, by resigning itself heroically to this situation, it simultaneously 
misses out on the very thing that defines the concept of knowledge: that it fails 
to recognize whatever is not at one with cognition.  
(LND, p. 82) 
Kant may set limits to the possibility of knowledge, may deny reason’s right to ‘stray 
into intelligible worlds’ (quoted in KCPR, p. 6), but he crucially ‘leaves open the 
possibility of reinstating or salvaging metaphysics’ (KCPR, p. 47). 
 It is this tension between critique and rescue that Adorno traces back to 
Aristotle and suggests is definitive of the metaphysical project itself. As something 
‘fundamentally modern⎯if you do not restrict the concept of modernity to our world 
but extend it to include Greek history’ (MPC, p. 19), metaphysics participates in the 
enlightenment project of demythologisation, but it is equally driven to salvage those 
                                                
18 ‘Why Rescue Semblance’, p. 187. 
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very concepts it critiques. The Kantian rescuing urge is manifested in the intelligible 
sphere, and its motivation, Adorno insists, ‘lies far deeper than just in the pious wish 
to have […] some of the traditional ideas in hand’ (ND, p. 385). Nonetheless, this 
‘Protestant apologetics’ (ND, p. 385) is certainly part of the story for Adorno, who 
reads the Kantian block as an expression of ‘bourgeois resignation’ (KCPR, p. 6): an 
unreflective and bumbling contentment to ‘set up house in the finite world and 
explore it in every direction’ (KCPR, p. 6). The tension in Kant’s thought is between 
this very resignation, which manifests itself in the block, and its preservation of that 
which lies beyond the block, even if this is only in indeterminate form, offering only 
the ultimately unsatisfactory ‘consolation […] of the kind we generally feel at 
funerals’ (KCPR, p. 49). The thing-in-itself is one such example of Kantian 
speculation. As O’Connor argues, for Adorno, the thing-in-itself is ‘nonidentical in 
that it is never directly given, yet it somehow stands behind the things as they appear, 
an ever present image of what cannot be reduced to the intentions or concepts of the 
subject’.19 While Adorno acknowledges that ‘Kantian philosophy is one that enshrines 
the validity of the non-identical’ (KCPR, p. 67), he registers frustration at the 
inaccessibility of non-identity: 
since the process of cognition and its content are radically separated from this 
absolutely unknowable things-in-themselves [sic] by […] a rupture, in the 
Platonic sense, the idea of a thing-in-itself adds nothing to my actual 
knowledge. This means that what I recognize as an object is just that, an 
object in the sense that we have discussed at length; it is not a thing-in-itself, 
and always remains something constituted by a subject.  
(KCPR, p. 129) 
The Kantian block, by limiting knowledge to the sphere of reason, risks 
circumscribing thought entirely, rendering it an ‘absolute tautology’ (MM, p. 123): the 
narcissism of thought only ever knowing itself. Nevertheless, Kant’s acute awareness 
of ‘the heterogeneous, the block, the limit’ (KCPR, p. 18) demonstrates ‘a mode of 
thought that is not satisfied by reducing everything that exists to itself’ (KCPR, p. 
66)⎯a mode of thought not shared by his Idealist successors. Adorno describes this 
awareness as ‘a kind of metaphysical mourning, a kind of memory of what is best, of 
something that we must not forget, but that we are nevertheless compelled to forget’ 
(KCPR, p. 176).  
                                                
19 O’Connor, p. 102. 
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As Irit Degani-Raz argues, ‘[i]t is commonly accepted that Beckett explores in 
his works various kinds of limits, physical as well as mental’.20 It is hardly surprising, 
then, that the Kantian block takes on a particular significance when considered in 
relation to Beckett’s works. In All Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine, 
Beckett explores the very situation that forms the basis of Kant’s philosophy: the 
limitation of thought to what we can objectively know, with its consequent rejection 
of ‘all strange’ (p. 173). Moreover, just as Kant’s philosophy is haunted by the non-
identical that is always beyond bounds, these two ‘closed space’ works manifest a 
struggle⎯necessarily and ironically unsuccessful⎯to maintain a sphere of total 
immanence, while growing close enough to the death of imagination to provoke a 
sense of abhorrence. 
 In his preliminary injunction⎯‘Imagination Dead Imagine’⎯the narrator of 
All Strange Away asks the reader to imagine a situation of pure immanence, in which 
speculation has no place. He directs our thoughts to ‘A place, then someone in it, that 
again’ (All Strange Away, p. 169). The repetition here works on both the level of 
semantics, as the statement echoes the preceding ‘A place, that again’ (p. 169), and 
thematics, as the narrator self-reflexively registers the derivative nature of his words 
in relation to Beckett’s corpus as a whole. More significantly, however, this repetition 
reflects the very ‘principle of immanence’ (DE, p. 8) that the narrator is attempting to 
imagine:  
The arid wisdom which acknowledges nothing new under the sun, because all 
the pieces in the meaningless game have been played out, all the great 
thoughts have been thought, all possible discoveries can be construed in 
advance, and human beings are defined by self-preservation through 
adaptation⎯this barren wisdom merely reproduces the fantastic doctrine it 
rejects: the sanction of fate which, through retribution, incessantly reinstates 
what always was. 
(DE, p. 8) 
                                                
20 ‘Cartesian Fingerprints in Beckett’s Imagination Dead Imagine’, Journal of Beckett Studies, 21 
(2012), 223–43 (p. 223). Degani-Raz’s reading of Imagination Dead Imagine works from a very 
different premise to my own. She posits that the limit this text attempts to cross is the problem of 
imagining the death of imagination. In this way, she takes as read the Kantian claim that we 
cannot overstep the bounds of secure knowledge (though Wittgenstein provides her immediate 
frame of reference: ‘in order to be able to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides 
of the limits of the unthinkable (i.e. we should have to think what cannot be thought)’ (p. 225)). 
My basis is rather the opposite: the death of imagination, or, at least, its severe dwindling, is 
already our socio-political predicament, a predicament that Beckett demonstrates an awareness of 
in these two texts.  
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Pure immanence presupposes repetition by ruling out the possibility of anything new. 
With the death of future possibility comes the death of memory. The allusion to the 
war⎯‘Out of the door and down the road in the old hat and coat like after the war’ (p. 
169)⎯must be stifled, not, as Daniel Gribben suggests, in an act of self-censorship 
that encrypts the ‘real story’ that the narrator ‘does not want to […] re-enact’,21 but, 
rather, because memory offers a route out of the immanence that the narrator is 
attempting to imagine.  
 What follows is 13 pages (Imagination Dead Imagine is considerably more 
condensed) of a continually self-revising description of a closed space containing a 
figure. The narrator changes, among other things, the size of the space from ‘Five foot 
square, six high’ (All Strange Away, p. 169) to ‘three foot square, five high’ (p. 170) 
(‘Tighten it round him’ (p. 170)), to a ‘perfect cube’ of ‘three foot every way’ (p. 
173), to a ‘rotunda three foot diameter eighteen inches high supporting a dome semi-
circular in section’ (p. 176) and, finally, to a ‘rotunda two foot diameter and two from 
ground to verge’ (p. 177). These gradually reducing dimensions serve to further 
restrict the figure, the physical containment a clear metaphor for the subtraction of 
possibility as the death of imagination draws closer. Another significant revision is 
the gender of the figure, who starts as an unnamed man and is arbitrarily changed into 
a woman, Emma, ‘since sex not seen so far’ (p. 172). There is a strong implication 
that the original man is named Emmo, since at the sex-change the images of Emma on 
the walls of the structure change to those of Emmo. The similarity between the two 
names and their closeness to palindromes contribute to the text’s impulse towards 
repetition as an elimination of all difference.  
Graham Fraser suggests that the ‘permutative impulse’ in All Strange Away 
functions as part of the narrator’s ‘pornographic imagination’.22 Referring to 
Coleridge’s distinction between imagination and fancy, which subordinates the 
latter’s use of ‘fixities and definites’ to the former’s poetic recreation of the given,23 
Fraser argues that ‘[t]he play of Fancy in All Strange Away is expressed in the 
                                                
21 ‘Samuel Beckett: Number 465. Censorship of the Self and Imagination in Beckett’s Work After 
World War II’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 13 (2003), 215–27 (p. 216). 
22 ‘The Pornographic Imagination in All Strange Away’, Modern Fiction Studies, 41 (1995), 515–30 (p. 
516; p. 515). 
23 Quoted in Ibid., p. 516. 
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narrator’s obsessive manipulation of his material’.24 While there are pornographic 
images of Emma on the wall⎯‘First face alone, lovely beyond words, leave it at that, 
then deasil breasts alone, then thighs and cunt alone, then arse and hole alone’ (All 
Strange Away, p. 171)25⎯as well as ‘the presence of naked, sweating bodies’, Fraser 
emphasises that the narrator’s ‘real interest remains the confining space’.26 He also 
notes the fragmented nature of the images on the wall and the voyeurism of both the 
narrator and Emmo. I agree that there is a distinctly pornographic quality to All 
Strange Away. However, I suggest that this is constitutive of the text’s broader 
paradoxical project of imagining absolute immanence.  
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer emphasise the deep 
affinities between Sade⎯the ‘quintessential example’ of pornography according to 
Fraser27⎯and the instrumental reason that characterises enlightenment philosophy 
and bourgeois society. More specifically, they suggest that Sade exposes the 
intellectual proximity between his pornographic depictions of ‘perverted sexuality’ 
(DE, p. 85) and enlightenment’s drive towards systematic unity and disenchantment: 
he ‘pushes the scientific principle to annihilating extremes’ (DE, p. 74). The ‘sexually 
objectified and abstracted’ fragments of bodies that provide the material for 
pornography can be seen as the logical extension of a social system that ‘treats human 
beings as things’ (DE, p. 67). Juliette’s sexual permutations, similarly, are traceable to 
the ‘repeatable, replaceable process’ (DE, p. 65) of enlightenment. More pertinently, 
Juliette demonstrates the same drive towards demythologisation that is definitive of 
                                                
24 Fraser, p. 517. 
25 The unusual word ‘deasil’, with its Gaelic etymology, refers to the clockwise movement of the 
narrator’s gaze and also appears in How It Is (p. 111), in which context Daniela Caselli notes that 
‘the Purgatorial direction of salvation […] can be read as one of the overdetermined meanings 
with which the text plays’. Beckett’s Dantes: Intertextuality in the Fiction and Criticism 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 168. This purgatorial motion 
accords with my claim that All Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine are characterised by 
their provisionality; they quite literally work through a dilemma rather than presenting it as 
solved. Within this context, damnation and salvation are equally distinct possibilities.   
26 Fraser, p. 515; p. 518. This is an interesting reading that does not rely on the figures themselves as 
the basis of the pornographic imagination. However, Fraser’s insistence that the ‘point of the 
permutation is not to exhaust the possibilities but to repeat them endlessly’ (p. 518) fails to 
acknowledge the very aim of the narrative: to imagine the death of imagination itself. For this 
reason, the permutations cannot be ends in and of themselves.  
27 Ibid., p. 516. Beckett was also profoundly interested in Sade’s work and even agreed to translate Les 
120 Journées de Sodome in March 1938, despite concerns about ‘the practical effect on my own 
future freedom of literary action in England & USA’. He later withdrew from this commitment. 
The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929–1940, ed. by Martha Dow Fehsenfeld and Lois More 
Overbeck, 4 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), I, p. 608 (21 February 1938). 
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the project of enlightenment: ‘She abominates any veneration which cannot be shown 
to be rational: belief in God and his dead son, obedience to the Ten Commandments, 
preference of the good to the wicked, salvation to sin’ (DE, p. 76). Her systematic 
sexual permutations are symptomatic of a closing circle of immanence: a circle of her 
own making, but that attests to a broader rejection of metaphysics. This is most 
apparent in her wholehearted rejection of love⎯as something beyond the stagnant 
zone of apathetic rationalism. As Adorno and Horkheimer argue, ‘[i]t is not just 
romantic sexual love which has been condemned as metaphysics by science and 
industry but love of any kind, for no love can withstand reason’ (DE, p. 91). The 
possibility of something beyond the pornographic gaze is barely hinted at in All 
Strange Away before it is snatched away: ‘Imagine lifetime, gems, evenings with 
Emma and the flights by night, no, no that again’ (p. 171).28 This moment is a 
significant contrast to the more crude sexual imaginings: ‘Imagine him kissing, 
caressing, licking, sucking, fucking and buggering all this stuff’ (p. 171). It is hardly 
coincidental that the glimmer of love in the text is coupled with an allusion to the 
narrator’s memory of wartime ‘flights by night’. Anything that resonates beyond the 
sphere of immanence must be cast off. 
Adorno emphasises the relationship between pornography and immanence in a 
less direct and yet perhaps more revealing way in his short 1956 essay, ‘Looking 
Back on Surrealism’. He notes the pornographic basis of Surrealist montages: in their 
disjunction of fragmented images they offer ‘mementos of the objects of the partial 
drives that once aroused the libido’ (NL1, p. 89). Such images are ‘nature morte’ in 
its most literal sense: they are ‘[t]hinglike and dead’ (NL1, p. 89). Adorno’s concern 
regarding Surrealism is that it, as Richard Wolin puts it, ‘celebrate[s] a reified 
immediacy in its montages’.29 By presenting ‘random assemblages of existing objects 
in their immediately given, hence reified form’,30 Surrealism risks duplicating and 
therefore confirming ‘everyday life in its indigent given state’.31 Pornography is the 
                                                
28 The eruption of extraordinarily big words⎯‘Know happiness’ (Ill Seen Ill Said, p. 86) and ‘Joy!’ 
(Worstward Ho, p. 104)⎯in other late prose texts adheres to a similar logic. 
29 ‘Benjamin, Adorno, Surrealism’, in The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory, ed. by Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT 
Press, 1997), pp. 93–122 (p. 108). 
30 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and 
the Frankfurt Institute (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977), p. 127. 
31 Wolin, p. 107. 
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model for Surrealism because, for Adorno, it is already a mode of representation that 
is trapped in immanence.  
 It is notable that All Strange Away dispenses with the pornographic images on 
the walls relatively early on in the text. The imaginings of the narrator adhere to 
conventional gender stereotypes: we are enjoined to imagine Emmo ‘kissing, 
caressing, licking [etc.]’ (All Strange Away, p. 171) Emma, but to imagine Emma 
‘being all kissed, licked, sucked, fucked and so on by all that’ (p. 172): Emma, as a 
woman, is necessarily the object of sexual attention. As a means of accounting for the 
sudden disappearance of the pornographic images on the wall⎯‘no Emmo, no need, 
never was’ (p. 173)⎯Fraser suggests that once ‘Emma is the figure within the box, 
Emmo is no longer needed as a lens through which to observe her. Consequently, 
Emmo is erased from the scenario entirely’.32 On this reading, Emma was always the 
intended object of the pornographic gaze. I would suggest that the narrator’s ultimate 
rejection of the pornographic image is far more pragmatic. While pornography 
reflects and affirms the reification of the given, there is an element of it that points 
beyond the merely existing. Adorno suggests that the truth content of Surrealism lies 
in its very fidelity to bourgeois society. In its images, ‘what has been forgotten reveals 
itself to be the true object of love’ (NL1, p. 89). While this truth content is 
extraordinarily fragile and is betrayed at every minute by the more dominant ‘signs of 
a Sisyphean, hellish, eternal recurrence’,33 it is still a moment of heterogeneity, a 
divergence from immanence. The pornographic images in the cuboid⎯‘nature 
morte’⎯prompt an unsolicited memory of ‘lifetime, gems, evenings with Emma’. 
Since the use of pornography in All Strange Away is always a means to an end⎯that 
of imagining the death of imagination, of envisioning a space of pure immanence⎯its 
failure necessitates its removal from the imagined scenario. 
 The context of Romanticism that offers an explanation for All Strange Away’s 
distinction between imagination and fancy has been well explored by critics.34 Paul 
Davies provides a useful summary:  
                                                
32 Fraser, p. 524. 
33 Wolin, p. 112. 
34 See, for example, Fraser; and Michael Angelo Rodriguez, ‘Romantic Agony: Fancy and Imagination 
in Samuel Beckett’s All Strange Away’, Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd’hui, 18 (2007), 131–42; 
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For Coleridge, the imagination […] does the transformative metaphorical 
work of the poet, ‘dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to re-create’. Fancy, 
on the other hand, ‘has no other counters to play with but fixities and 
definites’. […] Fancy is an aggregative faculty; it arranges units but does not 
create them or change them.35 
As a supplement to this Romantic context, the OED can offer some useful 
information. Fancy is a contraction of ‘fantasy’. Its meanings include: ‘A spectral 
apparition; an illusion of the senses’ (now obsolete); ‘Delusive imagination; 
hallucination’; ‘A mental image’; ‘A supposition resting on no solid grounds; an 
arbitrary notion’; and ‘Caprice, changeful mood’. These various definitions emphasise 
the inferiority of fancy in relation to imagination. Primarily, this inferiority is 
manifested in fancy’s inability to precipitate change. It is characterised by impotence. 
Within All Strange Away, the power of imagination is attributed solely to the narrator, 
who continually exhorts the reader and himself to ‘imagine’. Fancy, on the other 
hand, belongs to the figure within the narrative itself, whether Emmo or Emma.36 I 
suggest that in All Strange Away, fancy acts as the last remnant of hope in a context of 
encircling immanence. For all fancy’s impotence to effect real change in its 
surroundings, it nonetheless mounts an impoverished resistance to the text’s drive 
towards absolute identity by offering a reminder of something different: Adorno is 
adamant that ‘should fantasy be driven out, judgement too, the real act of knowledge, 
is exorcised’ (MM, pp. 122–3). Hope, of course, is by no means a guarantee that that 
which is hoped for exists, or could exist. As Adorno acknowledges, ‘Nietzsche in the 
Antichrist voiced the strongest argument not merely against theology but against 
metaphysics, that hope is mistaken for truth’ (MM, p. 97). Nonetheless, he continues: 
Nietzsche himself taught amor fati: ‘thou shalt love thy fate’. […] We might 
well ask whether we have more reason to love what happens to us, to affirm 
what is because it is, than to believe true what we hope. Is it not the same false 
inference that leads from the existence of stubborn facts to their erection as the 
highest value, as he criticizes in the leap from hope to truth? […] [T]he origin 
of amor fati might be sought in a prison. Love of stone walls and barred 
windows is the last resort of someone who sees and has nothing else to love.  
(MM, p. 98) 
                                                                                                                                      
Paul Davies, The Ideal Real: Beckett’s Fiction and Imagination (London: Associated University 
Presses, 1994). 
35 Davies, pp. 142–3. 
36 Davies disagrees with this, arguing that ‘[t]he provisional, speculative, and idly permutative 
language which generates the bulk of the text is clearly an example of fancy running away with 
itself, left on its own by the dying imagination to sustain itself solely on “images which it has had 
no part in producing”’ (p. 144). 
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Nietzsche identifies a logical fallacy in Christianity based on the ‘false inference’ that 
what we hope is the case is therefore true. However, as Adorno notes, this fallacy can 
also be ascribed to Nietzsche’s own thought: facts no more assure that there is nothing 
beyond them than hope guarantees truth. Moving beyond this impasse, Adorno 
attempts to salvage the concept of hope by arguing that ‘[i]n the end hope, wrested 
from reality by negating it, is the only form in which truth appears. Without hope, the 
idea of truth would be scarcely even thinkable’ (MM, p. 98). Truth, if it is not to be 
mere tautology, must be more than ‘the practicable summarizing and arranging of the 
merely existent’ (MCP, p. 115).  
 There is a distinct similarity between what Adorno suggests truth is not⎯that 
is, the ‘mere registering, order and summarizing of facts’ (MCP, p. 115) valorized by 
positivism⎯and what Coleridge claims fancy is: ‘the deliberate practice of reducing 
“the conceivable” to the “bounds of the picturable”’.37 If this is the case, then the 
immanence the narrator of All Strange Away is striving to imagine is more definitive 
than it at first appears. The ‘Fancy’ that provides the ‘only hope’ (All Strange Away, 
p. 170) for Emmo and Emma is worse than impotent: it actively contributes to the 
drive towards immanence within the rotunda. If this is an accurate description of the 
situation, however, then the reiterated coupling of ‘Fancy’ with ‘hope’ and the threat 
of ‘Fancy dead’ (p. 171) become inexplicable. If Fancy assists the identity-drive of 
the text then why would its death or absence be necessary? Even if Beckett does 
indeed gesture towards Coleridge’s distinction between imagination and fancy in All 
Strange Away, I suggest that he does not in fact simply replicate Coleridge’s valuation 
of imagination over fancy. Fancy may well be an inferior faculty to imagination, but it 
still has the capacity to inspire ‘hope’. Its final disintegration is the text’s muted 
tragedy: ‘henceforth no other sounds than these and never were that is than sop to 
mind faint sighing sound for tremor of sorrow at faint memory of a lying side by side 
and fancy murmured dead’ (p. 181). 
 Of course, All Strange Away does not succeed in its project of ‘Imagination 
dead imagine’. Not only is such a project premised on a paradox, but, as I have 
shown, the drive towards immanence is also interrupted throughout by moments of 
resistance. This, however, does not mark the text as a failure, but rather attests to the 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 144. 
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truth that ‘everything is not just nothing. If it were, whatever is would be pale, 
colorless, indifferent’ (ND, p. 104). Adorno argues that the Kantian block is premised 
on ‘the unthinkability of despair’: that his salvaging of the intelligible sphere 
‘condemns the intolerability of extant things’ (ND, p. 385). Kant insists that ‘he who 
has not conducted himself so as to be unworthy of happiness must be able to hope to 
partake of it’ (CPR A813/B841): that is, there must be a connection between virtue 
and happiness. Only with such a connection, as Bernstein speculates, would ‘the 
happiness of the Nazi and the suffering of his or her virtuous victim […] bespeak a 
moral deformity in the world order’.38 Kant is only able to save this connection 
through his construction of the intelligible sphere: 
I say, accordingly, that just as the moral principles are necessary in accordance 
with reason in its practical use, it is equally necessary to assume in 
accordance with reason in its theoretical use that everyone has cause to hope 
for happiness in the same measure as he has made himself worthy of it in his 
conduct, and that the system of morality is therefore inseparably combined 
with the system of happiness, though only in the idea of pure reason. 
(CPR A809/B837) 
Here we see that the reconciliation between virtue and happiness only takes place 
within ‘the idea of pure reason’. Our judgment that it is unjust for an immoral person 
to achieve great happiness or for a moral person to suffer is only possible because ‘it 
is grounded on a highest reason’ (CPR A810/B838). For all its inadequacies, this 
move manifests a moment of radical speculation within Kant’s system. Adorno argues 
that the very feeling of despair attests to our consciousness that there could be 
something different; it proves, as it were, that the ‘spell’ of immanence is not yet 
absolute: ‘Grayness could not fill us with despair if our minds did not harbor the 
concept of different colors, scattered traces of which are not absent from the negative 
whole’ (ND, pp. 377–8). That Kant constructs the elusive and unreachable intelligible 
sphere in reaction against the ‘intolerability of extant things’ demonstrates his 
awareness that ‘[t]he world’s course is not absolutely conclusive’ (ND, p. 404). 
Adorno’s crucial contention is that while ‘there is a “block” preventing access to the 
non-identical, the metaphysical, […] this “block” is historical not a priori’.39 Kant’s 
block limits reason to its regulative use, which ‘does not allow us to cognize what an 
object is as a thing in itself’ but ‘stimulates us to search for an ever more complete 
                                                
38 ‘Why Rescue Semblance?’, p. 191. 
39 Ibid., p. 188. 
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understanding of that object’;40 Adorno’s historicisation of the block, however, allows 
us to posit something beyond regulative knowledge of the metaphysical⎯only, 
however, if we discard Kant’s limited scientific conception of knowledge. 
 I will return to Adorno’s account of metaphysical experience in the next 
section of this chapter. It is certainly the case that the ‘hope’ of All Strange Away does 
not move beyond the negative truth that despair is not yet conclusive: that its very 
possibility ‘guarantees to us that the hopelessly missed things exist’ (ND, p. 372) or 
that, in the words of King Lear’s Edgar that appear in Beckett’s ‘Sottisier Notebook’: 
‘The worst is not | So long as we can say “This is the worst”’.41 Such despair is 
perhaps all the more acute in Imagination Dead Imagine, which, in its highly 
condensed form, evokes a pathos that is rarer in the more scientific register of All 
Strange Away. The text as a whole demonstrates a closer affinity to the world as we 
know it: the narrator’s observation that ‘imagination not dead yet’ (Imagination Dead 
Imagine, p. 182) provides him with the stimulus for the text itself: ‘yes, dead, good, 
imagination dead imagine’ (p. 182). His use of the modifier ‘yet’ works on a personal 
level, an acknowledgement that his faculties are not quite spent; however, it is also a 
broader indication of an enclosing context of immanence that neutralises any 
speculative impulse. At the end of the short text, the narrator withdraws from the 
rotunda altogether⎯an unimaginable action in All Strange Away: ‘Leave them there, 
sweating and icy, there is better elsewhere. No, life ends and no, there is nothing 
elsewhere, and no question now of ever finding again that white speck lost in 
whiteness’ (p. 185). The possibility of ‘better elsewhere’ is ‘invalidated as uttered’ 
(The Unnamable, p. 1), while the rotunda itself is reduced to complete identity: a 
‘white speck lost in whiteness’. This is the most extreme instance of absolute 
immanence within the two texts in that it registers the dying of the narrator’s 
imagination itself.  
But the significance of Imagination Dead Imagine is to be found in its 
attention to the basic condition of life of its two inhabitants. That they are alive is 
proven to the narrator by their breath: ‘Hold a mirror to their lips, it mists’ (p. 
                                                
40 Predrag Cicovacki, ‘Kant’s Debt to Leibniz’, in A Companion to Kant, ed. by Graham Bird (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 79–92 (p. 88). See CPR A509/B537. 
41 Quoted in Steven Matthews, ‘Beckett’s Late Style’, in Beckett and Death, ed. by Steven Barfield, 
Philip Tew, and Matthew Feldman (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 188–205 (p. 189). 
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184)⎯an allusion to Lear’s own desperate use of ‘a looking-glass’ to determine if 
Cordelia’s ‘breath will mist or stain the stone’.42 If in King Lear, the possibility of 
Cordelia’s recovery is ‘a chance which does redeem all sorrows’, while her death is 
an ‘image of […] horror’,43 in Imagination Dead Imagine the distinction between life 
and death is not so clear. The narrator admits that ‘Sweat and mirror notwithstanding 
they might well pass for inanimate but for the left eyes which at incalculable intervals 
suddenly open wide and gaze in unblinking exposure long beyond what is humanly 
possible’ (p. 184). This attentiveness to the corporeal existence of the bodies, who 
‘seem to want nothing essential’ (p. 184), emphasises Adorno’s claim that, in 
Bernstein’s words, ‘life does not of itself carry the promise of possible experience, of 
possible meaningfulness. Just carrying on is not the same as human possibility’.44 For 
Adorno, this is figured in its most extreme form in Auschwitz, which encapsulates the 
‘human cost of the violence of system and identity’.45 Auschwitz, for Adorno, 
‘confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity as death’ (ND, p. 362). In projecting 
‘the figure of a world reduced to self-identity without remainder, a world without an 
outside and without possibility’,46 Auschwitz neutralises the distinction between life 
and death. While Adorno leaves this claim in abstract terms, we can better appreciate 
his meaning by turning to Giorgio Agamben’s characterisation of the figure of the 
Muselmann, the term referring to those in the concentration camps who, overcome by 
extreme malnutrition and both physical and mental exhaustion, had simply given up.47 
Primo Levi describes them as: 
an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non-men 
who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead in them, always too 
empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call 
                                                
42 King Lear, p. 385 [V. 3. 275]; p.  386 [V. 3. 276]. 
43 Ibid., p. 386 [V. 3. 279]; p. 386 [V. 3. 278]. 
44 ‘Why Rescue Semblance?’, p. 184. 
45 O’Connor, p. 12. 
46 ‘Why Rescue Semblance’, p. 183. 
47 For more on Beckett and Muselmänner, see Marcin Tereszewski, The Aesthetics of Failure: 
Inexpressibility in Samuel Beckett’s Fiction (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013), pp. 81–7; 
David Houston Jones, Samuel Beckett and Testimony (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2011); Robert 
Harvey, Witnessness: Beckett, Dante, Levi and the Foundations of Responsibility (London: 
Continuum, 2010); Russell Smith, ‘Bearing Witness in How It Is’, Samuel Beckett Today / 
Aujourd’hui, 19 (2008), 351–60; Daniel Katz, ‘What Remains of Beckett: Evasion and History’, 
in Beckett and Phenomenology, ed. by Ulrika Maude and Matthew Feldman (London: 
Continuum, 2007), pp. 144–57; and Russell Smith, ‘“The acute and increasing anxiety of the 
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their death death in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired to 
understand.48  
The defining factor of the Muselmänner for Agamben is ‘not so much that their life is 
no longer life (this kind of degradation holds in a certain sense for all camp 
inhabitants and is not an entirely new experience) but, rather, that their death is not 
death’.49 The Muselmänner have no experience, no memory: there is nothing left 
within them to die. When Adorno argues, then, that the ‘pure identity of all people 
with their concept is nothing other than their death’ (MCP, p. 108), he does not 
necessarily mean their physical demise, because death has become identical with a 
life without experience or possibility. 
 It is the horror of this absolute identity, I suggest, that in Imagination Dead 
Imagine prompts ‘for the eye of prey the infinitesimal shudder instantaneously 
suppressed’ (Imagination Dead Imagine, p. 185). The use of the word ‘shudder’ to 
describe the narrator and reader’s response to the figures in the rotunda takes on a 
particular resonance when considered in light of Adorno’s concept of the ‘shudder 
[der Schauer]’ (AT, p. 26). The shudder, for Adorno, discloses a metaphysical 
experience analogous, as Gordon Finlayson suggests, to the ‘experience of wonder 
underlying classical metaphysics’.50 The shudder is a response to ‘the horror of pure 
identity’,51 manifested most radically in Auschwitz but increasingly evident in the 
social world. As an authentic response to such horror that is predicated on experience, 
the shudder is at risk of liquidation: Adorno registers the fear ‘that the shudder will 
dissipate’ (AT, p. 106). Modern art works, however, preserve and express it. The 
shudder prompted by Beckett’s late prose works is soberly predicted by Imagination 
Dead Imagine as the appropriate response to the context of immanence it is 
attempting to imagine: ‘life in the subject’, Adorno argues, ‘is nothing but what 
shudders, the reaction to the total spell that transcends the spell’ (AT, p. 418). The 
shudder’s instantaneous suppression in Imagination Dead Imagine, therefore, 
registers a worrying indication that experience is being nullified: that the ‘merited 
shudder in the face of […] a monstrosity’ (AT, p. 336) is gradually being replaced by 
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apathetic indifference: the final sign before the flashes of transcendence darken 
forever. 
 
II 
 
If All Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine are Beckett’s inherently 
paradoxical attempts to imagine a context of complete immanence, a context in which 
life becomes indistinguishable from death and experience is numbed, Company, 
fifteen years later, can be read as Beckett’s effort to escape the imprisoning rotunda of 
immanence through what Bernstein describes as ‘fugitive’ metaphysical 
experiences.52 The majority of the text⎯‘forty-four of the fifty-nine paragraphs’,53 
Davies assures us with a degree of exasperation⎯is given over to the repetitive 
description (by a third person narrator) of ‘one on his back in the dark’ (Company, p. 
3) and the disembodied voices he hears. This basic premise is reminiscent of All 
Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine⎯the ‘place where he lies’ is suggested 
to be ‘a hemispherical chamber of generous diameter’ (p. 23)⎯though the narrative 
treatment of the situation is markedly different. Moreover, this permutative 
description is interrupted by sustained passages devoted to (true or false) memories, 
narrated in the second person to the body in the dark. These memories or imaginings 
offer more or less successful speculations that transcend the sphere of otherwise 
dominant immanence. Moments of the text can be read in light of Adorno’s concept 
of metaphysical experience.  
 First, however, it is worth considering what it means to describe something as 
a metaphysical experience. The Kantian block effectively debarred knowledge of the 
transcendent; nothing mediates between the empirical and the intelligible except the 
elusive ‘as if’ of regulative knowledge. After Auschwitz, Adorno argues, an 
affirmative or traditional metaphysics is no longer possible: ‘our feelings resist any 
claim of the positivity of existence as sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they 
balk at squeezing any kind of sense, however bleached, out of the victims’ fate’ (ND, 
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p. 361). However, a post-metaphysical complacency that rejects transcendence 
altogether or is indifferent to it conceals, Adorno argues, ‘a horror that would take 
men’s breath away if they did not repress it’ (ND, p. 395). This horror, as I have 
explored, pervades the contexts of (near) total immanence in All Strange Away and 
Imagination Dead Imagine. Caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of an obsolete 
and morally culpable metaphysics, on the one hand, and a thought-dulling immanence 
on the other, Adorno proposes what O’Connor aptly describes as ‘a post-metaphysical 
version of the metaphysical project’ that relies on ‘reframing the core metaphysical 
notion of transcendence⎯of going beyond what is immediately given⎯within a 
materialist philosophy’.54 This involves shattering the Kantian block⎯Kant’s 
‘ignoramus’ is replaced by the fallible hope that ‘we do not know yet, but that some 
day, perhaps, the mystery will be solved after all’ (ND, p. 386)⎯but not in the name 
of the conceptual knowledge of the absolute that Kant ruled out. Rather, Adorno sees 
metaphysical experiences as elusive promises of something else: promises that, 
crucially, are ‘not aimed at a realm beyond the historical world, but rather at an 
altered state of the world itself’.55 Herein lies the materialist element of Adorno’s 
metaphysics: ‘transcendence’, he argues, ‘feeds on nothing but the experiences we 
have in immanence’ (ND, p. 398). The traditional diremption between the 
intramundane and the transcendent is no longer possible⎯if it ever was.  
One significant instance of this is in the corporeal elements of death that are so 
neatly shaved off from the supercilious metaphysical understanding of the same 
concept: 
The integration of physical death into culture should be rescinded in 
theory⎯not, however, for the sake of an ontologically pure being named 
Death, but for the sake of that which the stench of cadavers expresses and we 
are fooled about by their transfiguration into ‘remains’. 
(ND, p. 366) 
This ‘integration’ of death into theory that Adorno criticises is a reference to what he 
terms Heidegger’s ‘death metaphysics’ (ND, p. 369): that is, his affirmation of the 
possibility of an authentic being-towards-death. For Adorno, as Giuseppe Tassone 
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explains, Heidegger’s ‘transformation […] of the negativity of human death into 
something positive neutralises the sheer suffering of the body’.56 ‘Even in extremis’, 
Adorno asserts contra Hegel, ‘a negated negative is not a positive’ (ND, p. 393): 
Heidegger commits the fallacy of elevating ‘negativity, the critique of what merely is, 
into positivity’ (ND, p. 393). Death cannot be abstracted from the messy, corporeal 
process of dying. Indeed, Adorno attributes a subconscious awareness of this to 
children, who, in the ‘fascination that issues from the flayer’s zone, from carcasses, 
from the repulsively sweet odor of putrefaction, and from the opprobrious terms used 
for that zone’ intuit that ‘this is what matters’ (ND, p. 366). 
 In Company, Beckett demonstrates an awareness of the uncanny significance 
the ‘zone of the carcass and the knacker’ (MCP, p. 117) holds for children. A long 
passage is dedicated to the memory of a hedgehog the child rescued from the ‘cold’ 
(Company, p. 20). The ‘glow at your good deed’ (p. 20) is gradually replaced by ‘a 
great uneasiness. […] A suspicion that all was perhaps not as it should be’ (p. 21). 
Time passes before the child can bring himself to inspect the homemade hutch: ‘You 
have never forgotten what you found then. You are on your back in the dark and have 
never forgotten what you found then. The mush. The stench’ (p. 22). I would suggest 
that the significance of this moment for the child grown up is due not primarily to a 
sense of guilt or sadness, natural though these emotions would be. Rather, it is the 
‘place of carrion, stench and putrefaction’ (MCP, p. 117) that haunts the memory. The 
significance of this for Adorno is its indication that death is fundamentally 
incommensurable with life⎯a claim that contains ‘a perverse, dislocated bit of hope: 
that death does not constitute the entirety of existence’ (ND, p. 369). This may 
suggest the post-theological resurrection of immortality, but if, as Adorno insists, 
‘[a]fter Auschwitz there is no word tinged from on high, not even a theological one, 
that has any right unless it underwent a transformation’ (ND, p. 367), it must 
necessarily be a transfigured immortality. More specifically, it is a materialist 
immortality. Adorno insists on the truth content of ‘Christian dogmatics, in which the 
souls were conceived as awakening simultaneously with the resurrection of the flesh’: 
‘hope means a physical resurrection’ (ND, p. 401). Mortality and immortality, rather 
than being antithetical or separated by a Kantian-style block, are dialectical: ‘the 
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concept of mortality implies its opposite, not as an eternal abode after life on earth, 
but as resistance to mortality and refusal of dying in our daily practice’.57 It is, 
crucially, to the corporeal world that we must turn in our hopes of experiencing 
transcendence.  
 For Adorno, children have a privileged access to these glimmers of 
transcendence. They therefore play a significant role in his concept of metaphysical 
experience. Beckett’s work, too, which, as Daniela Caselli argues, is ‘generally 
discussed as populated with geriatric characters, is surprisingly prolific in children’.58 
Company, however⎯as the hedgehog incident would indicate⎯offers Beckett’s most 
sustained exploration of childhood and its experiences. It is important to note that 
neither Adorno nor Beckett subscribe to a romantic idealisation of childhood. Rather, 
they demonstrate an interest in the ‘capacity of children for wonder and their 
insistence on the particular’.59 Adorno describes one particular example of this: 
What is a metaphysical experience? If we disdain projecting it upon allegedly 
primal religious experiences, we are most likely to visualize it as Proust did, in 
the happiness, for instance, that is promised by village names like 
Applebachsville, Wind Gap, or Lords Valley. One thinks that going there 
would bring the fulfilment, as if there were such a thing. Being really there 
makes the promise recede like a rainbow. And yet one is not disappointed; the 
feeling now is one of being too close, rather, and not seeing it for that reason.  
(ND, p. 373) 
This passage knits together a number of elements that Adorno identifies in 
metaphysical experiences. Such experiences bespeak an attentiveness to the 
particular, an awareness of ‘the preponderance of the object’ (ND, p. 183). This 
concept⎯one that holds a significant place in Adorno’s philosophy as a whole⎯is in 
part a return to the Kantian thing-in-itself. In his 1969 essay, ‘Subject and Object’, 
Adorno observes that ‘objectivity can be conceived without a subject; not so 
subjectivity without an object’ (AR, pp. 142–3). The dialectical relationship between 
subject and object that forms the basis of Adorno’s thought maintains, therefore, a 
slight bias towards the object, without which we cannot conceive of the subject’s 
existence. While cognitive knowledge of the object in-itself is not possible, non-
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cognitive experience of it is. However⎯and this brings us back to the metaphysical 
experience itself⎯such knowledge is by no means guaranteed. Its fallibility is part of 
the structure of a true experience. Adorno continues: ‘To the child it is self-evident 
that what delights him in his favorite village is found only there, there alone and 
nowhere else. He is mistaken; but his mistake creates the model of experience’ (ND, 
p. 373). The concept of delight leads us to another characteristic of metaphysical 
experience: its promise of happiness, which, in giving ‘us the inside of objects as 
something removed from the objects’ (ND, p. 374), allows us to experience the world 
outside our subjective categories. These three elements are inextricably woven 
together. Happiness is implied in the very act of acknowledging ‘the surplus over the 
subject’ (ND, p. 374) because, as Andrew Bowie explains, ‘it is what is manifest 
when the world promises something beyond the given’.60 This promise cannot be 
fulfilled in the context of a damaged world, but its rainbow-like retreat, far from 
undermining its significance as an experience, actually constitutes it: ‘all experiences 
which have to be lived, which are not mere copies or reconstructions of that which is 
in any case, contain the possibility of error, the possibility that they can completely 
miss the mark’ (MCP, p. 141). 
Adorno suggests that metaphysical experiences are often ‘the weakest and 
most fragile’ (MCP, p. 141). They do not advertise themselves; they require an 
openness to the particular that can be associated with children⎯children who, as 
Shirke suggests, ‘experience specifically and perhaps also literally, what is strictly 
speaking inconceivable’.61 The very first memory of Company demonstrates this 
childlike openness to fresh experience and the response it gets from jaded adulthood: 
A small boy you come out of Connolly’s Stores holding your mother by the 
hand. […] It is late afternoon and after some hundred paces the sun appears 
above the crest of the rise. Looking up at the blue sky and then at your 
mother’s face you break the silence asking her if it is not in reality much more 
distant than it appears. The sky that is. The blue sky. Receiving no answer you 
mentally reframe your question and some hundred paces later look up at her 
face gain and ask her if it does not appear much less distant than in reality it is. 
For some reason you could never fathom this question must have angered her 
exceedingly. For she shook off your little hand and made you a cutting retort 
you have never forgotten. 
(Company, p. 6) 
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Justin Beplate suggests that this passage preserves ‘the memory of a first, small sin: 
guileless speculation’.62 The question is not a scientific one: the child is not asking for 
a factual explanation of the sky’s distance or nearness. Rather, he is displaying 
wonder at a natural phenomenon: truly experiencing it as something fundamentally 
uncognizable. What is particularly interesting about this passage is its intertextual 
allusion to other moments in Beckett’s work: namely Malone Dies and The End: 
I said, The sky is further away than you think, is it not, mama? It was without 
malice, I was simply thinking of all the leagues that separated me from it. She 
replied, to me her son, It is precisely as far away as it appears to be. She was 
right. But at the same time I was aghast. I can still see the spot, opposite 
Tyler's gate. 
(Malone Dies, p. 98) 
 
A small boy, stretching out his hands and looking up at the blue sky, asked his 
mother how such a thing was possible. Fuck off, she said. 
(The End, p. 81) 
This intertextuality undermines the authority of the memory qua memory. Gontarski 
perceptively suggests that ‘[c]hildhood memories, like literary allusions, are 
“figments”, “traces”, “fables”, or “shades”, a mix of memory, experience, desire, and 
imagination’.63 The significance of such memories lies not in their reliability or 
correctness, as though their correspondence to the ‘actual experience’ were something 
to be ticked off a checklist. The experience to which they allude is itself something 
provisional and uncertain, marked by innocent expectation and a essential fallibility. 
It is for this reason that Adorno argues that thought possesses ‘an element of 
exaggeration, of over-shooting the object, of self-detachment from the weight of the 
factual, so that instead of merely reproducing being it can, at once rigorous and free, 
determine it’ (MM, pp. 126–7). Memory and imagination are not so distinct as they 
may at times seem, and Company exploits this slippage throughout by refusing to root 
the supposed memories unambiguously in any singular consciousness: ‘the first 
person singular and a fortiori plural pronoun had never any place in your vocabulary’ 
(p. 45).  
 In both Malone Dies and Company, the episode takes place in a specific 
location: ‘opposite Tyler's gate’ and by ‘Connolly’s Store’, respectively. The very 
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rarity of such references, at least in ‘Beckett’s prose after Murphy’,64 as Davies notes, 
manifests an attentiveness to particularity above and beyond the mindless 
regurgitation of place and company names encouraged by an ever self-advertising 
capitalist market economy. However, the experience is eclipsed by the mother’s 
‘cutting retort’: this, fundamentally, is what is preserved by memory. Another 
memory discloses the child’s dawning awareness that his experiences are 
incommunicable: ‘The first time you told them and were derided. All you had seen 
was cloud. So now you hoard it in your heart with the rest’ (Company, p. 17). This 
sketch of the child’s excursion to a hillside, which Davies aptly describes as ‘one of 
the best evocations of paradisial experience in all Beckett’s work’,65 depicts the 
memory of a metaphysical experience, the possibility of which had previously been 
pre-emptively arrested by the mother’s ‘cutting retort’. One of the most distinctive 
elements of this passage lies in its fusion between what Davies describes as the 
‘analytic present’ of the body in the dark and the ‘lyric past’:66  
The light there was then. On your back in the dark the light there was then. 
[…] Back home at nightfall supperless to bed. You lie in the dark and are back 
in that light. Straining out from your nest in the gorse with your eyes across 
the water till they ache. You close them while you count a hundred. Then open 
and strain again. Again and again. Till in the end it is there. Palest blue against 
the pale sky. You lie in the dark and are back in that light. 
(p. 17) 
What Davies fails to note is the fusion of a third temporal possibility within the ‘lyric 
past’ itself: the child is banished to bed ‘supperless’, where, the text implies, he 
conjures up the memory of the ‘light’. The levels of temporality are, then, first, the 
original experience; second, the memory of that experience and the possible attempt 
to recreate it from the child’s home; third, the present-day memory⎯from within the 
all-encompassing darkness⎯of the event. All these layers are filtered through the 
second-person narration that dominates the recollections or imaginings, so it becomes 
impossible to locate a secure basis or consciousness from which the memories 
emanate. The fusion of these temporal possibilities arises from the doubling of ‘On 
your back in the dark’, a phrase that characterises the narrative of the ‘analytic 
present’ as well as a description of the child’s bedroom; the ambiguity of the 
                                                
64 Davies, p. 183. 
65 Ibid., p. 190 
66 Ibid., p. 189. 
  217 
temporality to which the repeated phrase ‘You lie in the dark’ refers; and the doubt as 
to whether being ‘back in that light’ is a memory or an attempt to replicate the 
original experience. The multifaceted ambiguity further obscures the object of 
experience itself, which remains obstinately undefined: ‘in the end it is there. Palest 
blue against the pale sky’.  
One of the few elements of the experience that is actually recounted is the 
significance of light. Davies observes that the presence of natural light in a number of 
the memories in the text plays a very different role to, on the one hand, the artificial 
and sourceless whiteness that dominates the earlier closed-space works and, on the 
other, the darkness that otherwise characterises Company itself.67 He suggests in 
reference to another, very similar passage, that light ‘is introduced here to modify the 
terms upon which, in the cold light of day, we see [everyday objects] related’.68 When 
this is considered alongside Adorno’s insistence on the primacy of the object as 
fundamental for metaphysical experience, we can see that light in this passage takes 
on the role of inducing speculative thought that goes beyond ‘mere statement’ (MM, 
p. 127). That the child is not seeing what is simply there⎯that he is, in fact, ‘over-
shooting the object’⎯is evident from his perseverance: ‘Straining out from your nest 
in the gorse with your eyes across the water till they ache’. In this way, the child 
adheres to Adorno’s insistence that ‘thought must aim beyond its target just because it 
never quite reaches it’ (MM, p. 127), invoking the need for a speculative moment in 
thought. This is echoed in the ‘strand’ passage, where the assertion that ‘Light dying. 
Soon none left to die’ (Company, p. 39) is swiftly undercut: ‘No. No such thing then 
as no light. Died on to dawn and never died’ (p. 39). The light may indeed dwindle in 
the evening, but the vision with which it is associated maintains its existence. ‘Were 
your eyes to open’, the narration continues, ‘they would first see far below in the last 
rays the skirt of your greatcoat and the uppers of your boots emerging from the sand. 
[…] Were your eyes to open dark would lighten’ (p. 40). There is a suggestive 
ambiguity regarding whether the eyes are closed within the memory itself or in the 
narrative present. If the latter, the words seem to offer a yearning for vision to return, 
a promise that it is possible for the dark to lighten. Within the memory itself, the 
attentiveness to the sound of the ‘wash’ (p. 39) and the insistence that light never 
                                                
67 Ibid., pp. 187–8. 
68 Ibid., p. 187. 
  218 
entirely fades suggest that the closed eyes accommodate another way of seeing that is 
unconditioned by the ‘cold light of day’.69  
 However, these moments of metaphysical experience in Company are no more 
than glimmers; they are ‘fugitives’, Bernstein explains, because they at once ‘flee 
from ordinary empirical experience and are intrinsically ephemeral and transient’.70 
Company dramatises the process by which such glimmers are gradually co-opted by a 
transcendence-resistant totality of the kind dramatised in All Strange Away and 
Imagination Dead Imagine. A number of the passages of memory allude to wandering 
in the countryside. While in no particular order⎯the memories as a whole are by no 
means chronological⎯these passages chart the slow demise of experience whose end 
point is the lonely darkness of the narrative present. The passage describing ‘[t]he last 
time you went out’ (Company, p. 25) registers how far the capacity for experience has 
deteriorated. The narrator notes the ‘expanse of light’ (p. 25) that has, in other 
memories, been associated with metaphysical experience; however, this time there is 
no speculative vision: ‘you advance if not with closed eyes though this as often as not 
at least with them fixed on the momentary ground before your feet. This is all of 
nature you have seen. Since finally you bowed your head’ (p. 26). The man has closed 
his eyes to the potentially liberating light that has represented the possibility of 
transcendence since his inception, or when he ‘first saw the light’ (p. 7). This passage 
contains other key differences from the other descriptions of ‘plodding along’ (p. 9). 
Most notably, his ‘father’s shade is not with [him] any more. It fell out long ago’ (p. 
26). The word ‘shade’⎯unelucidated in the text⎯seems to refer to a spectral 
presence that has now left him. This presence⎯dark and insubstantial though it may 
be⎯offers the ‘company’ (p. 5) so ardently pursued. The deterioration of vision, then, 
is not just of ‘nature’, but also of the supernatural⎯or, at least, the imagined company 
of his father’s ghost. This indifference to visual spectacles is twinned with a disregard 
for his ‘footfalls’ (p. 26), whether their noise or number:  
You do not count your steps any more. For the simple reason they number 
each day the same. Average day in day out the same. The way being always 
the same. You keep count of the days and every tenth day multiply. And add. 
[…] You do not hear your footfalls any more. Unhearing unseeing you go 
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your way. Day after day. The same way. As if there were no other any more. 
For you there is no other any more. 
(pp. 26–7) 
This assertion that the steps ‘number each day the same’ is contradicted not only by 
other, similar episodes⎯when, in a fit of exuberance, ‘suddenly you cut through the 
hedge and vanish hobbling east across the gallops’ (p. 16)⎯but the passage itself: 
‘Thither from your entering the pasture you need normally from eighteen hundred to 
two thousand paces depending on your humour and the state of the ground. But on 
this last morning many more will be required. Many many more’ (p. 26). The 
innocuous step-counting ritual has been transformed into a self-governing mechanism 
designed to render each day the same as the last. It is for this reason that the narrator 
is able to say with assurance: ‘You are no older now than you always were’ (p. 27). 
Time has begun to contract into an eternal present.  
Company’s complexity vis-à-vis the earlier closed space works lies in its 
juxtaposition of these very different elements. Unlike the paradoxical but definitive 
narrative impetus of All Strange Away and Imagination Dead Imagine, this text ‘tells 
of a past. With occasional allusion to a present and more rarely to a future’ (Company, 
p. 4). The folding and unfolding of narrative time in origami-like fashion places us 
ambivalently between hope and despair, rather like the predicament expounded in 
Augustine’s maxim that Beckett so admired. Peter Uwe Hohendahl argues that such 
ambivalence is also manifested in Aesthetic Theory, in which the ‘glimpses of hope’ 
Adorno attributes to artworks is always undermined by their ‘extreme vulnerability’.71 
For Adorno, it is in art that something approaching a metaphysical experience is 
possible. In Chapter Two, I argued that art is simultaneously the illusion (Schein) of 
freedom and the freedom of illusion. It is this paradox that underlies the metaphysical 
possibility of artworks: ‘Semblance’, Adorno argues, ‘is a promise of nonsemblance’ 
(ND, p. 405), but, as Bernstein explains, it is impossible ‘to categorically separate the 
objectivity of art’s promise from the lapse of such promising into mere illusion, its 
telling lies’.72 Adorno uses exactly the same metaphor of the rainbow in Negative 
Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory to articulate the promissory nature of metaphysical 
experience: ‘If one seeks to get a closer look at a rainbow, it disappears’ (AT, p. 162). 
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Nonetheless, just as the child ‘does not find in Monbrunn any of the fulfilment which 
is stored up in its name’ (MCP, p. 140)  and yet is not disappointed, the structural 
fallibility of art’s promise does not lead to despair: 
Part of the majestic beauty of promises, vows, and pledges is that they pose 
human determination and hopefulness in the teeth of intransigent reality. 
Artworks on Adorno’s accounting partake in that kind of emphatic claiming 
and impotence. In experiencing works of art we are experiencing a material 
event that is incompatible with the present social order of the living, and in so 
being promises another social order of the living.73 
Adorno famously reassigns Stendhal’s description of beauty as a ‘promesse du 
bonheur’ (AT, p. 109) to art itself, a claim that can be illuminated by his insight that 
‘[t]he happiness gained from artworks is that of having suddenly escaped’ (AT, p. 18). 
Art prompts this experience of happiness through its transcending impulse: ‘it 
epitomizes the unsubsumable and as such challenges the prevailing principle of 
reality: that of exchangeability’ (AT, p. 109). Nonetheless, art is simultaneously the 
‘absolute commodity’ (AT, p. 28): it is ‘a social product that has rejected every 
semblance of existing for society, a semblance to which commodities otherwise 
urgently cling’ (AT, pp. 308–9). This is the price art must pay for its metaphysical 
quality: without an authentic relation to the given world, it would not be able to 
arouse the experience⎯however fleeting and fallible⎯of another. 
I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that the closed space texts 
discussed can be characterised by their provisionality and even incompleteness. These 
late works, I argue, nourish what Finlayson describes as ‘the weak flame of 
metaphysical experience’.74 For Adorno, ‘[w]hat art, notably the art decried as 
nihilistic, says in refraining from judgments is that everything is not just nothing. […] 
No light falls on men and things without reflecting transcendence’ (ND, p. 404). This, 
I suggest, is what he means when he claims, in relation to Beckett’s work, that ‘[t]he 
slightest difference between nothingness and coming to rest would be the haven of 
hope, the no man’s land between the border posts of being and nothingness’ (ND, p. 
381). Even the pursuit of the ‘Unworsenable worst’ (Worstward Ho, p. 107) is 
destined for failure, because the utterance of despair means that ultimate despair has 
not yet been reached: this is Beckett’s negative ‘haven of hope’ and its promise of 
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happiness. And we, as readers, are in the position of the unnamed protagonist of 
Company, destined to ‘work [our] way through the darkness without a lamp’, always 
tempted to ‘mistake [life’s] remnants for the absolute, for flashes of meaning’ (MCP, 
p. 144)⎯just as the narrator gropes for meaning and, indeed, happiness, in the 
memories he is unable to acknowledge as his own. The fallibility of the Beckettian 
narrative⎯as Adorno’s archetypal instance of metaphysical art⎯leaves us with the 
paradox that the ‘promise of something transcending life […] is, and at the same time 
is not’ (MCP, p. 145). This is perhaps most beautifully articulated in the final, 
inconclusive words of Minima Moralia:  
Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it 
to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one 
day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or 
violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects⎯this alone is the task of 
thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the situation calls imperatively 
for such knowledge, indeed because consummate negativity, once squarely 
faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite. But it is also the utterly 
impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though 
by a hair’s breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well know that 
any possible knowledge must not only be first wrested from what is, if it shall 
hold good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and 
indigence which it seeks to escape. The more passionately thought denies its 
conditionality for the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and 
so calamitously, it is delivered up to the world. Even its own impossibility it 
must at last comprehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand 
thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption 
itself hardly matters. 
(MM, p. 247) 
 
CODA: ENOUGH? 
 
Beckett’s characters often claim to have had ‘enough’⎯enough of ‘[t]his gag’ (Rough 
for Theatre II, p. 244); of love (First Love, p. 32) and embraces (The Calmative, p. 
74); of company (Waiting for Godot, p. 31), games (Waiting for Godot, p. 68) and 
‘family chat’ (Molloy, p. 150); of ‘questions’ and ‘reasoning’ (The Unnamable, p. 19) 
and ‘this cursed first person’ (p. 56); of ‘shingle’, ‘sand’, ‘earth’, ‘sea’ (p. 20) and 
‘holes’ (p. 81); of ‘procrastination’ (p. 63); and, most fundamentally, of ‘this… this… 
thing’ (Endgame, p. 94) that is typically called existence. Simultaneously, however, 
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‘enough’ is never quite good enough, always somewhat unsatisfactory: Mr Rooney 
earns ‘barely enough to keep [him] alive and twitching’ (All That Fall, p. 193), while 
the narrator of The End is assured that he is ‘well enough’ (p. 79) to be turfed out of 
his bed. Most poignant, perhaps, is a conversation between Vladimir and Estragon: 
ESTRAGON: I had a dream 
VLADIMIR: Don’t tell me! 
ESTRAGON: I dreamt that – 
VLADIMIR: DON’T TELL ME! 
ESTRAGON: [Gesture towards the universe.] This one is enough for you? 
(Waiting for Godot, p. 17) 
If Beckett’s characters have had enough of the world, then, concomitantly, the 
world⎯‘how it is’⎯is never quite enough for them. The word itself is slippery: it 
implies the bare fulfilment of a state of necessity⎯to have enough to eat⎯but also its 
surfeit: ‘to have had enough (of anything): to have become tired of (it), desire no 
more’ (OED). What never seems to be achieved by ‘enough’ is equilibrium: 
satisfaction, happiness. It is for this reason that the ‘eternally mild’ (Enough, p. 191) 
life depicted in the rarely considered Enough is so remarkable in Beckett’s corpus as a 
whole, but particularly in relation to the late prose⎯from which it manifestly differs 
in its expansive, natural setting. ‘All that goes before forget’, the narrator opens by 
instructing us. This encourages a reading of Enough as manifesting a shift in 
emphasis or style, but this chronological account does not do justice to the text’s 
strangeness: in significant ways, it annuls or forgets what comes before and after. It is 
for this reason that I consider this enigmatic text in a coda: a supplement to the 
chapter that is, as Sarah Jane Reichardt suggests, at once ‘extraneous’ and ‘of utmost 
importance on an aesthetic and symbolic level’.75 
Enough distils decades of a life of happiness and companionship into a 
beautiful, condensed prose form. It even utilises that most un-Beckettian of things, 
euphemism⎯the narrator repeats that his/her companion was ‘on his last legs’ (p. 
186; p. 191), and, soon after their separation, ‘stop[s] counting’ (p. 189) on his return. 
Far from the ‘disgrace’ (p. 190) that the narrator interprets his/her banishment to be, I 
would suggest that it is in effect a deliverance from witnessing the death of a loved 
                                                
75 Composing the Modern Subject: Four String Quartets by Dmitri Shostakovich (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008), p. 67. 
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one.76 This is significant to the text as a whole because it reframes the couple’s 
separation as a biological necessity and leaves the narrator contemplating, from the 
perspective of old age, a life lived well: what Badiou describes as ‘a strange and 
powerful form of happiness’.77 ‘Enough’ in this context is, as Peter Murphy puts it, 
‘as good as a feast’.78 
In his recent book, Autonomy After Auschwitz, Martin Schuster considers 
Stanley Cavell’s claim that ‘[i]n Kant freedom depends upon freedom from desire, in 
[J. S.] Mill upon the freedom for desire’,79 and enlists Adorno in the latter camp, 
insisting that ‘[t]he desire for something better is an impulse that expresses a 
speculative surplus, and for Adorno it is both essential to our freedom and expressive 
of that freedom’.80 This is a significant and unusual move that, unfortunately, 
Schuster does not develop further: it corresponds with Adorno’s insistence on the 
need for humanity’s reconciliation with its natural being (in Chapter Four I 
considered Adorno’s enigmatic claim that ‘we are no longer simply a piece of nature 
from the moment we recognize that we are a piece of nature’ (PMP, p. 103)). While 
Adorno is relentlessly critical of the unnecessary needs and desires promulgated by 
the Culture Industry⎯the idea that ‘in addition to food and lodging the cinema is 
necessary for the reproduction of labour power is “true” only in a world which 
prepares men for the reproduction of their labour power and constrains their needs in 
harmony with the interests of supply and social control’ (P, pp. 108–9)⎯he is equally 
sceptical of what he considers to be ‘Kant’s ambivalence about happiness’: his 
exclusion of happiness or desire as a basis for morality, but his concomitant 
acknowledgement that, as Fabian Freyenhagen puts it, ‘we could reasonably reject 
morality, if we had not even the hope for happiness’.81 Indeed, as Raymond Guess 
argues, Adorno’s philosophy ‘make[s] room, centrally and systematically, for a 
concept of “happiness”’82⎯and such happiness, Adorno insists, ‘aims at sensual 
                                                
76 Badiou, in one of the few extended explorations of Enough, offers a different reading, but notes 
similarly that the separation ‘is not at all a longing to return to solipsism’. On Beckett, ed. by 
Nina Power and Alberto Toscano (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2003), p. 34. 
77 Ibid., p. 64 
78 ‘The Nature and Art of Love in Enough’, Journal of Beckett Studies, 4 (1979), 14–34 (p. 30). 
79 Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), p. 182. 
80 Schuster, p. 110. 
81 Adorno’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 81. 
82 Outside Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 61. 
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fulfillment and obtains its objectivity in that fulfillment’ (ND, p. 202). Finlayson even 
goes so far as to suggest that Adorno ‘endors[es] a hedonistic conception of 
happiness’.83  
This is all illuminating when considering the significance of desire in Enough. 
It is certainly not the case that⎯as Enoch Brater implies by comparing the text to 
Mercier and Camier, in which Mercier is ‘curiously without desires’84⎯the narrator 
lacks desire: 
I did all he desired. I desired it too. For him. Whenever he desired something 
so did I. He only had to say what thing. When he didn’t desire anything 
neither did I. in this way I didn’t live without desires. If he had desired 
something for me I would have desired it too. Happiness for example or fame. 
I only had the desires he manifested. But he must have manifested them all. 
All his desires and needs. When he was silent he must have been like me. 
When he told me to lick his penis I hastened to do so. I drew satisfaction from 
it. We must have had the same satisfactions. The same needs and the same 
satisfactions.    
(Enough, p. 186)  
This is not an uncomplicated passage and it contains some troubling elements that 
cannot simply be brushed over. The sexual act is worryingly one-sided and the hint of 
coercion is impossible to dismiss. However, we would be looking in the wrong place 
if we expected Beckett to depict socially acceptable bourgeois love or even a simple 
negation of it. What I take to be significant in this passage is not the narrator’s lack of 
desire, but desire’s curious equilibrium⎯enough, we might say⎯and the couple’s 
synchronicity with regard to it. Couples in Beckett are hardly unusual, but this pairing 
is characterised by an insistent tenderness: a togetherness that endures beyond their 
physical separation. The explicitly sexual nature of the relationship in Enough, for 
example, is treated with a frank sensitivity that we could not imagine accompanying, 
say, the ‘spectacle’ of ‘Macmann trying to bundle his sex into his partner’s like a 
pillow into a pillow-slip, folding it in two and stuffing it in with his fingers’ (Malone 
Dies, p. 89) in Malone Dies.85 In Enough, desire is distanced from the constraints of 
the social world, without disintegrating into the consolation of an illusory pastoral 
                                                
83 ‘The Work of Art and the Promise of Happiness in Adorno’, World Picture, 3 (2009), 1–22 (p. 15). 
84 ‘Why Beckett’s Enough is More or Less Enough’, Contemporary Literature, 21 (1980), 252–66 (p. 
261). 
85 Gibson makes a similar point, arguing that ‘the anti-romantic deflation’ of Enough ‘is not like that of 
the Trilogy’ (p. 207). 
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idyll. This is in part due to the text’s combination of the almost sentimental⎯‘We 
lived on flowers. So much for sustenance’ (p. 192)⎯with the candidly practical: 
‘What do I know of man’s destiny? I could tell you more about radishes. For them he 
had a fondness’ (p. 192)  
It is in a well-known aphorism from Minima Moralia that Adorno best 
articulates the relationship between freedom and happiness: 
Perhaps the true society will grow tired of development and, out of freedom, 
leave possibilities unused, instead of storming under a confused compulsion to 
the conquest of strange stars. A mankind which no longer knows want will 
begin to have an inkling of the delusory, futile nature of all the arrangements 
hitherto made in order to escape want, which used wealth to reproduce want 
on a larger scale. Enjoyment itself would be affected, just as its present 
framework is inseparable from operating, planning, having one’s way, 
subjugating. Rien faire comme une bête, lying on water and looking peacefully 
at the sky, “being, nothing else, without any further definition and fulfilment”, 
might take the place of process, act, satisfaction, and so truly keep the promise 
of dialectical logic that it would culminate in its origin. None of the abstract 
concepts comes closer to fulfilled utopia than that of eternal peace. 
(MM, pp. 156–7) 
Something of this⎯the freedom to be happy in a world where ‘[h]appiness is 
obsolete: uneconomic’ (MM, p. 217)⎯is captured in Enough, in which, as the 
narrator muses, it is as though ‘the earth had come to rest in spring’ (Enough, p. 191). 
In this text there is no such thing as progress: the couple spend their time walking ‘in 
a half sleep’ (p. 191) and refuse to ‘keep tally of the days’ (p. 191); they take pleasure 
in ascending the same mountain twice instead of ‘moving on’ (p. 190). There is, 
however, knowledge⎯but this is abstract knowledge that is neither quantifiable nor 
instrumental and that, remarkably enough, enters into a kind of accord with nature 
instead of dominating it: ‘We took flight in arithmetic. What mental calculations bent 
double hand in hand! Whole ternary numbers we raised in this way to the third power 
sometimes in downpours of rain’ (p. 188). This singular image combines intellectual 
‘flight’ with sensuous happiness and the natural world. Gibson notes that ‘[i]n its 
Beckettian manifestation, love is certainly quite mundane’,86 a point the narrator of 
Enough makes when s/he suggests that ‘our last decade […] veils those that went 
before and must have resembled it like blades of grass’ (p. 190)⎯despite insisting 
                                                
86 Ibid., p. 209. 
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that ‘[i]t is then I shall have lived then or never’ (p. 189). True experience, the 
narrator seems to explain, is not discernibly different from what Adorno would call 
the ‘wrong life’ (ND, p. 35): it is a frustrating paradox that ‘[i]n the right condition, 
[…] all things would differ only a little from the way they are; but not even the least 
can be conceived now as it would be then’ (ND, p. 299). For this reason, the ending of 
Enough, in which the narrator seeks to bracket out the memory of the ‘rain’ and the 
‘mounds’ (p. 192), leaving only ‘the two of us dragging through the flowers’ (p. 192), 
is a distinctly utopian one, closing with an image of sensuous unity: ‘Enough my old 
breasts feel his old hand’ (p. 192). The promise of happiness that Adorno identifies in 
ephemeral metaphysical experiences is here captured in that reiterated word: enough. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
  
This thesis has followed the twists and turns of the elusive concept of freedom as it is 
manifested, in minimal form, in Beckett’s work. Adorno’s insistence on the 
impossibility of a positive representation of freedom that is not ultimately self-
betraying has provided me with a lens through which to view Beckett’s radically 
negative images of freedom. Whether through minimal vestiges of freedom or 
determinate negations of a decidedly unfree reality, Beckett’s works refuse to offer 
the consolation of affirmation while tenaciously holding open the slightest of gaps 
between the world as it is and a possible other.  
 I have hitherto progressed roughly chronologically through Beckett’s corpus, 
though always with a greater concern for my perception of intuitive textual 
groupings.1 I would like to depart from this logic in my closing words to consider the 
narrative of modern freedom from an Adornian standpoint. This slight shift in 
perspective should, I hope, bring into final focus my synthesis of these two writers, 
which, of course, is strictly non-identical. Adorno’s understanding of freedom starts 
with the damaged nature of ‘subjective experience’ (MM, p. 18), even if it departs 
from the traditional attribution of freedom to the individual will. By positing itself as 
an autonomous being, the subject irrevocably splits itself from the world. Far from 
generating the freedom it promises, this inaugurates a new era of repression, as the 
subject’s domination of everything external to it (whether physically or through the 
subsumptive power of conceptual thought) involves self-repression: nothing natural 
can resist the sway of reason. The subject is, moreover, already caught up in a 
dialectic of history and nature, in which, as he dominates nature in the name of 
autonomy and reason, bringing it to a historical end, he is concomitantly subjugated 
himself by the force of history that takes on the weight of a natural phenomenon. 
Within this process, the more the subject dissociates himself from the world by 
                                                
1 My most conspicuous departure from chronology lies in my placement of The Lost Ones in Chapter 3 
with the earlier Endgame and How It Is rather than with the other closed texts in Chapter 5, a 
decision I justify in terms of the texts’ shared concerns. 
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refusing to place himself within it as a natural being, the less of a subject he becomes 
and the more he is shackled to a system of unfreedom.  
In distinctly Adornian terms, Stanley Cavell posits the question of whether our 
civilization is being replaced by another: 
In particular, is it being replaced by one in which nothing that happens any 
longer strikes us as the objectification of subjectivity as the act of an 
answerable agent, as the expression and satisfaction of human freedom, of 
human intention and desire? What has a beginning can have an end. If this 
future (civilization?) were effected its members would not be dissatisfied. 
They would have lost the concept of satisfaction. Then nothing would (any 
longer) give them the idea that living being, human things, could feel. So they 
would not (any longer) be human. They would not, for example, be frightened 
upon meeting others⎯except in the sense, or under circumstances, in which 
they would be frightened upon encountering bears or storms, circumstances 
under which bears would be frightened. And of course particular forms of 
laughter and amazement would also no longer be possible, ones which depend 
upon clear breaks between, say, machines and creatures.2 
This is a possibility clearly delineated in Beckett’s texts, particularly his late prose: 
the picture Cavell paints is all too familiar from The Lost Ones, All Strange Away and 
Imagination Dead Imagine. The power of Adorno’s thought here lies not in his horror 
at what we might become, for, as Martin Schuster acknowledges, ‘perhaps to be truly 
modern is to no longer be a subject’3⎯but his dual awareness that ‘the autonomous 
subject is both the product of rationalization (the process of civilization, the long 
history of the formation of the self up to its distortion by irrational reason) and a 
refuge from utter domination’.4 It is for this reason that he is able to make the 
unexpected claim that ‘[i]n the period of his decay, the individual’s experience of 
himself and what he encounters contributes once more to knowledge, which he had 
merely obscured as long as he continued unshaken to construe himself positively as 
the dominant category’ (MM, p. 17). Paradoxically, the period of the dissolution of 
the individual and its desperate assertion of freedom opens the opportunity for a 
community of truly free subjects. 
                                                
2 The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), p. 468. 
3 Autonomy After Auschwitz: Adorno, German Idealism, and Modernity (London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2014), p. 37. 
4 Duncan McColl Chesney, Silence Nowhen: Late Modernism, Minimalism, and Silence in the Work of 
Samuel Beckett (New York: Peter Lang, 2013), pp. 158–9. 
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Within this bleak context, then, Adorno allows for glimmers of hope. One 
such glimmer is what he describes as the ‘addendum’, which testifies to the presence 
of nature in the subject. By acknowledging this natural basis, the subject can forestall 
the process that leads to its disintegration and concomitant unfreedom. This would not 
entail the subject’s identity with the object, but a mediated non-identity that 
peacefully preserves their differences. In his late essay, ‘Subject and Object’, written 
shortly before his death, Adorno addresses the concrete consequences of this abstract 
question: 
In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relationship of subject and 
object would lie in the realization of peace among men as well as between 
men and their Other. Peace is the state of distinctness without domination, 
with the distinct participating in each other. 
(AR, p. 140) 
Beyond this, Adorno enlists thought, art and metaphysical experience as allies. 
Thought, which ‘points beyond itself’ (CI, p. 175) is defined by its ability to negate 
the world as it is. And as a realm of purposelessness in a society defined by exchange, 
art too offers a transitory escape from lived reality. Finally, metaphysical experience, 
which ultimately encompasses both thought and art, but also includes brief moments 
of absolute and inexplicable happiness, offers the hope that the context of immanence 
is not yet absolute and something beyond the given can still be imagined. 
In this thesis, I have attempted to elucidate Beckett’s minimal conception of 
freedom within this Adornian narrative. Beckett does not, of course, explicitly register 
this narrative, which he certainly would not have experienced in the same terms as 
Adorno, but I suggest that his works attest to a strikingly comparable consciousness 
of the predicament of freedom in modernity. To recapitulate some of the major claims 
of the thesis, in Chapter 1, I emphasised the perils of uninhibited subjectivity as 
demonstrated in Murphy and Eleutheria. Both texts, with their singularly explicit 
exploration of freedom, are ultimately concerned with the limits of freedom as 
conceived according to the predominant philosophical model of the autonomous 
subject. Simultaneously, I registered Beckett’s shift from the explicitly thematic 
presentation of freedom in these texts to a subterranean scrutiny of its complexities. In 
Chapter 4, I focused on Beckett’s experiments with the role of technology in his 
media plays, arguing that these texts offer an imaginative reconception of how 
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technology can mediate between the subject and the world. Fundamentally, this serves 
to interrupt the subject’s habitual domination of nature. In Chapter 3, I considered the 
bleak social worlds presented by Beckett in the 1950s and ‘60s and how they manifest 
the abstract tyranny of second nature. Beckett’s astute penetration of such nebulous 
social systems provides the foundation for their dispersal, while his re-writing of 
history from the perspective of its victims offers an alternative narrative to the 
dominant one of progress. In Chapter 2, I explored more broadly art’s relation to the 
world and its peculiar mode of resistance. Through Beckett’s post-war Novellas, I 
traced the winding route of romantic irony and its simultaneous seriousness and 
lightheartedness, demonstrating art’s tenuous yet significant critical detachment from 
the society to it nonetheless belongs. Finally, in Chapter 5, I probed the threat of 
absolute immanence already gestured to in Murphy’s final encounter with Mr Endon. 
In their paradoxical endeavour to imagine the death of imagination, Beckett’s late 
prose texts plunge us into the horror of absolute identity, which is ultimately deflected 
by the imaginative act itself. Only ephemeral metaphysical experiences, which are 
inevitably inscribed by failure, offer the means to transcend the given world. Without 
metaphysics in this specific sense, we are powerless to inaugurate any real freedom. 
In context, the Animator’s words in Rough for Radio II that ‘Tomorrow, who 
knows, we may be free’ (Rough for Radio II, p. 284) can only seem deluded. 
However, when considered in the light of Beckett’s corpus as a whole, there is an 
almost lambent quality to their stubborn hope. Beckett made his name with the 
‘fruitless waiting’ (MCP, p. 143) of Gogo and Didi in Waiting for Godot. Noting that 
‘Berg gave the highest rank to bars that express idle waiting as music alone can 
express it’, Adorno suggests elliptically that ‘[i]dle waiting does not guarantee what 
we expect; it reflects the condition measured by its denial. The less of life remains, 
the greater the temptation for our consciousness to take the sparse and abrupt living 
remnants for the phenomenal absolute’ (ND, p. 375). It is perhaps in this condition of 
‘idle waiting’ that Beckett’s works most profoundly denunciate these ‘sparse and 
abrupt living remnants’ and express the deeply negative hope that, as the Animator 
plaintively muses, freedom may be, at the very least, a future possibility. 
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